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FOREWORD 
With the ad vent of digital technologies, tangible Chains of Custody (CoCs) that refer 
to the chronological documentation of physical or electronic evidence now need to 
undergo a radical transformation from documents to electronic representation. This is 
especially true in cyber forensics , where all evidence is of a digital nature. That fact 
requires judges to understand the field of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT), in addition to their legal knowledge. 
This research proposes a novel framework to record, electronically, all information 
related to a cyber forensics investigation through the technology used by semantic 
web to create linked data. This technology is known as the web aspects. 
The novel framework can help the technicians to record and represent the tangible 
chains of custody related to their investigation process in arder to be provided to the 
judge in a court of law. It is assumed that the forensic information is prior improved, 
and the technicians who collected this information will use this framework to 
represent and transform the tangible documents into electronic data. Another level of 
improvements will be provided by this framework to annotate the forensic 
information using provenance vocabularies imported from the semantic web, and 
secure this represented information using Public-key Infrastructure (PKI). 
On the other hand, this framework can also be applied to other domains, not on1y in 
the cyber forensics field. The cyber forensics domain is considered, in this 
dissertation, as a case study to explain how these aspects can be used and highlight 
various advantages of using such aspects to represent forensic information. In the 
Vlll 
selected case study, such concepts are applied to represent the Chain of Custody 
documents generated from the forensic process. 
The proposed framework can be applied in various domains, where information needs 
to be represented and need full traceability combined with a totally secure remote 
access in order to facilitate its consumption and ensure its confidentiality (i.e., 
understandable, descriptive, interlinked, and discoverable). For example, it can be 
applied in the domain of medicine, where doctors can record and represent different 
information about their patients. It can also be used by governrnental agencies that 
address citizenship and immigration to record and manage information about citizens 
and immigrants, etc. 
The actual dissertation discusses this framework as a first step to implement a system 
for role players (technicians, prosecutors and defendants) andjudges to facilitate their 
legal procedures and help them to understand the digital evidence of cyber forensics 
presented to them in form of tangible documents. The framework contains a set of 
modules. Each module can be extended to accommodate different technologies 
provided recently by the field of Information and Technology (IT). 
The work presented in this research does not implement all technologies. Instead, it 
opens the door for researchers who want to extend and enhance each module to add 
more and better technologies. 
Each module of this framework touches on a certain discipline. For example, in the 
current dissertation, discussed is a module related to semantic vocabularies. It is 
based on sorne vocabularies imported from the semantic web; this does not mean that 
this module is limited to such vocabularies. More vocabularies from the semantic 
web can be imported to foster and extend the said module. Another module in the 
framework concems provenance metadata, where a lot of work is related to this 
lX 
sector of research. These works can also be used to extend and ameliorate the 
objectives of this module within the framework. 
In addition, the PKI module of the framework is a module responsible to authenticate 
and bend the publication of data from an open to a closed scale. Further research may 
propose other security options to be added to the digital certificates used in the PKI. 
Thus, what will be presented in this dissertation is a first version of this proposed 
framework. It opens the door to more extensions in a future work. 
Nevertheless, the current version of this framework can serve technicians to record 
and represent their forensic investigation, and can be used by prosecutors/defendants 
or their attorney, and judges in a court of law to consume and understand the forensic 
information related to all digital evidence provided to them. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Les acteurs d'un processus judiciaire accumulent et enregistrent les informations et 
preuves accumulées durant leurs enquêtes, afin de les présenter à un juge dans une 
cour de justice. Lorsque ces informations sont enregistrées et consignées, elles 
constituent des artéfacts tangibles appelés chaînes de traçabilité (CoC). Les données 
fournies dans ces documents jouent un rôle vital dans le processus d'enquête, parce 
qu'elles répondent à des questions sur la façon dont les preuves sont collectées, 
transportées, analysées et conservées, depuis leur saisie jusqu'à leur production 
devant un tribunal. Des métadonnées de provenance accompagnent aussi ces données 
contenues dans les CoCs, afin de répondre aux questions sur leur origine et 
d ' instaurer une confiance entre les différents acteurs du processus judiciaire, avec 
comme objectif ultime, le fait de rendre ces CoCs recevables devant une cour de 
justice. 
Aujourd'hui, avec l'avènement de l'ère numérique, les enquêtes sont non seulement 
appliquées aux crimes physiques, mais font aussi référence à des preuves qui sont de 
nature numérique et peuvent ne pas être compréhensibles par des juges. Il en découle 
la nécessité que ces CoCs, documents tangibles, subissent une transformation 
radicale, du format papier vers des données électroniques, afin de tenir compte de 
cette évolution et de produire donc, des CoCs électroniques (e-CoCs), lisibles, 
compréhensibles et exploitables aussi bien par les humains que par les machines. 
Le Web sémantique offre un cadre pertinent pour représenter et manipuler les CoCs, 
car il utilise des principes de Web connu sous le nom de Web des données (Principes 
des données liées, LDP), qui fournissent des informations utiles en RDF (Resource 
Description Framework, un modèle de graphe destiné à décrire de façon formelle les 
ressources du Web et leurs métadonnées), à travers des identifiants uniformes de 
ressources (URI). En outre, il comprend différents vocabulaires de provenance qui 
peuvent être utiles pour exprimer et promouvoir les métadonnées judiciaires. Ces 
principes sont utilisés pour publier les données publiquement sur le Web et donc 
proposer des données liées ouvertes, connues sous l'appellation de Linked Open Data 
(LOD). Cependant, l'aspect public des données d'enquêtes et de leurs métadonnées 
ne serait pas souhaité. Elles doivent obéir à certaines restrictions d'accès pour être 
partagées uniquement entre acteurs autorisés. Ces LDP peuvent être configurés pour 
publier des données sur une petite échelle, en utilisant l'approche de l'infrastructure à 
clé publique (PKI). Ainsi, la CoC représentée sera publiée sur une échelle restreinte 
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et ne pourra être consommée que par les acteurs concernés, à travers différents 
patrons de consommation de données. 
Cette thèse fournit un cadre complet expliquant comment les CoCs et les données de 
provenances sont représentées et publiées en utilisant LDP, et comment 
l' infrastructure PKI peut être utilisée pour restreindre l'accès à ces 
données/ressources, afin d'être partagé à une échelle restreinte. L'évaluation de ce 
cadre se fera à travers une expérimentation empirique appliquée sur un modèle 
judiciaire complet. 
MOTS-CLÉS : chaînes de traçabilité, cybercriminalité, données liées ouvertes, 
principes des données liées, patrons de consommation de données, infrastructure à clé 
publique. 
ABSTRACT 
Role players of any forensic investigation process record chronologically all forensic 
data resulted from their investigation in order to be presented to the judge in a court 
oflaw. When these results are recorded and posted, they are called Chains ofCustody 
(CoCs). The forensic data provided within these documents play a vital role in the 
process of forensic investigation, because they answer questions about how evidence 
is collected, transported, analyzed, and preserved since its seizure until its production 
in court. Provenance metadata also accompany these forensic data to answer 
questions about their origin and foster trustworthiness among role players and judges 
in order to make the tangible CoCs admissible in a court of law. 
Nowadays, with the ad vent and evolution of the digital age, the forensic investigation 
is not only applied to physical crimes, but also to digital evidence and may not be 
understandable by judges in the courts of law. This fact increases the need that these 
tangible documents undergo a radical transformation from paper to electronic data in 
order to accommodate this evolution and pro vide electronic-CoC ( e-CoC) readable, 
understandable, and consumable by humans and machines. 
The semantic web is a fertile land to represent and manage tangible CoCs, because it 
uses web principles known as Linked Data Principles (LDP), which provide useful 
information in Resource Description Framework (RDF) format upon Unified 
Resource Identifiers (URI) resolution. In addition, it includes different provenance 
vocabularies that can be useful to express and foster the forensic metadata. Generally, 
the power of LDP resides in publishing data publicly without any access restriction 
on the web. However, the openness of cyber forensics data and their metadata would 
not be convenient. Cyber forensics data should ohey sorne access restriction in order 
to be shared only among role players and judges. Public-key Infrastructure (PKI) can 
be applied to restrict the access to sorne or all resources of the represented data and 
bends the LDP from open to closed consumption, while maintaining the resolution of 
such restricted resources. The judge will in turn consume the restricted represented 
data using different LDP consumption patterns. A role player can also be the 
consumer of such represented resources published by other role players. 
This thesis provides a complete framework explaining how forensic and provenance 
data are represented and pub li shed using LDP, and how PKI can be used to restrict 
the access to these data/resources in order to be shared on a closed scale. The 
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evaluation of the framework will be done through an empirical experimentation 
applied in a complete forensic model. 
KEYWORDS: Chains of Custody, Cyber Forensics, Linked Open Data, Linked Data 
Principles, Consumption Patterns, Public-key Infrastructure. 
INTRODUCTION 
The his tory of forensic investigation tasks dates back thousands of years. These tasks 
deal with gathering and examining evidence about the past in order to prosecute 
criminals in the future. With the advent of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), forensic investigation is not only concentrated on physical crimes, 
but also on digital evidence. A new type of forensic investigation, known as 
computer/cyber digital forensics, has emerged. 
One of the most essential parts of the digital forensic process is the Chain of Custody 
(CoC). CoC is a chronological document accompanying all digital evidence, in order 
to avoid later allegations of tampering with such evidence. CoC provides useful 
information about the digital evidence produced during a forensic process by 
answering the five "Ws" and one "H" questions. The five "Ws" ask "When," "Who," 
"Where," "Why," and, "What," while the "H" asks "How." 
Today, cyber forensics is a daily growing field that requires accommodation for the 
continuous changes in digital technologies. The tangible CoC information also needs 
to undergo a radical transformation from paper to electronic data (e-CoC), which is 
readable and consumable by computers. 
The semantic web is a fertile land to represent this information because it is rich with 
different vocabularies and provenance metadata that can be useful to represent and 
manage such forensic information. 
Nowadays, the semantic web is the web of data. However, ·it is not just concentrated 
on the interrelation between web documents, but also between raw data within these 
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documents. This data interrelation is based on four aspects provided by Tim Berner-
Lee in 2006 known as the Linked Data Principles (LDP). These aspects allow the 
data being represented to be published in a structured way that can facilitate their 
consumption. 
This dissertation provides a novel framework that uses the LDP to represent the 
tangible CoC in order to be consumed in a court of law. The framework provided in 
this dissertation is elaborated through a set of modules. Generally, it presents how the 
semantic web and its technologies presented in vocabularies and metadata are a fertile 
land to represent the tangible CoCs from their publication by the role players 
throughout the cyber forensics investigation, until ·their consumption by judges in a 
court of law. 
In addition, the framework provided in this dissertation uses a Public-key 
Infrastructure (PKI) to ensure the identity and the authentication of each technician 
participating in the investigation process, and to protect and foster the published 
information related to the case in question from unauthorized access. This idea argues 
that not all information published on the web of data should be on an open scale. 
However, LDP need to be bent and adapted for publishing data with access 
restrictions in order to be shared on a closed scale. This is known as the Linked 
Closed Data (LCD). 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the research problems. 
Chapter 2 presents the state of the art. Chapter 3 concems the research methodology. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 discuss the proposed framework. Chapter 7 applies the system to 
a complete forensic process. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the thesis and presents 
future prospects for this work. 
The main benefits of this thesis comprise of transforming the tangible CoC into 
electronic CoC to: 
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• Accommodate with the new technology ofknowledge representation; 
• Poster trustworthiness among role players and judges by adding provenance 
metadata imported from the semantic web; 
• Help judges understand and consume the electronic CoC using different 
consumption patterns; and 
• Secure the represented resources in order to be used on a closed scale using 
the PKI. 
Ali ideas behind this thesis are published and discussed in different international 
conferences. Thus, the following paper introduced the idea of using the semantic web 
to produce an electronic chain of custody: 
Gayed, T. F. , Lounis, H. et Bari, M (2012a). Computer forensics: toward the 
construction of electronic chain of custody on the semantic web. International 
conference on software engineering and knowledge engineering, 406-411. 
In the same year, 2012, we published the complementary work of the above paper. In 
this work we introduced the benefit ofusing the semantic web is to improve the CoC: 
Gayed, T. F., Lounis, H. et Bari, M (2012b) . Cyber forensics: representing and 
(im) proving the chain of custody using the semantic web. International 
conference on advanced cognitive technologies and applications, 19-23. 
In the following 2013 paper, we mention explicitly ali advantages and rewards of 
using the LDP and the semantic web vocabularies to accommodate the tangible 
documents within the current era of technology: 
Gayed, T. F., Lounis, H. et Bari, M. (2013b). Cyber forensics: representing and 
managing tangible chain of custody using the linked data princip/es. International 
conference on advanced cognitive technologies and application, 87-96. 
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On the other hand, in another paper, we discuss the steps to represent forensic 
resources applied to the preservation task of the Kruse madel: 
Gayed, T F., Lounis, H et Bari, M (2013a) . Representing chains of custody 
along a forensic process: a case study on Kruse mode!. International conference 
on software engineering and knowledge engineering, 674-680. 
The year after, in 2014, two papers were published. The first one explains how to 
create custom tenns using the Resource Description Framework Schema (RDFS). 
This is illustrated by using the acquisition phase imported from the Kruse madel as a 
case study: 
Gayed, T F., Lounis, H et Bari, M (2014b). Creating proprietary terms using 
lightweight ontology: a case study on acquisition phase in a cyber forensics 
process. International conference on software engineering and knowledge 
engineering, 7 6-81. 
The second paper is about how the PKI is exploited to publish data using LDP on a . 
closed scale: 
Gayed, TF., Lounis, H et Bari, M (2014a). Linked closed data using PK!: a case 
study on publishing and consuming data in a forensic process. International 
. conference on advanced cognitive technologies and applications, 77-86. 
In 2015, a journal publication combined all ideas together has been released. It 
illustrates a complete scenario of using the LDP to publish and consume forensic 
resources, on a closed scale, using the PKI approach: 
Gayed, T F., Lounis, H. et Bari, M (2015) . Representing and Publishing Cyber 
Forensic Data and its Provenance Metadata: From Open to Closed Consumption. 
International Journal on Advances in Intelligent Systems, 7(3&4), 662-688. 
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Finally, while recent, our work is already referenced by sorne authors in the field 
narnely, in joumals such as "Elsevier Digital Investigation" and "International 
Journal of Computer Applications." 

CHAPTERI 
RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
1.1 Introduction 
The field of Computer/Digital forensics is growing on a daily basis. It combines 
computer science concepts with evidentiary rules and legal standards to prosecute 
criminals of digital evidence in a court of law (Casey, 2014). At the most basic level, 
the digital forensic process has three major phases: acquisition, authentication, and 
analysis (Kruse II et Heiser, 2001 ; Kahn et al., 2008). Simply said, the acquisition is a 
phase where evidence is collected and extracted from the suspected digital deviees 
(e.g., laptop, mobile phones, etc.). Authentication is the phase that ensures that the 
collected evidence is not altered and keeps its integrity. The analysis phase takes the 
acquired images to analyze and identify them into pieces of evidence in order to draw 
conclusions. 
In an adversarial system there usually exist two advocates representing their parties' 
positions before a jury or judge. The parties are the state and the accused. The 
evidence related to a crime is usually collected by the police or by a party whose 
services were retained by the police and handed over to the prosecution. The 
prosecutor will decide which pieces of evidence to present at trial while the accused 
will try to contest the validity/eligibility of a given piece of evidence. 
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The information collected by an authorized party is recorded chronologically in 
tangible documents. These documents will be called tangible Chains of Custody 
(CoCs), because they keep track and provide useful information related to the 
collected evidences by answering the five "Ws" and one "H" questions. 
A CoC is one of the most essential parts of any forensic investigation process 
(Ballou, 201 0). It accompanies all digital evidences in order to a void later allegations 
of tampering. Thus, the Chain of Custody is essential in this context. 
The following points summarize the process since the collection of evidence until the 
judge' engagement: 
1. Technicians whose services were retained by the authorities of the police 
investigation ( e.g., first responders, expert witnesses, police officers, bail iffs 
and investigators) will proceed with the collection of evidence; 
2. The collected evidence will be forwarded to the prosecutor who will choose 
which elements to present at trial; 
3. The evidence will be th en disclosed to the accused or his attorney; 
4. If the accused disputes the addressed evidence, a session will held to verify 
the admissibility of the collected evidence; 
5. In this session, the judge will hear the testimony of technicians to determine 
if there were flaws in the chain of custody imposing rejection of evidence. 
From the above process, we have four actors: technician, prosecutor, 
defender/accused and judge. ln this dissertation, the first three actors will be called 
role players, and the fourth actor will be the judge. 
Figure 1.1 depicts the conceptual diagram of a tangible CoC. The forensic process 
defines the role of technicians. The forensic process presented in this figure contains 
three phases exist in any forensic investigation: acquisition, authentication, and 
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analysis. Three types oftechnicians are needed to work on these forensic phases: first 
responder, authenticator and analyzer. 
The main role oftechnicians is to collect evidence. Each technician may participate to 
one or more forensic phase(s). The sirnplest case, each technician is assigned to one 
forensic phase. In each phase, a technician can accomplish one or more forensic 
task(s) and each task in a forensic phase can be accomplished by one or more 
technicians. Each technician is responsible for creating his own chain of custody for 
each task assigned to hirn. Creating a chain of custody means that a technician 
records chronologically all collected evidence in tangible documents. 
Figure 1.1 Conceptual diagram of CoC 
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This dissertation depicts how the tangible documents of the chain of custody will be 
transformed into electronic information consumable by human and machines. Chapter 
7 presents a complete case using the Kruse model, which contains three forensic 
phases. Each phase is assigned to a technician. Technicians will use a system called 
CF-CoC, as proposed in this dissertation, to publish such information and annotate 
them using different provenance metadata. Role players (technicians, prosecutor, and 
defendants or their attorney) and judge will be able to consume the 
published/electronic information. In addition; the system applies a secure approach to 
restrict the access and consumption to the published resources using digital 
certificates. 
Because the field of cyber forensics is growing on a daily basis and requires the 
accommodation for the continuous changes in digital technologies, the tangible CoC 
information also needs to undergo a radical transformation from paper to electronic 
data (e-CoC), which is readable and consumable by computers. This transformation is 
achieved by representing the information in a form that is understandable and that can 
be processed by computers. 
The semantic web will be a flexible solution to achieve this goal, because it is based 
on an infrastructure that provides a means for publishing vocabularies that can be 
read by humans and processed by machines. This infrastructure is called "Resource 
Description Framework" (RDF) (Beckett et McBride, 2004). It allows the encoding, 
exchange, and reuse of structured metadata. It also contains several semantic markup 
languages developed under the auspices of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
such as RDF Scheme (RDFS) (Word Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 2014) and Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) (McGuinness et Van Harmelen, 2004), which are based 
on XML (Bray et al., 2008). RDF data models are semantically encoded using RDFS 
and OWL (Berry et al. , 2003). 
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Today, the semantic web is the web of data, which is not just concentrated on the 
interrelation between web documents, but also between the raw data within these 
documents. This data interrelation is based on standardized web technologies: 
(Bemers-Lee et al. , 2001 ; Campbell et MacNeill, 2010) the HTTP (Fielding, 2014), 
URI (Bemers-Lee et al., 2014), and RDF (Beckett et McBride, 2004). It is designed 
to represent information in a machine-readable format by introducing different 
representation languages based on XML (Bray et al., 2008) or JSON 1 (JavaScript 
Object Notation), more recently. The latter is a lightweight data-interchange formats 
easily to understand by humans and machines. These technologies allow publishing 
structured data, so that it can be interlinked and navigable between each other. 
In addition, the author will consider the semantic web as a fertile land for 
representing and describing the tangible CoCs since it is rich with different 
provenance vocabularies that are useful to describe the forensic information. These 
vocabularies can provide answers to the five Ws and one H questions related to the 
origin of this data. Sorne examples of widely deployed provenance vocabularies are 
the Dublin Core (DC) (Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, 2015), Friend of a Friend 
(FOAF) (Brickley et Miller, 2014), and Ontology Metadata Vocabulary (OMV) 
(Hartmann et al., 2005), which contain different predicates that can elaborate the 
published data with extra information and metadata. 
Thus, representing forensic information using the technologies of the semantic web 
will be useful for each technician in the forensic process. It will allow technicians to 
record and publish their forensic investigation results in a structured and unifi.ed 
format. Furthermore, publishing data in such a format can facilitate the consumption 
of these data by the prosecution, defense and the judge in a court of law. This point 
will be discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
1 http://www.json.org/ 
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However, the accommodation with the digital era, and the digital nature of evidence 
in cyber forensics are not the only reasons to represent tangible CoCs into electronic 
data. There exist other problems related to the tangible CoCs that need to be resolved. 
As well, the next sub-sections discuss all the research problems that are considered to 
have incentivized this research. 
Before discussing the research problems, this section will depict an abstract scenario 
explaining the environrnent of our framework since the seizing of digital evidence 
until they arrive to the judge in a court of law. This model gives a brief and an 
abstract introduction on how digital evidence is collected, who is responsible for the 
forensic investigation process, how the CoCs are assigned to the forensic phases, and 
what our framework aims to do in order to transmit such forensic information to the 
judge in a court oflaw. Figure 1.2 illustrates this scenario. 
Prosecutor 1 
Accused 1 Defender 
'/ 
Tangible CoCs 
1 1 Judge 
• 
Acquisition 
KruseModel 
Forensic Process 
Authentication 
Technic ians 
Figure 1.2 Abstract scenario of cyber investigation (Gayed et al., 2014a) 
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When a user performs an action using any digital deviee, such as computer, laptop, 
digital camera, smart phone, etc. , if this action is committed in violation of a law, it is 
an illegal act and can be considered an infraction or even a crime, and its evidence is 
of digital nature. The performer of this act is then called the perpetrator of the crime. 
Sorne acts are country dependent. This means that the committed acts can be 
considered crimes in sorne countries and not in others. 
Any discovered crime should ohey a scientific investigation using certain forensic 
processes (Kohn et al. , 2008). This investigation aims at gathering and examining 
information about the past in order to be used in the future in the court of law. Each 
phase in a forensic process is assigned to a person that is qualified to play a certain 
role in the forensic investigation, such as first responders, expert witnesses, police 
officers, bailiffs and investigators. ( e.g., the first responder is a person who is 
qualified first-hand to seize, preserve and collect all the necessary information on the 
crime scene). The role players may be technician, the prosecution or the defense. One 
or more technicians may be assigned to a forensic phase. Technicians are the orres 
who are responsible to record and save all investigation results that are achieved 
during their forensic phase. Once they finish their tasks, they provide the collected 
information to the prosecutor to choose which elements to put into evidence as part of 
his prosecution. 
For simplicity, Figure 1.2 considers that each forensic phase is assigned to a 
technician that creates his own CoC, describing all forensic information he collected 
and all results he deduced using different forensic tools. 
The classical way used by technicians is to record their information in tangible 
documents, seal them in an envelope, and provide them to the prosecutor. The latter 
selects and prepares the evidence that he wants to use to prosecute the accused. The 
selected evidence will then be disclosed to the accused or his attorney. The recording 
task is usually performed manually and does not include any computers, except for 
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sorne classic tasks ( e.g., word processing, printing and filling in documents, using 
emails, etc.). 
The novel proposed system will reside somewhere on a web cloud and will be owned 
for instance, by a neutral si de, which is not on conflict of interest with the prosecutor 
and defender, to facilitate the cyber investigation and justice process. The proposed 
framework will use web technologies to aid (i) the technicians to securely record (i.e., 
publish/represent) electronically the information related to their CoCs, (ii) 
prosecutor/defender to consume this information and append his prosecution 
elements and communicate with the defender/accused and finally, (iii) in case of 
dispute the judge to consume the represented information. 
Once the technicians transform the tangible CoCs from paper to electronic form, the 
transformed (i.e., represented) information should ohey sorne access restrictions, 
especially since the information being published will be shared in a public manner, 
which is due to the nature of the used aspects (i.e., LDP) of the web. Thus, the 
framework should provide a secure way to let the technicians publish their 
information, and after they finish their task, they should be able to share the published 
information with the prosecutors. 
1.2 CoC challenges 
As mentioned, CoCs documents record all information related to digital/physical 
evidence. They are also known as testimony documents, since they ensure and 
guarantee that all evidence related to the crime case in hand are not altered 
throughout the forensic investigation. Failure to record enough information related to 
the evidence may lead to its exclusion from legal proceedings. Furthermore, if the 
CoCs are not well-maintained and the suspect is guilty, the defense can argue that the 
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CoCs were not properly established and cast doubt on the acquired evidence (Casey, 
2014). In such a case the judge will need to hear the testimony of the technicians to 
determine if there were flaws in the chains of custody imposing their rejection. 
1.2.1 Accommodation with digital technologies 
Today, technicians are still providing the forensic information describing their 
investigation process with the information that resulted from various forensic tools in 
the form of tangible documents. Most of the evidence manipulated in the digital 
forensics field is of digital nature. Even if the digital evidence and their investigation 
results are provided on digital deviees and have a digital format, their testimony 
descriptions are provided within tangible documents . This is due to the fact that the 
audiences of these documents, in all countries, are prosecutors, defenders and judges 
who are mainly competent in the legal field. Thus, these documents should take an 
appropriate form that accommodates the audience receiving them. 
Since the 1990s, the US DOJ (Department of Justice) National Institute has been 
trying to encourage and support all research that can prevent crimes and can improve 
criminal policy justice and practice (Sherman et al., 1997; Losavio et al. , 2006). 
AU information describing the investigation process such as those that are recorded 
by technicians and those that ·resulted from forensic tools need to be unified and 
stored together to facilitate their interoperability and consumption. 
In addition, all forensic information resulting from a forensic phase and published by 
a technician should be interlinked with other forensic information resulted from 
another forensic phase and published by another technician. This is because the 
forensic information is a co-operative task, where all technicians should participate 
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together in order to draw dependent conclusions. The investigation of a technician 
player may depend on the results and conclusion drawn by another technician. 
1.2.2 Fostering trustworthiness among role players and judges 
The problem is not only to represent the information included in tangible CoCs to 
solve the issues mentioned above. It is also to express information about where the 
CoC information came from. Judges can find the answers to their questions in the 
CoC, but they need to also know the provenance and origins of those answers. 
Provenance of information is crucial to guarantee and ensure the trustworthiness and 
confidence of the shared information among role players (technicians, prosecutors 
and defenders) and judges. Trustworthiness starts by identifying actors in order to 
build a secure channel to share information. However, when the objective is mainly 
focused on the information itself, the latter should be illustrated through various 
provenance information. 
Hence, this dissertation will distinguish between forensic information and provenance 
information (Gayed et al., 2012a). Forensic information should be responsible to 
answer the five Ws and one H questions related to the case in hand, while provenance 
information should be responsible to answer questions about the origin of these 
answers (i .e., what information sources were used, when were they updated, how 
reliable the source was) . This will be accomplished through the use of different 
provenance metadata of the semantic web. Providing answers to such questions 
fosters the trustworthiness among publishers (i.e. , role players) and consumers (i.e. , 
judges and role players) and makes the e-CoC admissible in a court oflaw. 
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1.2.3 Judges' awareness of digital evidence 
In the literature, sever al works have been provided to identify the judges' 
understanding of ICTs underlying digital evidence (Losavio et al., 2006; Insa, 2007; 
Rogers et al. , 2007). These works aim to design specialized training and education 
programs to ameliorate their ICT knowledge and make them better able to evaluate 
scientific and technical evidence presented in a court of law. 
There exists different terms related to physical evidence, which are well-known by 
anyone. For example, the word "gun," is a common word that does not need to be 
interpreted and explained to understand. However, this is not the case in cyber 
forensics. In cyber forensics, terms are mostly related to information technology and 
such terms need to be interpreted and expanded to get and understand their meaning 
(see Figure 1.3). 
What? How? Why? 
Hash ~ Unique Numeric Value H 
Generated by a H To identify Code or Stream of Characters Hash Function . certain object 
Figure 1.3 Expansion of a cyber forensics term 
For example, as shown in Figure 1.3, a tenn called "Hash Code" is expanded to 
provide what is meant by a hash code, how it is generated, and why it is used. Along 
this path we may have another expansion path. For example, the How rectangle can 
be nested with more information to explain what a hash function is, and so on. This is 
called "linked information" or "descriptive information", where each piece of 
information can be dereferenceable to provide more information. 
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Judges are more specialized in, as well as better understand the legal domain and 
procedures than the field of ICT. Most judges do not have the required knowledge 
conceming information technologies, or the knowledge that they currently have is not 
enough to evaluate and take the proper decision for the case in question. One solution 
that has been proposed in the literature is to organize a training program to teach 
judges about the field ofiCT (Kessler, 2010). 
The dissertation argues against this solution's direction, because it will not be an easy 
task to teach judges the different concepts of ICT. Instead, it discusses the solution of 
providing a descriptive e-CoC, where technicians can publish the results of their 
investigation. The prosecutor, defender and judge (in case of dispute or contest from 
the defender) can consume such results in a descriptive and understandable way and 
thus take the proper decision regarding the case in question. 
While consuming the represented information, a judge should have the ability to 
consume forensic information in a descriptive way. It is important that judges can 
find and discover more information about different resources, especially those that 
are unknown to them. LDP use the URI to identify different resources (i.e. , subjects 
or things). These resources should have dereferenceable nature. This means that each 
resource can be expanded to other resources in arder to get more information and 
navigate among other related resources. Representing the data using such a structure 
is an example of a new area of research called Linked Education (LE). 
1.2.4 Security of tangible CoCs information 
Usually, the CaC documents must be affixed securely when they are transported from 
one place to another. This is achieved in a very classical way: seal them in plastic 
bags together with physical evidence if there is any, such as a hard disk, USB, cab les, 
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etc.), label them, and sign them into a locked evidence room with the digital evidence 
and deviees themselves to ensure their integrity. The e-CoCs also need to be secured, 
from their publication by the technicians until their consumption by judges. LDP are 
used to publicly publish the data on the web and need to be adapted and bended with 
access restrictions. 
1.3 Research hypotheses 
This dissertation will verify a set of hypotheses. Each hypothesis is related to a 
research problem. The following hypotheses are mentioned in this section in the same 
order as research problems. 
Hypothesis 1: 
The semantic web can be a fertile land to create interlinked e-CoCs, which are 
readable and consumable by people and machines, and the forensic information 
resulting from a forensic tool can be interoperable with these interlinked Co Cs. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Provenance metadata expressed in the formats used by the semantic web can be 
useful to answer the questions about the origin of the CoC data, and then foster 
trustworthiness among role players and judges. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Representing the CoC resources using the linked data principles can provide a 
descriptive e-CoC and then improve the subject matter and the understanding of the 
digital evidence. 
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Hypothesis 4: 
PKI can be applied to the Linked Data (LD) to securely publish and consume the 
data among role players and judges, as weil as transform the open data to closed 
data. 
This dissertation will discuss a novel framework that solves the research problems 
mentioned in Section 1.2 and verifies the correctness of the proposed hypotheses by 
applying this proposed framework to a complete forensic process. The framework is 
named Cyber Forensics-Chain ofCustody (CF-CoC). Before moving on to Chapter 2, 
the next section depicts how this thesis is organized with respect to the research 
problems and hypotheses. 
1.4 Thesis organization 
This section summarizes the organization of this thesis. Most of this organization 
depends on research problems and hypotheses order. 
Table 1.1 Thesis organization 
Chapters 
CoC Challenges 
Hypotheses Proposed Solutions (Research problems) 
State of the art corresponding to challenges, hypotheses, and 
Chapter 2 
solutions. 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
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Accommodation with Hypothesis Representing CoC using 
digital technologies #1 LDP 
Chapter 4 F ostering the 
Hypothesis Adding provenance 
trustworthiness arnong role 
#2 metadata to the e-CoC 
players and judge 
Judges awareness about the Hypothesis 
Consumption patterns Chapter 5 
digital evidence #3 
Security of CoCs Hypothesis 
Adapting PKI to LOD Chapter 6 
information #4 
Chapter 7 Applying the CF-CoC system to a complete forensic model 
Chapter 8 Conclusions and future work 
The above table contains four colurnns: the first is the chapter number (i.e., excluding 
the current chapter), the second column indicates the challenges that encounter the 
tangible CoCs (i .e. , excluding Chapter 2, which explains the state of the art of this 
research, and Chapter 3, which illustrates the research methodology). The third 
colurnn is about the hypotheses of this research, of which there are four. Chapter 4 
provides the solution related to the first two hypotheses. Chapter 5 is dedicated for 
the third hypothesis, and finally, Chapter 6 depicts the PKI to answer the last 
hypothesis. 

CHAPTERII 
STATE OF THE ART 
2.1 Introduction 
Technology and law are two different fields, but with the rapid evolution of 
technology occurring today, both fields are increasingly becoming related to one 
another and intersecting (i.e. , marriage of law and technology) . The convergence may 
occur from two scopes, whether the law converges with technology or technology 
converges with law. 
First scope, if law converges toward technology, then we are going to exploit the law 
and its power to provide legal and secure electronic services for people who use the 
technology in their daily lives. This is known as "IT Law", and consists of law and 
legal aspects to govem the information technology. The "IT law" is not the same of 
"IT aspects of law üself'. The latter are used to deliver legal services to people 
through the IT field. 
Second scope, if technology converges to the law, then we are going to discuss what 
the technology can do to facilitate and enhance the legal procedures over alllevels of 
ajudicial system. This is known today as the field ofelectronicjustice (e-justice). 
Many works have been provided in literature on both scopes. For example, in the first 
scope, a work presented in (Yoo, 2005) discussed how the US Supreme Court cleared 
the way to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to resolve how to fit the 
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leading broadband technologies, such as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) services and 
cable modems. Another example is provided in the field of e-commerce, where all e-
transactions should be protected and controlled by legal procedures and law2 . 
On the other hand, in the second scope, the work presented in (Cabral et al., 2012), 
discussed the use of technology to enhance access to justice. In this work, the authors 
discussed the enhancement of delivering of legal services to all private and public 
sectors of the United States. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), which is 
responsible for these services, intended to increase the quantity and quality of 
services through technology, by developing web-based business processes using 
smart phones. 
Another example of using technology to serve the law is the use of statistical data-
mining techniques to detect credit card fraud (Chan et al. , 1999) and using anomaly 
detection methods to identify potential terrorist activities (Seifert, 2004). 
Researches related to both scopes are numerous and are not limited to those 
examples. Other examples can be found in the journal of technology and law3 to 
name but one source. 
This thesis lies under the second scope, where the technology of the semantic web 
will be exploited to, (i) aid role players to maintain and represent the CoC, and, (ii) 
help judges understand digital evidence. 
The state of the art related to the proposed framework goes over different disciplines, 
such as semantic web, Cyber Forensics (CF), provenance of information, and 
security. Therefore, the state of the art in this chapter will have different facets . Each 
facet discusses the related works of each discipline apart. 
2 http://www.hg.org/ecornmerce-law.html 
3 http://jolt.law.harvard.edu 
L_ ______________________________________________________ . __ _ 
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The main classification of the state of the art, as shown in Figure 2.1 , is organized 
according to the research problems that were proposed in the first chapter. 
State of the Art 
Accommodation with Fostering Trustworthiness JudgesAwareness 
of Digital Evidences 
Secu rity of Co Cs 
Information digital technologies Between Role Players & 
\ Judges 
l 1 '---1 -1 j 
Semantic Web & 
Web of Data 
Linked Open 
Data 
Cyber Forensics & 
Digital Evidences 
OWL Reasoning 
RDFS Defining Proprietary 
Terms 
Provenance of Pattern Public Key 
Information Consumption Infrastructure 
Provenance Open Named 
Vocabularies Provenance Graph 
Mo del 
Forensic lmproving Knowledge Forensic Browse Crawl Query & Linked 
Pro cesses Co Cs Representation of Formats Reasoning Education 
Figure 2.1 
CF& CoCs 
1 1 
PKI & Digital Purposes 
Certificates 
1 1 
Protocols Types & 
Exchanges 
Disciplines hierarchy of the state of the art 
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This dissertation discusses four problems. Each problem is related to one or more 
discipline(s). For example the "Accommodation with digital technologies" is a 
problem related to two different disciplines: "The semantic web and web of data" and 
"The CF and digital evidence". Each discipline contains a set of related works. 
Another example is the problem of "Fostering the Trustworthiness among Role 
players and Judges". It is related to the discipline of "Provenance of information", 
which can be used to foster the admissibility of chains of custody in a court of law. 
Under this latter discipline, different models are expanded to depict the recent 
published works related to such discipline. 
The discipline(s) related to each problem is/are mentioned according to their utility in 
this dissertation. This means that we may have another related discipline(s) in 
literature that is/are related to each problem, but they are not mentioned. Most of the 
mentioned disciplines are selected according to their usage in the proposed 
framework. 
2.2 Accommodation with digital technologies 
The accommodation of tangible CoCs with digital technologies is based on two 
questions: How the CoC can be represented to accommodate the digital technologies 
and what are the current works published in literature to represent and improve the 
forensic information? Regarding the "How", the web of data vision is discussed to 
depict how it can be used to represent such information (Section 2.2.1). Regarding the 
"What", the CF and digital evidence discipline is provided to explain different 
forensic processes and all efforts that have been performed to represent and improve 
such information (Section 2.2.2). 
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2.2.1 Semantic web and web of data 
Semantic web is an extension of the current web (i.e., from document to data) 
(Bemers-Lee et al. , 2001 ; Bizer et al. , 2009), designed to represent information in a 
machine-readable format by introducing a standard model called RDF. RDF is 
originally designed as a metadata model to model and interchange information on the 
web (Beckett et McBride, 2004). 
The classical way for publishing documents on the web is just by presenting them in 
HTML (Hyper Text Markup Language)4 format, naming these documents using URI, 
and linking them through hypertext links called hyper text anchors of HTML. These 
facts allow the consumer to navigate over the information on the web by using a web 
browser application and crawling over the information by typing keywords in a 
search engine that is using the support of HTTP. This is called "the web of 
documents" (see Figure 2.2). 
As shown in Figure 2.2, the current web contains different sets of HTML documents, 
connected to each other through hyper-links. They are consumed using web browsers 
and search engines. 
VVeb 
Brovvsers 
~ 
~--~ hyper-
1 links 1 
0 0 
Search 
Engi·nes 
Figure 2.2 Web of documents 
4 http://www.w3.org/htmV 
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With the same analogy, entities and contents (i.e., data) within documents can be 
linked using typed links and with the same principles used by the web (i .e. , web 
aspects) . This is called "the web of data" (see Figure 2.3). 
Nowadays, the main aim of the semantic web is to publish data on the web in a 
standard structure, and in manageable format (Campbell et MacNeill, 2010). Tim 
Bemers-Lee outlined the principles of publishing data on the web. These principles, 
known as Linked Data Principles (i.e. , LD principles) (Bemers-Lee, 2006; Bizer et 
al. , 2009; Omitola et al. , 2011), are the following: 
• Use URI as names for things (Bemers-Lee et al., 2004). 
• Use HTTP-URis so that people can look up those names (Fielding, 2014). 
• When someone looks up a URI, useful information can be provided using the 
standards (RDF, SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language) 
(Prud'Hommeaux et Seabome, 2008), where RDF is a universal data format, 
and SP ARQL is a standard query language for RDF). 
• Include RDF stateme'nts that link to other URis so that they can discover 
related things. 
Figure 2.3 Web of data 
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According to the W3C recornmendation, RDF is a foundation for the encoding, 
exchanging, and reusing of structured metadata (Beckett et McBride, 2004). It can be 
serialized using different languages (e.g., RDF/XML (Beckett et Bemers-Lee, 2011), 
Turtle (Beckett et Bemers-Lee, 2012), RDFa (Adida et al. , 2004; W3C, 2015), N-
Triples (Beckett, 2014), N3 (Bemers-Lee et Connolly, 2011)). RDF consists ofthree 
slots. The three slots form a triple: subject-predicate-object or resource-property-
value. Next paragraphs illustrate briefly these slots. 
In RDF, predicate is the second part of an RDF statement. Unlike object, a predicate 
and subject must always be a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). The predicate 
establishes the relationship between a subject and object and makes the object value a 
characteristic of the subject (i.e., indicates what kind of relation exists between 
subjects and object, for example, this is the name or date of birth). The predicate 
URis cornes from vocabularies, collections of URis that can be used to represent 
information about a certain domain. 
Subjects and Objects are the first and third part of a statement, respectively. The 
subject of an RDF statement is either a URI or a blank node (anonymous resources), 
both of them denote resources. Objects can be resources and values, IRIIURIIURL, 
literais, or blank nodes (when mentioning resources without global identifier). 
Literais can be basic values (plain) or IRI (typed). A plain literai is a string combined 
with an optionallanguage tag (e.g., 4th of July, 5.12, Lacoste). 
<dc:title>Walking on street</dc:title> 
With an optionallanguage: 
<dc:title> <pcv: Descriptor> 
<pcv:label xml:lang="en">Walking on street</pcv:label> 
</pcv: Descriptor> </dc:title> 
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Typed literai is a string combined with a datatype URI that identifies the datatype of 
the literai (e.g., common datatypes such as integers, dates, floating point defined by 
XML) 5. 
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.example.org/index.html"> 
<exterms:creation-date 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date">1999-08-16 
</exterms:creation-date> 
</rdf:Description> 
RDF also identifies things using web identifiers (URis) and describes resources with 
properties and property values: resource-property-value. Resources have properties 
(attributes) that admit certain range of values or that are painting to other resources. 
A resource is anything that can have a URI describing an entity from the web ( e.g., 
persons, places, web documents, pictures, etc.). Resources can be meaningfully 
placed in a class. A class (or classification) is a meaningful way of grouping 
resources. When any resource is placed into a class, it is called an individual of that 
class (also sometimes called an instance of the class). For example, a feline class, a 
class for ail members of the feline species: 
tutorial:Feline rdftype rdfs:Class 
If we place the cat berry to this class Feline, then Berry resource will be an individual 
(instance) from the class Feline: 
thing:berry rdf:type tutorial:Feline 
5 http://www.infowebml. ws/rdf-owVLiteral.htm 
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This formally means that the resource berry (with its unique subject URI) is an 
individual (or, member) of the class with identifier given by the object URI. 
A property in RDF allows us to define or describe characteristics of individual of a 
class. It is a resource that has a name (e.g., author, homepage) and property value is 
the value of a property (e.g., 56) or a resource (e.g., http: //www.w3schools.com). 
If the object is a literai, then we will have literai triples and this type will be used to 
describe the properties of resources. If the object is a resource, then we will have 
RDF Links and this type will describe the relationship between two resources. In this 
case, the predicate position defines the type of relationship between resources. 
RDF resources were represented by Uniform Resource Identifiers (URis) of which 
URLs are a subset. URI is a string of characters used to identify a name or a web 
resource (Bemers-Lee et al. 2014). Recently, URis have been upgraded to 
International Resource Identifier (IRI) 6. The difference is that the former supports 
only ASCI encoding (i.e. , 1 byte encoding), while the IRI is fully international 
characters generalizing the URis and use the UTF-8 encoding (i.e., variable length 
encoding, 1-4 bytes). 
URI and HTTP are the two essential technologies of the web upon which the LD 
relies. URI can be used to identify and represent any entity that exists in the real 
world. It identifies a resource either by name, location or both. 
All Unified Resource Locators (URLs) and Unified Resource Name (URNs) are 
URis, but not all URis are URLs or URNs. When a URI identifies a resource using 
name in a given namespace, but doesn't specify how the resource is obtained, then 
this URI is called a "URN" ( e.g. , this may appear in XML documents to define a 
namespace, targetNamespace="urn:example", where a "targetNamespace" uses a 
6 https: //www.w3 .org/lntemationaViri-edit/draft-duerst-iri-04 
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URN to define an identifier to the namespace). When a URI identifies a resource 
using the network location using access mechanism (i.e., HTTP, File Transfer 
Protocol FTP, etc.), then this URI is called a "URL" (e.g., http://test.com, 
ftp: //test.com). 
On the web, any URI is always accompanied by the HTTP, which makes the entity 
being represented, deferenceable/resolvable to more resources. Both technologies 
were integrated with HTML to structure and link web documents. Nowadays, the data 
presented in these documents are integrated using the RDF and URI HTTP to 
structure and link different data and resources. 
URis are meant to identify web document or a real world object using Hash URI or 
303 URI7. The essential thing to publish data is to have a unique domain/narnespace 
minted by unique URL owned by the publisher. As mentioned, URI HTPP is used to 
relate and identify real-world objects and abstract concepts and thereby maximizing 
the discoverability of more data (i.e., resources) . Thus, URis need to be 
dereferenceable to identify real objects (Sauermann et al., 2011). Objects and 
documents should not be confused with each other; therefore, a common practice 
called "contents negotiating" is used by an HTTP mechanism (Fielding, 2014). It 
sends HTTP headers with each request to indicate what kind of documents they 
prefer. Servers can then inspect these headers and select an appropriate representation 
of resources: HTML document or RDF document. 
In addition, URis can be used to distinguish between the thing/resource and a web 
document describing this thing/resource. Two different types of URis can be used by 
the content negotiation for non-information resources (Sauermann et al. , 2011; 
Bemers-Lee et al., 2014): 
7 https://www.w3 .org/TR/cooluris/ 
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• 303 URis (known as 303 redirect) : when the URI identifying non-
information/non-document resource is dereferenced (i.e. , called first request, 
from client to server), the server used redirects the client request to see 
another URI of a web document (i.e., called second request, from server to 
client), which describes the concept in question. This redirection is called 
"303 redirect". To elaborate on the idea, this redirection occurs when the 
server can not retum a representation of the requested resources. At this time, 
the server sends back to the client the URI of an information resource 
describing the non-information resource. URis related to non-information 
resource can have three different patterns: 
o URI identifying resource 'x' itself: 
( e.g., http:/ /www.example.com/resource/x) 
o URI identifying the serialized RDF document (i.e., serialized using 
RDF/XML, Turtle, N3 or any other language) describing the resource 
' x' : 
(e.g., http: //www.example.com/data/x.rdf) 
o URI identifying the HTML document describing resource 'x' : 
( e. g., http :/ /www. example. corn!page/x.html) 
• Hash URis: This type of URI is another way of naming non-information 
resources to avoid two http requests used by the 303 URis. Its format contains 
the base part of the URI and a fragment identifier separated from the base by a 
hash symbol (e.g., http://www.example.com/about#x). When a client requests 
Rash URI, the fragment part is stripped off by the HTTPS protocol before 
requesting the URI from the server. This means that the Hash URI does not 
necessarily identify a web document and can be used to identify real-world 
objects. If clients strip off the fragment part before requesting a Hash URis, it 
results in an absolute URI that identifies a document in which the same thing 
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has been described using Hash URL. In this case the content negotiation could 
be employed to redirect the absolute URI (http://www.example.com/about) to 
either an HTML or an RDF representation. 
U sing the first type of URI, publishers could publish the description of any concepts 
(e.g., real world abject: persans) on their servers using two types of representations: 
HTML document containing a human-readable representation about a concept 'x', 
and RDF document about the same concept 'x'. This can be done by publishers using 
the three different patterns described above (Berrueta et al., 2008; Heath et al. , 2008; 
Heath et Bizer, 2011). 
Using the second type of URI, publishers can define different vocabulary terms in 
arder to describe their data that they want to publish on the web. They may also use 
the Hash URI to serve an RDF/XML file containing the definitions of all these 
vocabulary terms. After the resources are identified using URis, they are connected 
together using different types ofRDF links (Heath et Bizer, 2011): 
• Relationship Link: this type of link relates a resource to different resources 
in other data sources 
• Identity Link: this link is used to link two or more URI when they are 
representing the same real-world abject. This type of link is useful to retrieve 
more information about a resource and map it to other identical resources. 
• Vocabulary Link: this link is used to link between data instances (i .e., A-
Box, Assertion Box) and the definitions of ' vocabulary terms (T-Box, 
Terminology Box) are used to represent and publish this data instances. Also, 
it can link the definitions of two terms together. This elaborates the fact that 
each term will be self-descriptive and dereferenceable to more resources. 
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Once these links are provided, they create a global data graph that spans data sources 
and enable the resolvability between different resources within different data sources . 
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Figure 2.4 RDF Models (Heath et al. , 2008) 
Figure 2.4 depicts how all these concepts can be realized in a RDF madel. In this 
figure, a persan called "Richard Cyganialè' identified himself by URI 
http://richard.cyganiak.de/foaf.rdf#cygri (i.e., Rash URI), and he used the "rdftype" 
(i.e., vocabulary link) to specify the Persan class, and the name property imported 
from FOAF vocabulary to specify his name and location (i.e., relationship and 
vocabulary link). He stated that he is near Berlin by using the URI 
http://dbpedia.org/resource/Berlin (i.e., 303 URI and relationship link) represented in 
the name space "dbpedia:Berlin ". The latter is dereferenced and can be a subject for 
another RDF graph describing the City Berlin in more detail including its population 
and the country in which this city is located (i.e. , relationship link). 
Finally, the third RDF graph used the name space object of the second graph to 
provide the other cities that are located in Germany using the SKOS (Simple 
Knowledge Organization System) (Isaac et Summers, 2008; Pastor et al. , 2009) (i.e., 
relationship link). 
36 
Identity links may also exist if one or more resources with different URis refer to the 
same real world object/concept. Another resource that may exist in another data 
source that describes Hamburg is called the "Hanseatic" city. Hamburg and 
Hanseatic city are equivalents in the real world and may be mapped together using 
the "owl:sameAs " constructor (i.e., identity link). 
The Linked Open Data (LOD) cloud project is a visible example that uses ail these 
structures and adapts the technologies provided by the web of data to build the LD. 
2.2.1.1 Linked Open Data (LOD) 
The era of LD started from October 2007, after Tim Bemers-Lee underlined 
explicitly the principles of publishing data on the web. Researchers of the semantic 
web consider that there was no semantic web before the LOD web project, as there 
were no explicit guidelines to aid ali people to publish their data in a well-linked 
mann er. 
However, long before 2007, since 1997, the semantic web was built on URis and 
RDF. Data was published following the LDP, but the only difference is that they were 
not underlined explicitly at that time. Prior to the LDP, and before 2007, there were 
two ways of publishing RDF on the web: 
• The first way was to publish dumps of RDF and OWL and not linking 
them to other data sources (i .e., no connection using URis and no links 
could be followed for navigation). Their concems were meant only to 
foster and enrich the semantics by mainly focusing on ontologies; the 
decidability of the languages and the modeling methodologies. This way 
was used by most ofthose people who published data on the web. 
----------- -----------
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• The second way was to publish RDF in a linked-data manner using typed 
links, and it was used by a minority of people. This group concentrated 
mainly on web aspects, and linking data using typed links. 
LDP is the calling name to what the second set of publishers was doing. It laid out 
sorne guidelines (i.e., aspects that were underlined explicitly by Tim Bemers-Lee in 
2006) and encouraged people to follow them. Thus, LD was not just a switch that was 
tumed on in 2007. It has roots in what the second group ofRDF publishers was doing 
a long time before. 
As the major shift in research, the development community surrounding the semantic 
web has moved from the semantics towards the web aspects. Semantics focus on 
constructing complete ontologies, while web aspects require fewer axioms by using 
lightweight ontology and connection through URI and typed links. Thus, the 
concem shifts from concentrating on the ontologies and their semantics, to focusing 
on the web aspects (i .e. , LDP) and how to publish and consume data on the web. 
Today, the Linked Open Data (LOD) project is the most visible project using the 
technology stack of the web (URLs, HTTP, and RDF) and converts existing open 
license data into RDF according to the LDP (Bemers-Lee, 2006; Campbell et 
MacNeill, 2010) (see Figure 2.5 for last state of LOD cloud 2014). 
As mentioned, the LOD is based on the LDP, where URI resources are linked using 
typed RDF links to other resources within the same or to other datasets. Two 
direction links can be used: links to navigate forward and others to navigate backward 
between resources . For example, if we have an RDF triple connecting the two 
resources x and y, and we need to move forward from x to y, then this RDF triple 
should appear in the document describing the resource y. This triple is then called an 
incoming link, because it allows to navigate back to resource x and it can be thought 
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of as an incoming link to y8. lt is the same case for the outcoming link, where the 
RDF triple should appear in the document describing the resource x and allows it to 
navigate forward to resource y (Alexander et al., 2009). 
Ontologies are then used to foster and serve the semantic interoperability between 
parts that want to exchange such data. These are known as lightweight ontologies 
(Hitzler et Harmelen, 201 0) that use the full advantages of semantic web 
technologies, minimize OWL constructs, and reuse existing RDF vocabularies 
wherever possible. 
While RDF provides the model and syntax for describing resources, it does not define 
the meaning of those resources . That is where other technologies such as RDF 
Schema (RDFS) come in (W3C, 2014). RDFS specifies extensions to RDF that are 
used to define the common vocabularies in RDF metadata statement and enables 
specification of schema knowledge. It develops classes for both resources and 
properties. However, RDFS is limited to a subclass hierarchy and a property 
hierarchy with domain and range definitions of these properties. RDFS limitations are 
range restrictions, incapable of expressing disjointness between classes, the 
combination between classes, cardinality restriction, and characteristics of properties 
(W3C, 2004). 
Thus, RDF is the standard format to create LD and it is sufficient to use the 
constructors of RDFS and sorne features of OWL to represent data in an LD 
structure. Combination of constructors from both vocabularies (i.e., RDFS and OWL) 
represents the lightweight ontology ofRDF and LD. This is known by RDFS++9. 
8 http://linkeddatabook.com/editions/l.O/#htoc42 
9 http://linkeddatabook.com/editions/ l.O/#htoc50 
Figure 2.5 
10 http://linkeddata.org/ 
Part of the Linking Open (LOD) Data Project Cloud Diagram 
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Figure 2.5 shows part of the LOD data project cloud diagram, where links exist 
between items in two connected datasets. Sorne datasets are connected together using 
the outcoming links, the incoming links or both. 
The next subsections highlight all the RDFS constructors and sorne OWL primitive 
constructors that will be used to cons tru ct the first two modules of the CF -CoC 
framework mentioned in Chapter 3. 
The RDFS and OWL constructors are classified according to the term type (see Table 
2.1 and Table 2.2). A term X can be defined as a class (i.e., a class like "rdfs:Class ") 
or as a property (i .e., property like "owl:ObjectProperty ").This definition takes place 
before the term will be used (i.e., before publication, T-Box: terminological box). 
Later, the defined terms are used to describe and publish various data (A-Box: 
Assertion Box) (Dean et al., 2004; McGuinness et Van Harmelen, 2004; Van 
Harmelen et McGuinness, 2004). The type of the term also determines its slot 
position during publication (i.e. , when the term is a property, it always occupies the 
predicate slot. However, if it is a class, it can be a subject or object). 
2.2.1.2 RDF Schema (RDFS) constructors 
As mentioned, RDF Schema is the semantic extension of the basic RDF vocabulary. 
It is used to provide a data-modeling vocabulary for RDF data. The RDFS 
constructors are used to define terms, which are used to express groups of similar 
resources (W3C, 2014). 
RDFS differs from a classic object-oriented system 11 . The latter defines a class in 
terms of the properties its instances should have. However, the former describes 
11 https: //www.w3.org/TR/sw-oosd-primer/#comparison 
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properties in terms of the classes of resource to which they apply (i .e., domain and 
range described in the next table, Table 2.1 ). This fact is beneficiai for others to re-
define the original description of these classes. For example, RDFS can define a 
property "eg:author" to have a domain of "eg:Book" and a range of "eg:Person ", 
while the object-oriented system can define a class "eg:Book" with an attribute called 
"eg:author" of type "eg:Person ". Thus, in RDFS, it is easy for others to 
subsequently define additional properties instead of re-defining the original 
description of these classes. This benefit is considered to be one of the architectural 
principles of the web (Bemers-Lee, 2006; W3C, 2014). Table 2.1 summarizes the 
constructors of RDFS vocabulary and highlights where such constructors can appear 
in slots of RDF models. Let us consider that the term in question is named X, which 
is considered an instance of rdfProperty or rdfs:Class. The next points elaborate on 
the constructors of Table 2.1. Let us consider that X and Pare properties, Y and C are 
classes, T is a triple, S is a subject and 0 is the object in tripleT. 
• X rdfs:subPropertyOfP 
Any property denotes a relation between resources. "rdfs:subPropertyOf" 
constructor applies to properties and is interpreted as the subset relation 
between the relations they denote. The "rdfs:subPropertyOf" is an instance of 
"rdfProperty" and states that all resources related by X are also related by P. 
This means if T(S, X, 0), and X ts sub-property of P, 
T(X,rdfs:subPropertyOf,P), and both are instances of "rdfProperty ", this 
implies that T, where T is a constructor, can have also P as predicate T(S, P, 
0). For example, if "mother" is a sub property of ''parent'', if there is a valid 
triple (a, mother, b) th en the triple (a, parent, b) is also val id. 
• X rdfs: range Y 
States that X is an instance of the class "rdfProperty ", Y is an instance of the 
class "rdfs:Class " and that the resources denoted by the object 0 of T (S, X, 
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0) whose predicate is X are instances of the class Y. For example, if mother 
has a range Person T(mother, rdfs:range, Person), and mother is a predicate in 
T(Alice ,mother, Eve), then Eve is the instance of the class Person. 
Table 2.1 RDFS Constructors for Property and Class Terms (W3C, 2014) 
If X is an instance of rdfProperty 
rdfs: Is an instance of rdfProperty that is used to state that all resources 
subPropertyOf related by one property are also related by another. For example, 
the triple X rdfs:subPropertyOfX' states that X is an instance of 
rdfProperty, X' is an instance of rdfProperty and X is a 
subproperty of X'. Also the domain and range of 
rdfs: subPropertyOf is rdf Property 
rdfs: range Is an instance of rdfProperty that is used to state that the 
values/resources of a property X are instances of one or more 
classes. For example, the triple (X rdfs:range C) states that X is an 
instance of the class rdfProperty, that C is an instance of the class 
rdfs:Class and that the resources denoted by the objects of triples 
whose predicate is X are instances of the class C 
rdfs: domain Is an instance of rdfProperty that is used to state that any resource 
that has given property X is an instance of one or more classes. For 
example, the triple (X rdfs:domain C) states that X is an instance of 
the class rdfProperty, that C is an instance of the class rdfs:Class 
and the resources denoted by the subjects of triples whose predicate 
is X are instances of the class C 
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If X is an instance of rdfs :Class 
rdfs: Is an instance of rdfProperty that is used to state that all the 
subClassOf instances of one class are instances of another. For example, the 
triple (X rdfs:subClassOfX') states that X is an instance of 
rdfs:Class, X' is an instance of rdfs:Class and X is a subclass of X' 
Common constructors between property instance and class instance 
rdfs: Is an instance of rdfProperty that is used to provide a human-
comment readable description of a resource 
rdfs:label Is an instance of rdfProperty that is used to pro vide a human-
readable version of a resource'name 
• X rdfs:domain Y 
States that X is an instance of the class "rdfProperty ", Y is an instance of the 
class "rdfs:Class " and that the resources denoted by the subject S ofT(S, X, 
0) whose predicate is X are instances of the class Y. For example, if mother 
bas a domain person T(mother, rdfs:domain, Person), and mother is a 
predicate in T(Alice,mother,Eve), then Alice is the instance of the class 
Person. 
The simple case is to have a single class for domain and range, respectively. The 
constructor of owl:intersectionOf is the default semantics of multiple classes in 
domain/range in RDFS. For example, if a Father is an intersection between Parent 
and Male, this means that a Father is exactly a parent who is also a Male. A Person is 
union ofFemale or Male; this means that every person is either Male or Female. 
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The standard way to create multiple domains and ranges for the same object property 
is through deciding whether the union "owl:unionOf" constructor or the intersection 
"owl:intersectionOf" constructor hold between classes (i.e., both are constructors 
from OWL vocabulary and both cannot be expressed in RDFS). Both have different 
meanings, and which one to use depends on what we want to express in our ontology. 
For example, let us say you have a property P and its domain/range is defined using 
two classes on the triples T 1(P, rdfs:domainlrange, A) and T2(P, rdfs:domain/range, 
B). If we use the union, this means that any individual that is the subject/ ( object) of a 
property P must be an instance of A or B. However, if we use the intersection this 
means that individual that it is the subject/ (object) of a property P must be an 
instance of A and B (i .e., see below for an example that is serialized and expressed 
using turtle language): 
In cases where we need to make a disjunction (union) of the classes A and B, and "a" 
is an individual, then 
: myProperty rdfs:domain [a owl: Class; owl:unionOf(:A :B)] 
In cases where we need to make a conjunction (intersection) of the classes A and B, 
and "a" is an individual then 
: myProperty rdfs:range [a owl: Class; owl:intersectionOf(:A :B)] 
• X rdfs:subClassOfC 
Classes are resources denoting a set of resources, by the meaning of the 
property "rdftype ". The constructor "rdfs:subClassOf" is an instance of 
"rdfProperty" that is used to state that ail instances of one class are instances 
of another. This means if T(S, rdftype, X), and X is a subclass of C T(X, 
rdfs:subClassOf, C) and both are instances of "rdfClass ", it is implied that S 
is of type C T(S, rdftype, C). For example, if Alice is of type woman T(Alice, 
rdf type, Woman), and woman is a subclass of class pers on T(W oman, 
,----------------- ---
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rdfs:subClassOf, Person), where woman and person are instances of 
"rdfClass ", then this implies that Alice is also a person T(Alice, rdftype, 
Person). 
• X rdfs: label L 
The constructor "rdfs:label" is an instance of "rdfProperty" that is used to 
provide human-readable version of a resource's name. For example, if we 
have a short name for a resource R, the label can provide a human-readable 
word or phrase describing R. L, here, is of type Litera!. This means that the 
range is "rdfs:Literal" and its domain is the class rdfs:Resource itself, T(R, 
rdfs:label, L). 
• X rdfs:comment L 
2.2.1.3 
The constructor "rdfs: comment" is also an instance of "rdfProperty" that is 
used to provide human-readable description of a resource R. It is the same 
idea of label constructor; its range is the "rdfs:Literal" and its domain is the 
resource itself, T(R, rdfs:comment, L). 
Web Ontology Language (OWL) constructors 
Web Ontology Language is richer with additional vocabulary than that supported by 
RDFS to add more restrictions to the knowledge representation by defining abjects 
and their relationship and adding restrictions on properties. For example, 
relationships between classes (e.g., disjointWith), equality (e.g., sameAs), richer 
properties ( e.g. , symmetrical) and class property restrictions ( e.g., allValuesFrom) 
Thus, these extra features answer the limitation of the RDFS. 
In LD, OWL constructors are not fully deployed. Only few constructors are mainly 
used to map between property and class terms. Other constructors are used to relate 
-- ----- ------- ----
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and build relationships between various properties. The primitives selected from the 
OWL for LD are provided in the next table (see Table 2.2) (Dean et al., 2004). 
Table 2.2 OWL Constructors for Property and Class Terms (W3C, 2014) 
If X is a term of type (rdf: type) Property ( rdf: Property 1 owl: ObjectProperty) 
owl : equivalentProperty This constructor is used to map between two terms of 
type Property 
owl : inverseOf This constructor is used to state that one property is 
the inverse of another. It is used to describe inverse 
relation between properties. 
owl: Whenever X property is used as a predicate in a triple, 
JnverseFunctionalProperty its abject will have one and only one subject. Thus, 
each object should be able to uniquely identify a 
subject. This constructor is a sub class of 
owl:objectProperty 
owl : Functiona!Property Same idea as the last constructor, but here, when X is 
defined to be of type Functiona!Property, each 
subject, where X is a predicate, can have at most one 
object. This constructor is a subclass of rdf Property 
If X is a term of type ( rdf: type) Class ( rdfs: Class) 
owl : equivalentClass This constructor is used to map between two terms of 
type Class 
Common Constructors between Property and Class terms 
owl: sameAs 
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Two URI terms can be mapped together using the 
sameAs constructor to refer to the same resource 
The next points elaborate on the cohstructors provided in Table 2.2. Let us consider 
that X and Y are properties of type ''rdfProperty ": 
• X owl:inverseOJY 
Simply, as it is shown in this structure, X is the inverse ofY ifwe read it from 
left to right. At the same time, we can deduce that Y is the inverse of X from 
the other direction (i.e. , from right to left). In practice, it is also useful to 
define relations between properties in both directions. This relation is exactly 
the same as the passive voice in grammar. lfwe have an axiom ofthe form Pl 
owl:inverseOfP2 asserts that for every (x, y) in the property extension of P 1, 
there is a pair (y,x) in the property extension ofP2, and vice versa. 
For example, "people own cars" means the same thing as "cars are owned by 
people" . This means that when "owl:inverseOf" is used between two 
properties in a triple, the domain of a property is the range of the other and 
vice versa. Thus, "owl:inverseOf" is a symmetric property. 
The inverseOf property is also useful to work on individual resources, for 
example it is used for inverse roles (e.g., isChildOf = hasChild). 
• X as owl:InverseFunctionalProperty 
In this structure, when a property X is tagged as "InverseFunctionalProperty" 
in T(S,X,O), then the object 0 of a property X statement uniquely determines 
the subject S (sorne individual) . Further when another subject S' is linked to 
the same object 0 through predicate X, then the S' is actually the same 
subject S (i .e., S' owl:sameAs S). Thus, in this case, the object 0 uniquely 
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determines the same individual subjects (i.e., S' and S are two different names 
for the same thing) . 
For example, the value of the property Social Security Number (SSN) is 
assigned to one, and only one, person. To represent this information in its 
correct semantic, SN should be tagged as "JnverseFunctionalProperty ", 
where its domain will be of type person (''foafPerson" of type "rdfClass "), 
and its range will be a literai ("rdfs:Literal ") (e.g., T(Peter, SN, 306305)). 
Then any mentioned subjects (e.g., Peter, myBrother, myCousin, etc.) 
published by any publisher refer to the same person. 
• X as owl:FunctionalProperty 
In this structure, when a property X is tagged as "FunctionalProperty" in 
T(S,X,O), then X is a property that can have only one (unique) value for each 
instance (i.e., resource) S. the values of 0 cannot have two distinct values (at 
most one value). For example, any woman can have either one, and only one, 
husband which is a man or no husband at all (i.e., this example is culture 
dependent and may change from one country to another. It is used under the 
assumption that each woman may have only one husband). So, to express this 
information semantically correct, "hasHusband" in T (Alice, hasHusband, 
Bob) is a property of type "FunctionalProperty", where its domain and range 
are of type person (i.e., ''foafPerson "). 
• X owl:equivalentProperty Y 
The main aim for this constructor is to map between properties from two 
ontologies and relate the same subject resource to the same value object 
resource where both are properties. For example, if we have (X, 
rdfs:subProperty, Y) and (Y, rdfs: subProperty, X) ~ (X, 
owl: equivalentProperty, Y). This fact saves much effort in developing 
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ontology in ways to have simple and useful implications and facilitate the task 
for an OWL reasoners to derive a value for sorne resource' s X if it can find a 
value for resource Y (Dean et al. , 2004; W3C, 2004), because the 
owl: equivalentProperty hold between· two properties that have the same 
"values" (i.e., same property extension), but both of them have different 
intentional meaning (i.e., denote different concept)12 : 
<ow 1: Obj ectProperty rdf: ID="lecturesln"> 
<ow 1: equi valentProperty rdf:resource="#teaches" /> 
</owl:ObjectProperty> 
In T(X, owl:equivalentProperty, Y), X is a property in the left slot, and Y is 
another property from the right slot. W e can deduce that the domain and range 
of the "owl: equivalentProperty " constructor are the same (rdfProperty). The 
"owl:equivalentProperty " is intended for RDFS/OWL properties. 
For example, if we have two different ontologies (namespaces): ns and DC 
(DC, 2015), both of them have a property called "title", and they are 
equivalent with the same values T(dc:title, owl: equivalentProperty, ns:title) 
and we have another triple T'(book, dc:title, roman), where the book is a 
resource and roman is of type Literai, then we can infer : Tinferred (book, 
ns:title, roman), where ns:title is also of type rdfProperty. 
• X owl:equivalentClass Y 
This property holds the same explanation mentioned in the point of 
"owl:equivalentProperty ", but the difference is the mapping between two 
classes instead of two properties. So, X and Y are of type "rdfs:Class ". By 
using this constructor, two class descriptions involved have the same class 
12 http ://www. infowebml.ws/rdf-owVequivalentProperty.htm 
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extension (i.e., have exactly the same set of individuals) (Dean et al., 2004). 
Also, as mentioned before, "equivalentProperty" does not imply property 
equality. This is also the same case with "equivalentClass" (i.e., equivalence 
between two classes means both class extensions contain exactly the same set 
of individuals). The "equivalentClass" does not imply class equality (i.e., 
class equality means that classes denote the same concept). However, 
"owl:sameAs" is the constructor that can be used to treat equality between 
classes. 
The "owl:equivalentClass" constructor also differs from the 
«rdfs:subClassOf". In subclass, the relationship is hierarchical, and in one 
way, direction from child class to parent class. Thus, if A is a subclass of B, 
this restricts A to necessarily inherit all characteristics (properties) of B. 
Further, all instances of A must necessarily have ali properties of B, but the 
"owl:equivalentClass" can go in both directions between both of them. This 
means, if A and B are two equivalent classes, then A rdfs:subClassOf B in 
one direction and B rdfs:subClassOf A in the other direction (see Section 
2.2.1.4 for its entailment rule). 
• X owl:sameAs Y 
In contrary with the equivalentClass and equivalentProperty, the sameAs is 
used to define equality by stating that two URI references actually refer to the 
same individual/thing. This means that both URis denote the same concept. 
Links and individual to an individual occurs when both individuals have the 
same identity. For example: 
<rdf:Description rdf:about="#J ean _Claude_ V anD am"> 
<owl:sameAs rdf:resource=VanDam"/> 
</rdf:Description> 
51 
The sameAs constructor is used to state that seemingly two different 
individuals ( e.g., Jean_ Claude_ V anD am and V anD am) are actually the same 
persan. 
However, the first former constructor - equivalentClass is used to state that 
classes are extensionally equivalent (i.e., have exactly the same sets of 
memberslindividuals), but it does not imply class equality, for example: 
<footballTeam owl:equivalentClass us:soccerTeam/> 
This example states that the two classes have the same class extension. This 
means that both classes have exactly the same set of individuals, but are not 
necessarily the same concept. They are not equated but are equivalent. 
When the "owl:sameAs" constructor is used to relate the same 
classes/properties, this means that the two classes/properties are to be 
interpreted as the same object/individual. This occur only in OWL FULL, 
where a class can be treated as instances of (meta) classes and thus pushes the 
ontology out of OWL DL. Using again the same example, we can use the 
owl:sameAs to define equality between FootballTeam and SoccerTeam, thus 
indicating that the two classes have the same intentional meaning : 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="FootballTeam"> 
<owl:sameAs rdf:resource:http://sports.org/US#SoccerTeam> 
</owl:Class> 
For the second former constructor - equivalentProperty is used to mention 
that two properties are equivalent not equated and when we want to equate 
them we canuse the owl:sameAs in the OWL Full. 
The "sameAs ", "equivalentProperty", "equivalentclass" are three constructors that 
relate terms intensionally and extensionally. The constructor "sameAs" is used not 
only to equate between two individuals, but also between classes and properties. This 
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means that classes and properties can be also treated as individuals, and this only 
valid in OWL Full. OWL Full allows free mixing of OWL with RDF Schema and, 
like RDF Schema, does not enforce a strict separation of classes, properties, 
individuals and data values.When "sameAs" equates individuals, both individuals will 
have same intentional meaning because both individuals denote the same concept. 
The other two constructors, "equivalentProperty", "equivalentclass", can be used to 
state that two terms (property/class) have the same extensions. For classes: two 
classes are equivalent when both of them, have exactly the same set of individuals. 
For properties: two properties are equivalent when both of them have the same 
values. This means that these terms will have same extensional meaning (not same 
concepts). 
All constructors provided in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are enough to define and publish data 
on the web. Publication of terms on the web passes through three steps: identification, 
definition and publication. 
Identification of terms is about how to identify and select terms describing the 
domain of interest (i.e., these terms are the entities whose properties and relationships 
can be used later in the publication of data). This step is achieved through the 
descriptions of different processes and tasks performed within the domain of interest. 
The identified terms are also called custom or proprietary terms. 
In the second step, the identified terms are then defined using different constructors 
ofRDFS (W3C, 2014) and OWL (Dean et al., 2004; McGuinness et Van Harmelen, 
2004; W3C, 2004), and uniquely named by HTTP URis. 
In the third step, once terms are identified and defmed, they are then published on 
standardized contents formats. This format is the RDF that provides a generic data 
model composed of a set of triples where the custom terms occupy one or more 
slot(s) (i .e. , subject, predicate, or object) in these triples. Also, the vocabularies of the 
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semantic web are used together with the proprietary terms to describe and represent 
the forensic information. 
Before discussing the concepts of defining proprietary terms, the next section 
presents and underlines sorne entailments rules that were provided implicitly in the 
explanation of each constructor. 
2.2.1.4 Reasoning on RDFS++ 
Reasoning depends mainly on the semantic level of the representation of RDFS and 
OWL that implies a given mathematical formalization for the knowledge base. As 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1.1, lightweight ontology of LD is a combination of RDFS 
constructors and sorne primitives of OWL. These constructors contain a set of 
inference rules. Inference is a derivation of logical conclusions from premises known 
or assumed to be true. ln RDF, inferences correspond to entailments that derive new 
assertions from existing ones. 
Reasoning is a process to extract new information from existing information stored in 
a knowledge base. For the LD, the knowledge base is the store where the information 
is presented in the form of RDF triples. The extracting information process is not 
limited to extracting or querying triples that are physically stored in the knowledge 
base. It also infers implicit (i.e., not been explicitly stated) information from these 
triples. 
RDFS and OWL contain a set of inference rules related to their constructors. This 
section discusses the rules of RDFS constructors, and sorne rules of OWL (i.e., those 
that are primitives and used to describe the LD). Table 2.3 depicts the rules of the 
most used constructors ofboth vocabularies (i.e. , RDFS, and OWL). 
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OWL Reasoners can be used to reason on RDFS constructors. However, the inverse is 
not valid, because RDFS is a subset of OWL. 
Other entailments rules that can be provided and that are related to the above 
constructors are: 
• owl:equivalentProperty : 
(pl , owl:equivalentProperty, p2) , (a,pl,b) = > (a,p2,b) 
(a,p2.b) = > (a,pl,b) 
• owl:equivalentClass : 
If (cl , owl:equivalentClass, c2) and it is associated with another triple (a, 
rdftype, cl) => (a, rdf typ e, c2) 
(a, rdf type, c2) => (a, rdf type, cl) 
But, if the triple of "owl:equivalentClass " is not associated with another triple 
(cl , owl:equivalentClass, c2) => (cl , rdfs:subClassOf, c2), (c2, 
rdfs :subClassOf, cl) 
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Table 2.3 Rules and entailments of RDFS and OWL 13 
Constructor N ame Rules and Entailments 
rdfs :subClassOf subClassOfis a transitive when: 
(A,rdfs:subClassOf,B),(B,rdfs:subclassOf,C)=> 
(A,rdfs :subClassOf,C) 
Another Entailment rules of subClassOf 
(a, rdftype, A), (A,rdfs :subClassOfB) => (a, rdftype, 
B) 
(A, rdfs:subClassof, B), (B, rdfs:subClassOf, A)=> (A, 
owl:equivalentClass, B) 
rdfs :subPropertyOf subPropertyOfis transitive when: 
(a,p,b) (p, rdfs:subPropertyOfq) => (a,q,b) 
rdfs:domain (p ,rdfs:domain,A), (a,p,x) => (a, rdf:type, A) 
rdfrange (p ,rdfs:range,A), (x,p,a) => (a, rdf:type, A) 
owl:Functiona!Property If a property p is tagged as FunctionalProperty then ali 
x,y, and z: p(x,y) and p(x,z) => y=z 
owl: If a property p is tagged as InverseFunctiona!Property 
InverseFunctiona!Property then ali x,y and z: p(y,x) and p(z,x) => y=z 
13 http://semanticweb.org/OWLLD/ 
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owl: inverseof If a property pl, is tagged as the owl:inverseofp2, then 
for all x and y: pl(x,y) iffp2(y,x) 
Also, for the constructor "owl:sameAs ", there exist several rules, between subj"ects, 
objects, predicates. 
All the constructors mentioned above represent the relational primitives between 
classes and properties. Those constructors are used by publishers to define and 
retrieve implicit information from a triple store (RDF graphs) through RDFS 
reasoners and SP ARQL (Prud'Hommeaux et Seabome, 2008). Those constructors are 
the means to reach a lightweight version of semantic web and limit use of ontologies 
and knowledge representation in order to avoid unexpected inferences when the data 
are consumed (i.e. , in light ontology no much ontological axioms are used, only sorne 
little primitives from OWL). 
2.2.1.5 Deîming proprietary terms 
Sometimes there will be cases where new terms need to be developed to describe 
sorne aspects of a particular data set. Other times the existing vocabularies are not 
adequate to describe a particular data set and this is the case of Cyber Forensics, 
where it is rare to find forensic terms or well-known vocabularies describing it 
because this domain is still in its infancy and development. Thus, new proprietary 
terms need to be defined and developed in a dedicated vocabulary, applying the 
features of RDFS (W3C, 2014) and OWL (W3C, 2004) to describe this particular 
dataset. However, before creating a new custom term, sorne aspects (crite1ions) 
should be taken into consideration. Sorne receipts have been provided in (Heath et 
Bizer, 2011): Search for terms from widely used vocabularies that could be reused to 
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describe the domain in interest. If the widely deployed vocabularies do not provide 
the required terms to describe such domains, new terms should be defined as 
proprietary terms. 
• When defining a new term, a namespace owned and controlled by the 
publisher is required (i.e., unique namespace), in order to mint the new terms 
to this domain/namespace. 
• When creating new terms, a map should be established between these terms 
and those that are from other existing vocabularies. 
• Apply the LDP to the new terms by using the web technology stack (HTTP, 
URL, and RDF) and this task takes place during the publication process 
starting from the identification of terms un til their publication. 
• Label and comment each created term. 
• If the term is of type property (i.e., predicate), the domain and range of this 
term should be determined using the constructors of RDFS and not 
overloading this new term with ontological axioms. 
• If at a later time and after creating a new term, another term was found and 
enough to be used, an RDF link should be set between the newly created term 
and the existing one. 
Though there exist different guides to publish terms, the process of selecting and 
identifying them remains a subjective task and depends on the term creator (i.e., we 
may have two creators selecting and identifying two different terms describing the 
same concept in the real world) . This does not affect the quality of terms being 
published, because the LDP on the web of data make them self-descriptive. The latter 
advantage is due to two reasons: 
• LDP with naming using HTTP/URis, offer a dereferenceable nature to the 
term, so that any LD consuming applications can look up the RDFS/OWL 
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definitions and retrieve more information about said term - this means that 
every vocabulary term links to its own definition (Berrueta et al., 2008). 
• Publishing mappings between terms from different vocabularies in the form of 
RDF links (Mendelsohn, 2008). 
A related work published in (Brinson et al., 2006) to define an ontology in CF, where 
an ontological madel was created for outlining CF tracks in the education process. 
This ontology is an ontology with small 'o'. The small 'o' describes situation where 
classification schemes are being built and refers to the semantic web ontologies in 
computer science, while capital '0' is a term borrowed from philosophy and it is 
referring systematic recording of existence and in software system something that 
exists is something that can be represented by the ontology with small 'o' (Poli et al., 
201 0). This related work discussed how to construct a hierarchical structure for 
classification of certification domains. 
As mentioned, CF is a domain that requires the definition of new proprietary terms. 
More ontologies with small 'o' need to be created. The proposed CF-CoC framework 
provided in this dissertation will aid the role player to represent CoC by defining new 
proprietary terms and publish such information on the web of data in RDF format. 
Today, the semantic web is made up oflinked data. This means that the semantic web 
is the "what: what we need to achieve" and the linked data is the "how: how we can 
achieve a semantic web". Despite this crucial role of linked data, there is no work 
provided in literature to represent CF information using this technology or 
representing such information in a lightweight ontology. All the work from the 
literature try to represent CF information using deep ontologies or using different 
representation models (state of the art related to representing forensic information 
will be discussed in Section 2.2.2). This dissertation will discuss (in Chapter 3) the 
advantages ofusing LDP to represent CF information. 
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2.2.2 Cyber forensics and digital evidence 
The second discipline in the state of the art section is related to CF and digital 
evidence. Despite the infancy of the CF field, many works have been provided related 
to the forensic processes, CoC, and forensic formats. 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the most basic level of a forensic pro cess con tains three 
phases. However, there exist numerous forensic models in literature, each of which 
relies upon reaching a consensus about how to describe digital forensics and evidence 
(Andrew, 2007; Kohn et al., 2008). Many works were provided either to explain orto 
compare between such models. 
2.2.2.1 Forensic Processes 
The works provided under this category concentrated on the creation of different 
forensics processes. Different Digital Forensics Process Models (DFPM) have been 
proposed since 2000 (e.g., Kruse (Kruse II et Reiser, 2001), the United State 
Department of Justice (USDOJ) (Ballou, 2010), Casey (Casey et al. , 2014), Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop (DFRW) (Palmer, 2001), and Ciarhuin in (Ciardhuain, 
2004)) to assist the players of investigations to reach conclusions upon completion. 
A forensic process contains a set of forensic phases that are executed in sequence. 
Technicians of each forensic process are responsible for providing all forensic 
information resulting from their investigation, and so on, until the end of a forensic 
process. Figure 2.6 shows an activity diagram of a forensic process called the Kruse 
model. Its phases are also mentioned in Figure 1.1. 
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Acquisition Authentication Anatysls 
Figure 2.6 Activity diagram of Kruse model 
Investigation models are numerous. Many works were provided (Ciardhuain, 2004; 
Garfinkel et al., 2006; Kahn et al., 2008; Ballou, 201 0; Yusoff et al., 2011; Casey et 
al. , 2014) (see Table 2.4) to explain and compare such models . Sorne phases from 
different forensics models may have identical technical requirements, but they differ 
only in their names (Carrier, 2006). The work presented in (Yusoff et al., 2011) 
underlines 46 phases from 15 selected investigation models that have been produced 
throughout 1995 to 2010, and then identifies the commonly shared processes between 
these models. 
Sorne phases of a forensic model may overlap with another model. For example, the 
analysis phase is common between USDOJ, DFRWS, and Reith models. Bach of 
those phases is assigned to one or more technicians. Thus, the number of forensic 
phases and how many technicians are assigned to each phase determine the total 
number of technicians participating in the forensic investigation. Bach forensic phase 
also contains a set of forensic tasks. In addition, these tasks may overlap and be 
similar to other tasks in other forensic models. 
Table 2.4 
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This section explains the phases of the Kruse madel (Kruse II et Reiser, 2001) in 
detail, since it is the madel that encompasses three basic phases of ·any forensic 
investigation. The three phases are acquisition of the evidence, authentication of the 
recovered evidence and analysis of the evidence. The next figure shows the use case 
diagram of the Kruse madel. It shows the three phases of this madel and the 
technician assigned to each phase. 
------------<Ccquîs l1:1o0 
Firs t R esponder 
--'-----------4Cü1:hen1:1cao:î~ 
Au"':hent:lcat:or 
------------(c An a lysîs :=:> 
Analyzer 
Figure 2.7 Use case diagram ofKruse madel 
The next three paragraphs briefly explain each phase separately. Also, see Figure 1.1: 
• Acquisition: this phase is about acquiring digital evidence from digital 
suspected deviees (e.g., closed-scale deviees, large-scale deviees, etc.). It 
contains three forensics tasks: state preservation, recovering, and copying. 
The technician of this phase is called the "first responder" (Kahn et al. , 
2008; Ballou, 2010; Yusoff et al. , 2011). 
o State preservation: the first task is saving the state of the digital 
deviee under question, by seizing the machine containing the 
suspected storage deviee. 
o Recovery: after seizing the suspected deviee, the technician tries to 
recover all deleted files on the deviee because the main objective of 
recovery task is to restore the deleted file, especially the system 
files that record valuable details about this suspected deviee. 
62 
o Copy: after recovering the deleted files, the first responder takes 
copy from the suspected deviee to avoid tampering and alteration. 
• Authentication: the technician of this phase is called the "authenticator". It 
is the process of ensuring that the acquired evidence has not been altered 
and kept its integrity, from the time it was extracted to the time it was 
transmitted and stored by an authorized source (Menezes et al., 1996). 
Until normal circumstances, a change to the evidence will render the 
evidence inadmissible in court. Investigators authenticate the digital media 
by generating a checksum (Hash) of its contents (i.e. , using the MD5, SHA, 
and CRC algorithms). Checksum is like an electronic fingerprint (i.e., 
unique numerical value) in that it is almost impossible for two digital 
media with different data to have the same checksums. The main aim 
behind this task is showing that the checksums of the seized media 
(suspected) and the trusted (image) are identical and allows the 
authenticator to effectively and confidently stand by the integrity of the 
data in court. 
• Analysis: this is the last and most time-consuming step in this model. The 
technician of this phase is the analyzer. In this phase, the investigator tries 
to uncover the wrongdoing of the crime by examining the acquired data, 
such as files and directories, in order to identify pieces of evidence and 
determine their significance and probative value, drawing conclusions 
based on the evidence found. In (Carrier, 2003), three major categories of 
evidence are defined that should be considered in the analysis phase: 
o Inculpatory evidence: evidence that supports a given theory (illegal 
pictures on the hard drive). 
2.2.2.2 
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o Exculpatory evidence: evidence that contradicts a given theory 
(time stamp proves that the suspect did not commit the crime). 
o Evidence of tampering: evidence which cannot be related to any 
theory, but shows that the system was tampered with to avoid 
identification. 
Improving CoCs 
Several works are provided in the literature to improve the CoC. The work presented 
in (Giova, 2011) provides the idea of exploiting RDF structures to improve an 
expansible open format of AFF4. In (Co sic et Baca, 201 Ob), a conceptual Digital 
Evidence Management Framework (DEMF) was proposed to implement secure and 
reliable digital evidence CoC. This framework answered the 'who', 'what' , 'why' , 
'when', 'where' and 'how' questions. The 'what' is answered using a fingerprint of 
evidence. The 'how' is answered using the hash similarity to changes control. The 
'who' is answered using the biometrie identification and authentication for digital 
signing. The 'when' is answered using the automatic and trusted time stamping. 
Finally, the 'where' is answered using two tracking technologies such as Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), for geo-
location. 
Another work in (Cosic et Baca 2010a) discusses the integrity of CoC through the 
adaptation of hashing algorithm for signing digital evidence by taking into 
consideration identity, date and time of access of a digital evidence. The authors 
proposed a valid time stamping provided by a secure third party to sign digital 
evidence in all stages of the investigation pro cess. 
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Other published work to improve the CoC is based on a hardware solution. SYPRUS 
Company provides the Hydra PC solution. It is an entire securely protected, self-
contained, portable PC deviee that is connected to Universal Seriai Bus (USB) port, 
which provides high-assurance cryptographie products to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and non-repudiation of a digital evidence with highest-strength 
cryptographie technology (Jueneman et LaPedis, 2011). This solution is considered 
an indirect improve to the CoC, as it protects the digital evidence from modification 
and violation (Brown, 2009). 
2.2.2.3 Knowledge representation of CF processes and CoCs 
The work on the knowledge representation created in CF concentrates on the 
representation of CF models or on digital evidence (as indirect improvement for the 
Co Cs). 
An attempt made to represent the knowledge discovered during the identification and 
analysis phase of the investigation process (Bogen et Dampier, 2004). This attempt 
uses the Universal Modeling Language (UML) for representing knowledge. It has 
been extended to a unified modeling methodology framework (UMMF) to describe 
and think about planning, performing and documenting forensics tasks. 
Another work presented in (Kôhn et al., 2008) explains how different CF processes 
are modeled using UML. In this work, the use cases and activity diagrams are 
presented in order to clarify the limitations of such processes. 
Research is also provided in (Schatz, 2007) that proposes that the formai 
representational approach will be beneficiai for the CF. This work summarized the 
nature of digital evidence and digital investigation at a fundamentallevel. 
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Other works are also presented in (Schatz et al., 2004a, 2004b ). Indirectly they try to 
improve the CoC through the representation of digital evidence. Both works 
concentrated mainly on the representation and correlation of the digital evidence and 
as an indirect consequence to (im)prove of the CoC. 
Recently, a new work is provided in (Al-Fedaghi et Al-Babtain, 2012) to model the 
forensic process. This work proposed an abstract model for the digital forensic based 
on the flow-based specification methodology. This methodology is generally used to 
represent several items, such as data, information, or signals using the Flowthing 
. Model (FM), which contains six stages (arrived, accepted, processed, released, 
created, and transferred) allowing anyone to draw the system using flow systems. 
2.2.2.4 Forensic Formats 
Over the last few years, different forensic formats were provided. In 2006, Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop (DRWS) formed a working group called Common 
Digital Evidence Storage Format (CDEF) for storing digital evidence and associated 
metadata (Common Digital Storage Format (CDEF), 2009) surveyed the following 
disk image main formats (Simson et al., 2006): AFF, Encase Expert Witness Format 
(EWF), Digital Evidence Bag (DEB), gfzip, ProDiscover, and SMART (now sold 
under the name ofEnCase). 
Most of these formats can store lirnited amounts of metadata, such as case name, 
evidence name, authenticator name, date, place, and hash code to assure data integrity 
(CDESF, 2009). The most commonly used formats are described here. AFF is 
defined by Garfinkel et al. in (Garfinkel et al., 2006) as a disk image container, which 
supports storing arbitrary metadata, such as sector size and deviee serial number, in a 
single archive. The EWF format is produced by EnCase's imaging tools. It contains 
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checksums, a hash for verifying the integrity of the contained Image, and error 
information describing bad sectors on the source media. 
Later, Tuner's digital evidence bags (DEB) proposed a container for digital evidence 
scene artifacts, metadata, information integrity, and access and usage audit records 
(Turner, 2005). However, such format is limited to name/value pairs and makes no 
provision for attaching semantics to the name. lt attempts to replicate key features of 
physical evidence bags, which are used for traditional evidence capturing. 
The work in (Cohen et al., 2009) observed problems to be corrected in the first 
version of AFF. They released the AFF4 user specifie metadata functionalities. They 
described the use of distributed evidence management systems AFF4 based on an 
imaginary company that has offices in two different countries. AFF4 extends the AFF 
to support multiple data sources, logical evidence, and severa! others enhancements 
such as the support of forensic workflow and the storing of arbitrary metadata. Said 
work explained that the RDF (Beckett et McBride, 2004) resources can be exploited 
with AFF4 in arder to improve the forensics process madel. The authors in this work 
provided and implemented an architecture that is capable of storing multiple 
heterogeneous data type that might arise in all modem investigation. 
The technician can use any one of these forensic formats. Each forensic tool can 
generate one or more forensic format(s) that can describe specifie forensic results 
(e.g., AFF4 can be generated by the EnCase imaging tool and provide information 
about the size of digital media, its chunk size, its chunks in segment, etc.). The 
technician player is able to manipulate such formats and record different information 
in his CoC. The framework proposed in this thesis will let the technician to define his 
own custom terms to describe different forensic information recorded in the CoCs. 
The AFF4 is an evolution in forensic imaging technology. The oldest forms of 
forensic images had severa} limitations (e.g., raw image or sometimes named dd 
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image, stands for data description) . Sorne of these shortcomings were: the size of the 
image is exactly the same as the size of the source deviee (no compression), and the 
oldest images were not able to keep metadata with image. Metadata must be kept. 
extemally and manually associated with the image. AFF4 was able to overcome such 
limitations by offered compression and started storing metadata within the image. 
AFF4 uses metadata as its central abstraction by storing ali known information in an 
RDF model (subject-predicate-object). The subject is the globally unique name 
(URN) generated by GUID (Global Unique Identifier) for an AFF4 object, the 
predicate is a verb from a known lexicon. Ali AFF4 statements are stored in a 
resolver, which is a central point which manages the AFF4 information model. The 
following is an example serialized in turtle language of URN globally unique 
identifier for a file found on the path /test/imagel4 : 
<aff4 :11123 -abc/test/image> 
aff4:chunk_size 74628; 
aff4:compression <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl951.txt>; 
aff4:size 2719; 
aff4: stored <aff4://235-abcd>; 
a aff4 :image 
The above turtle code provides sorne information about the image in form of RDF 
model( e.g. , chunk, compression, size), the type of the object URN(e.g. , 1230-abc) is 
AFF4 image, and the object is stored in a volume URN, (e.g. , aff4://235-abcd). 
Integration can be performed between this RDF model and other models. 
Briefly, this section (Section 2.2) discussed the works related to the new epoch of the 
semantic web and different forensic representation models. This dissertation will 
14 http://www.aff4.org/docs/Overview/Introduction.html 
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discuss how to represent and improve the forensic information using the LDP, as well 
as how the RDFS constructors and sorne primitives of OWL can describe and define 
the CoC documents related to the CF domain in order to be published and consumed 
by the role players and judge, to facilitate the consumption of digital evidence. 
2.3 Fostering trustworthiness among role players and judges 
Firstly, from the side of the legal system, before digital evidence can be presented for 
persuasive use, it must be admitted by the judge in court (lnsa 2007; Krotoski et al. , 
2011; Finklea et Theohary, 2012). Admissibility refers to the requirements for 
evidence to be entered into a court case. There are three common factors that make 
evidence admitted to the court: 
• Authenticity: it refers to whether or not the evidence is authentic, or what it is 
purported to be. This means a process for establishing that digital evidence is 
what it is represented to be. Authentication refers to legal concepts that 
promote the integrity of investigation process by ensuring tendered evidence 
establish what are offered to prove. For example, is the hard drive being 
seized the correct hard drive that contains the suspected evidence or it has 
been altered?, therefore sorne degree of authentication is required. 
• Relevancy: it refers to the relevance of presented evidence to the case m 
question. Are the used and provided evidence related to the case, and do they 
add weighted/significant value to the investigation? 
• Reliability: refers to whether or not the evidence meets sorne "minimum 
standard of trustworthiness", this means the creditability of a source that is 
being used as evidence. It is realized through respecting sorne legal concepts 
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such as the "Daubert" standard or Frye test, which was superseded by Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE) as the standard for admissibility of expert evidence 
in federal court (Bernstein, 2001). Each country and province may have its 
own rules. For example, sorne states in the United States use the "Daubert'' 
guidelines (Farrell, 1993). When technical or scientific evidence is presented 
before the court, these guidelines are used to prevent 'junk' science from 
being exploited in the courtroom (Smith et Bace, 2002): 
o Have the procedures (forensic procedures and techniques) been 
published, preferably in a journal? 
o Has the professional community accepted these published procedures? 
o Have the procedures been tested? 
o What is the error tolerance rate of these procedures? 
Reliability and authentication are much related, but both are distinct concepts. The 
purpose of reliability is to establish whether evidence is what it purports to be, while 
the authentication is to ensure that the admitted evidence has not been tampered with. 
For example, if there is video footage of a murder, even if the footage is authentic, 
meaning it was not tampered with, the prosecutor must prove the video was reliable 
(i.e. , that this video footage actually depicted this particular murder). 
Such factors aid the role players to legally complete their CoC documents and 
improve their contents (i.e. , all information provided in this document and describing 
each forensic phase should respect these common elements). Another level should be 
fulfilled including: the thoroughness in verifying the origin of this information, where 
this information came from, how it was collected (reliability), who collected this 
information, what this information is (authenticity), when it was collected, and why it 
was collected (relevance). Thus, five "Ws" and one "H" questions should accompany 
ail recorded information in order to build trustworthiness among role players and the 
judge. The ability to track the origin of information is a key component in fostering 
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and demonstrating trustworthiness, which is required finally for the admissibility of 
any digital evidence. 
Secondly, from the side of the web itself, the web is a decentralized system full of 
information provided by a vast number of instruments in every discipline of science 
and diverse open sources of varying quality. In arder to make effective use of the 
web, provenance metadata should be accompanied by the data itself to describe how 
datais collected and processed (i.e., 'Who' created and published the data and 'How' 
the data are published, etc.). This information provides the means for quality 
assessment for different web resources such as documents, services, ontologies, and 
datasets. Such resources can also be queried, exploited to reason and consumed to 
identify their outdated information (Bonatti et al., 2011 ). 
Provenance metadata are not only used to assess data quality but can also support a 
number of uses (Gobie, 2002; Pearson, 2002; Cameron, 2003), such as audit trail (i .e., 
to determine resource usage and detect errors in data generation), attribution (i.e., 
establish ownership of data and enable its citation), or/and informational purposes 
(i.e. , using metadata to browse and provide a context to interpret data and more 
supplementary information related to the data). In addition, because the data on the 
web is vast, the need for automated processes to annotate all of them is increased 
(Berry et al. , 2003). Interestingly, this was also the main concem of the International 
Provenance and Annotation Workshop Series (IP AW) 15. 
Bence, CoC forensic information should also include provenance metadata. Such 
metadata can be exploited to give the judge more information about the CoC such as 
its provenance, its completeness and its timeliness. This information strengths the 
provenance dimension of the published data. 
15 http://www.ipaw.info/ 
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According to the literature, various methodologies are supported by the semantic web 
to integrate provenance information to the published data. The straight-forward 
approach following the Linked Data principles is to use the URI of the RDF 
document, the data is retrieved from, as subject for statements about its provenance 
(i.e. , meta data should be represented as RDF triples describing the document in 
which the original data is contained) (Eckert, 2013). Such methodologies can be 
classified into three main categories. The first category uses the provenance 
vocabularies of the semantic web (Brickley et Miller, 2014; DCMI, 2015). The 
second one is to use the Open Provenance Model (OPM) (Moreau et al. , 2011). The 
last category uses the Narned Graph (NG) for RDF triples to add provenance 
metadata about each group of triples. Several provenance vocabularies types are 
listed in (Hartig et Zhao, 2012). 
2.3.1 Provenance vocabularies 
Widely deployed provenance vocabularies are the Dublin Core (DC) (DCMI, 2015), 
Friend of a Friend (FOAF) (Brickley et Miller, 2014), etc. considered as built-in 
vocabularies on the semantic web, which contain predicates that can provide extra 
information related to the published data. The objects of these predicates can be 
represented by URI (e.g., dereferenceable resources) or literai/terminal identifying 
such objects. Another provenance vocabulary provided in (Hartig, 2009; Hartig et 
Zhao, 201 0) describes how provenance metadata can be created and accessed on the 
web of data. 
All vocabularies presented in the ·semantic web can express the quality and 
trustworthiness of any published data. 
Trust is a term with many definitions and it is always equated with provenance, but 
both terms are not the same. The former is derived from provenance information, and 
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it is subjective and depends on the context, while the latter is used to address the 
verification of an identity to access an entity. In many cases establishing trust for an 
entity involves analyzing its origin and authenticity. 
Provenance and authentication are often conflated to establish trust. For example, a 
publisher for a document may also need a digital signature to be authenticated and 
verified by a third party. (i.e., an example has been provided in Figure 2.4). 
2.3.2 Open Provenance Model (OPM) 
Dming a session on provenance standardization in 2006, the provenance research 
community raised a challenge to understand better the capabilities of different 
systems, the representations they used for provenance, their similarities, their 
difference. At this time the first provenance challenge was born to provide a forum 
for the community to understand provenance systems. After that this was followed by 
second provenance challenge aiming at establishing inter-operability of systems, by 
exchanging provenance information. In June 2008, the first OPM workshop was held 
to discuss sorne requirements to allow provenance information to be exchanged 
between systems, allow developers to build and share tools that operate on such 
provenance model. 
The Open Provenance Model (OPM) is a more expressive vocabulary that describes 
provenance in terms of entities such as agents, artifacts, and processes (Freire et al., 
2008; Moreau et al., 2011). Simply, its main objective is to capture dependencies 
between these entities by constructing provenance graph. Therefore, nodes, artifacts, 
processes or agents, can be connected by directed edges. An edge represents a 
relation between its source, denoting the effect, and its destination, denoting the 
cause. An artifact is generated by a process; a process used an artifact; a process is 
triggered by another process. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~--~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
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Another work provided in (Zhao, 201 0) exp lains the Open Provenance Model 
Vocabulary (OPMV), which implements the OPM model using lightweight OWL and 
assert the OPM concepts. Open Provenance Model Vocabulary OPMV can also be 
used with other provenance vocabularies, such as DC (DCMI, 2015) and FOAF. 
2.3.3 Named Graph (NG) 
Whilst many authors advocate the use of semantic web technologies (i.e., 
vocabularies, Light weight ontologies), the work in (Carroll et al. , 2005) proposed 
Named Graphs (NG) as an entity denoting a collection of triples . The idea of the 
named graph is to take a set ofRDF triples and consider them as one graph, assigning 
toit a URI reference. 
Thus, URis are used to identify collections of statements. Triple store or RDF store is 
a database for the storage and retrieval of triples through queries of the semantic ·web. 
Adding a name to the triple makes a "quad store" or named graph. 
In addition, URI can be assigned to a set of triples, and treat this set as a subset based 
on its graph identifier (i.e. , graph URI). Extending the RDF model from triple to a 
quad is useful when managing RDF dataset, such as tracking provenance ofRDF data 
(i.e., track the metadata associated to this URI), versioning (i.e., add more description 
to the URI, label and description), or may also add extra semantic to the URI 
identifier using different vocabularies of the semantic web. 
For example, ifwe have an RDF graph containing two set oftriples (see Figure 2.8): 
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Figure 2.8 RDF triples 
The first triple consists of URI subj ect of type ''foaf:Agent" and the second triple is 
the same URI subject that has a computer science value as an abject with a predicate 
''foaf tapie _interest ". Bath triples can be named together using as a single URI 
identifier as shawn in the next figure: 
URl Graph 
Identifier 
! 
http:/ /example.org/Peter.tt l 
RDF Model 
! 
@prefix foaf: <http:/ /xm lns.com/foaf/0.1 
http: //example.org/Peter#me 
a foaf:Agent 
foaf: topic_i nterest: "computer science" 
Figure 2.9 Named Graph for RDF madel 
As shawn in Figure 2.9, the RDF madel contains two triples . Bath triples are 
described using the vocabulary of FOAF. Metadata can not only be added inside the 
graph. It can also be used to describe the URI identifier of the graph itself, as shawn 
in the next figure : 
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de: date 25- 0 4 -2010 
http://examp le .org/Pete r.ttl 
Figure 2.10 Graph identifier with metadata 
Adding metadata to the URI graph identifier facilitates the graph management or 
facilitates the management of a set of triples assembled within this graph. For 
example, in Figure 2.1 0, the property terms dc:date and dc.publisher are used from 
the DC vocabulary (DCMI, 2015). One provides the date and the other provides the 
publisher name. Therefore, these metadata will be applied automatically to each triple 
inside the graph. Thus, the first and the second triple will also have the same date and 
publisher name. 
Therefore, the NG is useful to the consumer to navigate and access provenance 
metadata related to certain sets of triples and to get more description about them. 
Another example for that is the LDspider (Isele et al. , 2010), which allows crawled 
data to be stored in quad store using the named graphs data madel. 
In addition, as the SPARQL is widely used for querying RDF data, it can also be used 
in the named graph to query single or sets of named graphs. Recent work published in 
(Omitola et al., 2011) allows publishers to add and trace provenance metadata to the 
elements of their datasets. This is presented through the extension of the VoiD 
(Vocabulary of Interlinked Datasets) vocabulary into "voidp" vocabulary (i.e., 
lightweight provenance extension for the void vocabulary) (Alexander etHausenblas, 
2009). VoiD is an RDF Schema vocabulary for expressing metadata about RDF 
datasets. VoiD is used to relate publishers and users of RDF data and to express 
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general metadata based on DC, access metadata ( describe how RDF data can be used 
using various protocols), structural metadata (describe the schema of datasets and is 
useful for tasks such as querying and data integration) and links between datasets 
(describe how multiple datasets are related and can be uses together). Also, the VoiD 
vocabulary considered different properties such as dataset signature, signature 
method, certification and authority, in order to prove the origin of a dataset and its 
authentication. 
To summarize, the state of the art in this section discussed two important points. The 
first point concems how legal documents prepared by the role player can be 
admissible in the court of law. The second point discussed different provenance 
teclmologies that can be used to add extra information to the published data which 
can be useful in the context of CF. 
2.4 Judges awareness of the digital evidence 
Judges awareness of digital evidence is related to the fact that judges do not usually 
have the technical knowledge related to the field of ICT (Kessler, 2010). Judges 
should have different means to consume and understand the published data related to 
the digital evidence. The state of the art related to this problem concerns different 
consumption patterns that can be used by the consumer of the LD to navigate 
between different resources and to expand (i.e., dereference, "follow-your-nose" 
style) resources to discover, get and understand the represented information. 
From the state of the art of consumption application on the semantic web, there exist 
four different patterns to consume any published data. As mentioned, LD is a style of 
publishing data that makes it easy to interlink, discover and consume them on the 
semantic web. The main way to publish LD on the web is to make URis that identify 
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data items dereferenceable into RDF descriptions. Consumers can use four different 
patterns to consume the information through browsing, crawling, querying and 
reasonmg. 
Also, in this section, Linked Education (LE) will be discussed (Dunkel et al., 2006; 
Evangelia et al. , 2011). Nowadays, e-leaming researchers are trying to exploit the 
LDP to establish a well-interlinked data for the education domain. This era of 
research will not be used in the framework, but it should be mentioned, because it can 
be considered to extend the framework with more educational resources in a future 
work. · 
2.4.1 Browsing pattern 
· Browsing is like the traditional web browsers that allow users to navigate between 
HTML pages (see Figure 2.2, web of documents) . The same idea applied for LD to 
interact with the web of data (Heath, 2008), but the browsing is perforrned through 
the navigation over different resources by following RDF links and downloading 
them from a separate URL (Quan et Karger 2004) (e.g., RDF browsers such as 
Disco 16, Tabulator17, or OpenLink Browser18) (see Figure 2.3, web of data). 
16 http:/ /wifoS-03. informatik. uni-mannheim.de/b izer/ng4j/disco/ 
17 http://www.w3 .org/2005/aj ar/tab 
18 http://virtuoso.openlinksw.com/dataspace/doc/dav/wiki!Main/ 
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2.4.2 Crawling pattern 
RDF Crawlers are developed to crawl LD from the web by following RDF links. 
Crawling linked LD is a search using a keyword related to the item in which 
consumers are interested (Cheng et Qu, 2009) (e.g., SWSE (Hogan et al., 2013) and 
Swoogle (Ding et al., 2004)). 
2.4.3 Querying pattern 
Consumers can also perform extra search filtering using query agents . This type of 
searching is performed when SPARQL endpoints are installed, allowing expressive 
queries to be asked against the dataset (Hartig et al., 2009). Furthermore, a VoiD 
vocabulary (vocabulary of interlinked datasets) (Alexander et Hausenblas, 2009) 
contains a set of instructions that help VoiD users. By following them one can 
succeed in his/her discovery and exploitation and usage of LD datasets through 
dereferenceable HTTP-URis (navigation) or SPARQL endpoints (searching), using 
SP ARQL protocol ("void:sparqlendpoint ") or URI protocol. 
As mentioned in Section 1.2.3, judges are more specialized in the legal domain and 
know more about law procedures. Many do not have ICT skills. The solution that has 
been proposed in the literature is to organize a training program to educate judges 
about the field of ICT (Kessler, 201 0). This dissertation argues against this solution's 
direction and will provide e-CoCs that can be consumed using different consumption 
patterns. 
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2.4.4 Reasoning pattern 
The filtering of information is not restricted to extracting explicit information that is 
stored physically in RDF datasets. It can go beyond. Reasoning pattern can infer 
implicit information from the RDF triples. As the number of lightweight ontology 
constructors describing proprietary terms increases, the possibility of inferring extra 
information also increases (see Section 2.2.1.4). 
2.4.5 Linked Education (LE) 
Since 2001 , when Tim Berners-Lee presented the semantic web as a web 
interpretable by machines, the researchers of e-learning have been trying to exploit 
semantic web technologies for e-learning. They provided several works on this 
research. For example, sorne works (Dunkel et al. , 2006; Evangelia et al. , 2011) 
underlined the advantages of using the semantic web for representing the learning 
object metadata. Other works provided the use of ontologies to describe the contents 
of learning resources or modeling an e-learning environment by means of a multi 
agents system (Dietze et al., 2012; Dietze et al. , 2013; Ke131er et al. , 2013). 
However, despite these proposais, different learning repositories are still isolated 
from each others. The Technology Enhanced Learning (TEL) is a new synonym for 
e-learning and refers to technology enhanced classrooms and learning with 
technology in order to enhance the e-learning. It has focused on the interoperability 
(integration) and reuse of different learning resources and data on the web. They tried 
to alleviate the great challenge about the heterogeneity of such resources and data. 
Their works were concentrated on two dimensions: the metadata scheme (e.g. , LOM 
and ADL SCORM (Sharable Content Object Reference Model (SCORM), 2004) and 
the interface mechanism (e.g. , OAI-PMH AND SQI (Van de Sompel et al. , 2001 ; 
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Lagoze et Van de Sompel, 2003)), which are used to support the interoperability and 
share different resources on the web in an open way. Despite these works, the 
integration process is not totally accomplished, and it will be costly to integrate all 
repositories together. 
Nowadays, the researchers of the TEL field find that the LDP is a fertile land to 
represent and integrate different educational resources. Their works is concentrated 
on adopting the interface mechanism and metadata scheme into the LDP (Schatz, 
2007; Farouk et Ishizuka, 2012). 
As been discussed, the LDP provide the "How" to create a semantic web. LDP 
provide well-established principles and vocabularies based on the technology stack 
(e.g., URLs, HTTP, and RDF) that facilitate the data interoperability, accessibility 
and reusability. These features can ultimately be leveraged to construct rich and well-
interlinked data for the educational domain. A new research field has emerged called 
the 'Linked Education'. 
2.5 Security of COC information 
The CoC documents must be affixed securely when they are transported from one 
place to another. Usually, this occurs by sealing the envelope containing the tangible 
documents. This will not be the same for the information that will be represented to 
be consumed by computers. Sorne security algoritluns should arise to accommodate 
the digital nature of information. 
In the literature, there exist vast security algorithms. The most related work in 
literature to the LD was provided in (Rajabi et al., 2012). In their work the authors 
explained how Public-key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to achieve the trustworthiness 
of LD and how different datasets are exchanged in a trusted way. As well, the work 
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provided in (Cobden et al., 2011), outlined in a vision paper the need to have an 
access restriction on the LOD. Each work apart does not provide the complete picture 
to realize the LCD using PKI. 
In (Rajabi et al., 2012), the work explains how the PKI can be used to secure the 
resources of LD but did not put the scope on how such stuff can be implemented and 
applied. This work can bring out a new epoch of research related to the counter part 
of LOD, Linked Closed Data - LCD, where the publisher would take steps of 
imposing access restrictions to protect his information. 
However, in (Cobden et al., 2011), the work outlined the need of the LCD in certain 
fields (e.g., business and finance), but did not refer to the PKI solution or how the 
LCD can be realized. This dissertation complements and completes the half picture of 
both works, by explaining how the PKI and digital certificates are used to restrict the 
access of resources in the LD cloud while keeping the resolvability of such resources, 
to crea te LCD. 
Both works did not provide a solution to secure resources while maintaining their 
resolvability. This statement is still an open debate. In severa! situations, URI/URL 
resources need to obey sorne access restrictions, where a specifie set of people are 
those who are authorized to access such resources. LDP should be bended to realize 
the adaptation of publishing and consuming the resources on a closed scale without 
losing the resolvability feature of these resources. Thus, a trade-off question arises in 
this case: how can we realize the access restriction over certain URI/URL resources 
while keeping the resolvability feature of the same resources from anonymous 
consumption? A very good example to elaborate on this idea is the topic presented in 
this dissertation, where the represented CoC resources should obey access restrictions 
in order to be shared on a closed scale among role players and the judge, while 
keeping the resolvability feature of these resources. Chapter 3 will discuss the 
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possibility to resolve this compromising question and how PKI can be applied to 
secure the forensic information. 
This section also underlines sorne concepts from literature related to the PKI, 
especially the digital certificates: what are digital certificates? Their purposes? Their 
protocols? Their types? How can they be exchanged? 
2.5.1 PKI and digital certificates 
PKI is a combination of softwares and procedures providing a means to create, 
manage, use, distribute, store, and revoke digital certificates (Blaze et al., 1999; Kuhn 
et al., 2001; Barker et al., 2009; Davies 2011). PKI is called Public-key because it 
works with a key pair: the public-key and the private-key. 
A digital certificate is a piece of information that indicates a recognized proof of a 
person's identity (e.g. , a passport). It uses the key pair managed by the PKI to 
exchange securely the information in order to create trustworthiness among data 
pro vider and data consumer in a network environment (En trust, 201 0) (i .e., 
trustworthiness occurs when the receiver is reassured of the identity of the sender. As 
mentioned, it is known as non-repudiation). 
Digital Certificate 
ldentity of certificate Owner 
- Dis ting uis hed Name 
- Owner·s Public K ey 
General Information 
1 
- Issue date 
- E x pira tion date 
Information about CA 
- Distinguished Name 
- CA's S ig n a tu re 
CA 's Private Key 
~ 
1 
Message Digest 
ô 
J Generat 
Signa 
e Digita l 
ture 
Figure 2.11 Digital certificate (Davies 2011) 
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Any certificate (see Figure 2.11) con tains the identity of the certificate owner, su ch as 
the distinguished narne, and information about the Certification Authority (CA -
issuer of certification), such as CA's signature of that certificate as well as the 
expiration date and the certificate's issuance date (Perlrnan, 1999). 
A digital certificate alone can never be proof of anyone's identity. A third trusted 
party is needed to confirmand sign the validity of each certificate and share securely 
the cryptographie key pair. This party is called "Certification Authority" (CA). 
Since a CA (e.g. , VeriSign Inc., Entrust Inc., Enterprise Java Bean Certificate 
Authority-EJBCA, etc.) relies on public trust, it will not put its reputation on the line 
by signing a certificate unless it is sure of its validity, which rnakes them acceptable 
in the business environment. 
Ali digital certificates provide the sarne level of security, whether they are created by 
a well-known issuer, or by an unknown one. Usually, the information providers 
request their certificates from well-known parties when they provide services and 
information to large segments in society. 
2.5.2 Purposes and advantages 
A digital certificate has various security purposes and advantages that can be used to 
(Kuhn et al., 2001): 
• Allow only the authorized participant (sender/receiver) to decrypt the 
encrypted transrnitted information (i.e., encryption). 
• Verify the identity of either sender or recipient (i.e. , Authentication). 
• Keep the privacy of transmitted information only to the intended audience 
(i .e., privacy/confidentiality). 
84 
• Sign different information using a signature algorithm (e.g., Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir, and Leonard Adlernan (RSA) (Rivest et al. , 1983), Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA) (Alajbegovié et al. , 2006), etc.) in order to ensure the 
integrity of information and confirm the identity of the signer of such 
information (i.e. , digital signatures). Digital signatures also solve the non-
repudiation problern by not allowing the sender to dispute that he was the 
originator of the sent message. 
2.5.3 Protocols 
In the field of ICT, the digital certificate is called "SSL/TLS certificate" because it 
uses two essential protocols : the SSL and the TLS 19• The former is the short version 
of the Secure Socket Module. This protocol is used to describe a security protocol 
underlying a secure communication between a server and a client. 
After upgrading this protocol with sorne encryption standards, the protocol got 
another acronyrn called TLS, which is standing for Transport Layer Security. Both 
protocols are based on the public-key cryptography (Perlrnan, 1999). They are used to 
establish a secure connection over the HTTP. Classically, the HTTP establishes an 
unencrypted connection without using_the SSL and TLS (i.e., ifthere is sorne intruder 
around monitoring the communication between server and client, he can corne with 
all plain data packages of such transferred data). HTTP is then extended to HTTPS to 
secure the connection and encrypt all the transferred data with the SSL (i.e., HTTP + 
SSLITLS = HTTPS) (Request For Comment (RFC), 1999). 
19 https://www.evsslcertificate.com/ssl/description-ssl.html 
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2.5.4 Types and exchanges 
There exist three types of digital certificates. Figure 2.12 presents an abstract scenario 
where Alice and Bob want to share information over a secure connection (i.e., 
HTTPS). 
Firstly, Alice and Bob should determine a third trusted party called the CA. The latter 
is responsible to issue SSLITLS certificates for both of them so that they can identify 
themselves to one other. CA issues two types of certificates: server certificates and 
client certificates. 
• Server certificate: this certificate is issued by the CA and is used by Alice 
(i.e., suppose that she is the owner of the information) to identify herself to 
her authorized clients, like Bob. When Bob tries to access this server, he will 
be sure that he accessed the right one. If Alice fails to identify herself, Bob 
will not trust Alice' s information. 
4. Alice verity the 
CA signature i n 
Bob certificats with 
the CA 
1 . Alice sends 
request for 
SSUTLS 
CA has his own 
Root/CA certificats 
2. CA sign the requests using the 
private key and generate the 
certificates for Alice and Bob 
HTTPS connection 
3. Alice and Bob share their 
certificates created by the CA 
4 . Bob verity the CA' 
signature i n Alice 
certificats with the 
CA 
1 . Bob sends 
request for 
SSUTLS 
certificats 
Figure 2.12 Sharing SSLITLS certificates (Gayed, Lounis et al. 2014a) 
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• Client certificate: the CA issues this certificate, and it is used by Bob (i.e. , 
suppose he is the consumer of Alice's information) to identify himself to 
Alice. Alice will not allow anyone to access her information unless he has a 
certificate known by her. 
• CA certificate: the third certificate is the certificate of the CA itself. 
Sometimes it is called a "self-signed" or "root certificate", because it is the 
CA itself who will sign its certificate. The CA uses this certificate to sign the 
certificate requests received from the clients and servers. In addition, this type 
of certificate answers the question of how Alice and Bob confirm the 
identities of each other. Alice would know that Bob is the right person by 
verifying that his certificate is signed by the common trusted part authority 
(CA), and vice versa. Both identify themselves through the CA certificates. 
From the definitions mentioned above, we notice that there is no distinguishable 
difference between the server certificate and the client certificate; both use the 
certificates to identify themselves to the other. The only difference that distinguishes 
both concerns who is providing the information and who will consume it. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained different concepts and technologies related to the research 
problems. The first part started by introducing the semantic web and how it uses the 
LDP to create web of data. The latter uses the RDF as a standard format to represent 
link and interoperate info rmation on the semantic web. It depicted how RDFS 
constructors and sorne primitives from OWL can be used to create a lightweight 
ontology, how to define new/proprietary terms and how these constructors can be 
used to infer implicit information from the store of RDF triples. 
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This chapter discussed how the LDP is used to create the semantic web and how it 
can be used to represent information using the light weight ontology and define 
proprietary terms. This will be also useful to represent forensic information. This idea 
will be elaborated on Chapter 3 through mentioning several advantages of using LDP 
to represent such information and how lightweight ontology corresponds to forensic 
phases and tasks. 
The second part was about fostering trustworthiness among role players and judge. 
The state of the art mentioned in this part is related to provenance technologies of the 
semantic and how to foster information using different provenance vocabularies and 
techniques. Chapter 3 will discuss how the provenance information can be adapted 
and used to add another dimension to the forensic information. This dimension will 
be considered as a supplementary metadata that will aïd judges to know the origin of 
the published information. 
The third part depicted different consumption patterns that can be used to consume 
any published data on the semantic web. As mentioned, judges usually do not have 
ICT skills and as a result they, may not be able to understand or take the proper 
decisions toward the presented digital evidence. Hence, the main objective of this 
dissertation is to let the judges understand digital evidence presented to them. 
Whatever technology is used to accomplish this objective, it should also be clear in 
its mechanism and methodologies. For example, judges cannot consume published 
data through SP ARQL query language since this consurnption pattern necessitates the 
awareness of semantic web and technical skills to write SP ARQL code. 
Finally, the last part in this chapter discussed the PKI and different advantages of 
digital certificates. The next chapter will discuss how digital certificates can be 
adapted to LOD in order to consume the forensic information on a closed scale 
among role players and the judge (LCD). Requests of certificates will be the 
responsibility of a neutral side that is responsible to select the proper issuer institution 
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to issue the server certificate for its CF-CoC system and the client certificates for the 
judge and role players. 
CHAPTERIII 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodology to build a system that can address 
all research problems. The first problem is that the system must support the 
possibility to transform the CoC from the tangible document into electronic 
information that is consumable by people and machines. Chapter 2 discussed how the 
information is expressed on the semantic web. The question is: how can such 
principles be exploited to represent forensic information, and what are the advantages 
of using su ch representation in cyber forensics? 
The second problem concems trustworthiness that must be built among judges and 
role players. This objective won't be reached unless the judge knows from where 
such represented information came from, and when, who, where and how the 
represented resources are published. Is the semantic web able to provide 
supplementary information to annotate the published resources (Berry et al. , 2003) 
that makes the e-CoC admissible in a court of law? 
The third problem is related to how the judge can manipulate this electronic 
representation instead of the tangible documents. Does the judge own the necessary 
information on how to consume this electronic representation? At the same time, can 
this representation add extra information to help the judge understand the digital 
evidence? 
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The last problem deals with the possibility to use the web aspects, which are used to 
publish public information on the web; to publish and represent information that 
should be used on a closed scale among role players and judges. Is it possible to bend 
such principles to be used on a closed scale and secure the published resources? 
The approach that we present must integrate different solutions to these problems and 
lead to a system able to address all challenges mentioned in Chapter 1. 
3.2 Representing COC using LDP 
The first problem presented in this dissertation is the need to transform the tangible 
CoC into a form that accommodates the digital technologies, especially so that such 
documents contain information about digi~al evidence. The first hypothesis proposed 
to accomplish this radical transformation is to use the semantic web to represent and 
manage the tangible CoC. 
This hypothesis states that the semantic web can be a fertile land to create interlinked 
e-CoCs, which are readable and consumable by people and machines, and the 
forensic information resulting from a forensic tool can be interoperable with these 
interlinked CoCs (Gayed et al., 2012a, 2012b). Before going further, the next part 
will highlight the main reasons to exploit knowledge representation itself (i.e., 
regardless of the how) as a means to transform this information into an electronic 
format. 
Knowledge representation has been persistent at the centre of the field of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) since its founding conference in the '50s (McCalla et Cercone, 
1983; Ringland et Duce, 1988; Shrobe et Szolovits, 1993). This concept is described 
by Davis et al. through several distinct roles (Davis et al. , 1993) a representation 
pla ys: 
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• A surrogate, a substitute for the thing itself: each surrogate corresponds to 
its referent in the real world. Thus, a knowledge representation of a CoC 
serves as a surrogate to that CoC ( e.g., the surrogate of the tangible CoC, 
which ~xists in the physical world, is the representation of the e-CoC). 
• A set of Ontological commitments: according to Gruber, "ontology is an 
explicit specification of a conceptualization" . Conceptualization means that 
an aspect of the world is described by an abstract model. This model 
(including concepts, propert~es and relationships) is described using sorne 
formai language, making it consumable by humans and machines. In this 
context, the representation of the CoC using the LDP will contain 
simplifications and assumptions according to the perspective 
( conceptualization) of the role player to model different forensic entities and 
their relationships using well-defined vocabularies (unambiguous) from the 
s~mantic web. This point will be explained in Section 3 .2.1, point 7. 
• A fragmentary theory of intelligent reasoning: AI uses knowledge 
representation to enable sorne automated reasoning. Different logic 
formalisms are used for knowledge representation to support reasoning and 
inferences. Recently, different works have been provided for linked data 
reasoning (Bonatti et al. , 2011 ; Corby et al. , 2012; Farouk et Ishizuka, 2012; 
Freitas et al. , 2012). As mentioned in Chapter 2, this will be very useful for 
judges to use the machines to infer implicit information from the 
represented information. 
• A medium of human expression: The role player will use knowledge 
representation as a medium to express different concepts about the tangible 
CoCs (extemal world) for the machine or for other people (i.e. , judges). The 
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knowledge representation allows role players to provide more details about 
the CoC. The semantic web is rich with different vocabularies and 
provenance metadata that allow the role player to express CoC information. 
The state of the art in Chapter 2 showed that the semantic web uses LDP as a means 
to crea te web of data. Therefore, next subsection 3 .2.1, discusses advantages of using 
the semantic web and its principles to represent forensic information. Also, it will 
explain why the forensic format resulted from a specifie forensic tool can also be 
interoperable with this represented information. 
After discussing these advantages, the subsection 3.2.2 discusses how forensic phases 
and tasks are corresponding to the ontology structure. Section 3.2.3 explains how this 
forensic information is described on each level: for instance, how to create a forensic 
phase and then how its tasks are described using proprietary terms, as well as how 
these terms are selected and defined to describe different resources associated to each 
task. Finally, how created terms are used to publish forensic infmmation is also 
described. 
3.2.1 Why LDP for representing forensic information? 
There are several advantages for representing the forensic information using LDP 
(Gayed et al., 2013b) : 
1. CoC and LDP have comrnon features. The most common feature is the 
interlinked nature. This feature is indeed shared by CoC and the RDF data 
model. The nature of CoC is characterized by interrelation!dependency of 
information between different phases of the forensics process. Each phase can 
lead to another phase. This interrelation fact is the basic idea ("follow-your-
nose" style) over which the LD is published, discoverable and significantly 
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navigated using RDF links. RDF links in LDP would not only be used to 
relate the different forensic phases together. It can also be used to assert 
connection between the entities described in each forensic phase. Also, RDF 
typed links enable the data publisher to state explicitly the nature of 
connection between different entities in different phases or same phase, which 
is not the case with un-typed hyperlinks used in HTML. 
~--P-ha_s_e_x __ ~l~<------~)~1 ---P-ha_s_e_v __ ~ 
Figure 3.1 Correspondence of forensic phases and LD resources 
As shown in Figure 3.1, as the forensic phases are interlinked together, the resources 
' 
of LD can also be interlinked using forward and backward links. 
2. LDP enable links to be set between items/entities/resources in different data 
sources using a common data model (i.e. , RDF) and web standards (i.e., 
HTTP, URI, and URL). As well, if the CoC is represented using the LDP, the 
items/entities in different phases of a forensic process can also be linked 
together. This will generate a space in which different generic applications 
can be implemented: 
a. Browsing applications: will enable judges and role players to view data 
from one phase and then follow RDF links within the data to other 
phases in the forensics process. 
b. Search engines: judges and role players can crawl the different phases of 
the forensics process using different search keys (keywords). 
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c. Query published information: representing information usmg LDP 
allows the judges and role players to also trigger sophisticated queries to 
infer implicit information. However, they will not write query code by 
themselves, which will be discussed later in consumption patterns. 
Figure 3.2 Interrelation between two datasets 
3. Ontology can contain at least one dataset. As shown in Figure 3.2, a dataset 
contains different RDF triples. Each resource is connected to another resource 
within the same dataset, another dataset, orto ontology. Interrelation between 
entities facilitates their consumption using at least one pattern mentioned 
above. This is also the case between entities/resources of different forensic 
phases. 
4. LD applications that are planned to be used by judges and role players are 
able to translate any data even if it is represented with unknown vocabulary. 
This can be realized using two methodologies: 
a. Firstly, by making the URis that identify vocabulary terms 
dereferenceable (i .e., it means that HTTP clients can look up the URI 
using the HTTP protocol and retrieve a description of the resource that 
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is identified by the URI), so that the client applications can look up the 
terms, which are defined using RDFS and OWL. 
b. Secondly, by publishing mappings between terms from different 
vocabularies in the form of RDF links. Therefore, for any new term 
definition, the consumption applications are able to provide and retrieve 
more information describing the provided data. 
Both facts allow the judge and the role players to explore and navigate between 
resources in order to get supplementary information about such resources. 
5. Nowadays, RDFS (W3C, 2014) and OWL (Dean et al. , 2004; McGuinness, 
2004; Van Harmelen et McGuinness, 2004) are partially adopted in the web 
of data. Both are used to provide vocabularies for describing conceptual 
models in terms of classes and their properties (definition of proprietary 
terms). RDFS vocabularies consist of class "rdfs:Class" and property 
"rdfProperty" definitions, which allow the subsumption relationships 
between terms. This option is useful for judges to infer more information from 
the data in hand using the entailment rules mentioned in Chapter 2. For 
example, as mentioned, RDFS uses a set of relational primitives ( e.g., 
"rdfs:subClassOf", "rdfs:subPropertyOf", "rdfs:domain ", and "rdfs:range ") 
that can be used to define rules allowing additional information to be inferred 
from RDF graphs. 
Also, OWL extends the expressivity of RDFS with additional modeling 
primitives that provide mapping between property terms and class terms at the 
level of equivalency or mverswn (e.g., "owl:equivalentProperty", 
"owl:equivalentClass", "owl:inverseof'). This will be useful for the role player to 
map between terms. This occurs when a role player finds that sorne of the terms 
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that he has created are similar or equivalent to other terms created by another role 
player in another forensic phase. 
OWL and related vocabularies including provenance are not yet fully adopted on 
web of data, but soon the full adaptation will be achieved (Zhao et al., 201 0; 
Glimm et al., 2012). This will be a great advantage to add more property and class 
terms to the ontological dimension of the LD, and therefore, provide useful and 
descriptive information. 
6. By using LDP to represent the CoC, the latter will be enriched with different 
vocabularies such as, Dublin Core (DC) (DCMI, 2015), Friend of a Friend 
(FOAF) (Brickley et Miller, 2014) and Semantic Web Publishing (SWP). In 
addition, vocabulary links are one type of RDF links that can be used to point 
from data to the definitions of the vocabulary terms, which are used to 
represent the data, as well as from these definitions to related terms into other 
vocabularies. This means that there is a mix of data to the definitions. This 
mixture is called "schema" in the LD and contains distinct terms imported 
from different vocabularies to publish the data in question. This mixture may 
include terms from widely used vocabularies, in addition to proprietary terms. 
Thus, we can have severa! vocabulary terms to represent the forensics data 
and make it self-descriptive (i .e., using the two methodologies mentioned in 
point 3) and enable LD applications to integrate the data across vocabularies 
and enrich the data being published. 
7. The forensic information should not confuse judges in courts. Contradictions 
and heterogeneity need to be avoided in the information provided to the 
judges by the role players. LD tries to avoid heterogeneity by advocating the 
reuse of terms from widely deployed vocabularies (same agreement of 
ontology - as being mentioned ontology i an explicit pecification of a 
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conceptualization) in order to increase homogeneity of descriptions and 
consequently easing the understanding of these description (Jentzsch, 2013). 
As mentioned, the widely deployed vocabularies of the semantic web do not 
cover all domains. However, linked data sources still cover a wide range of 
topics, but they do not cover all aspects of these topics (nowadays, there exist 
at least 369 different vocabularies on the web of data20). An example is the 
forensic field, where role players will commonly define their own new custom 
terms (proprietary terms) and mix those terms with the widely used ones to 
explain and describe more specifie aspects and publish all the content from -his 
forensic investigation. Therefore, it is a great advantage to use LDP to 
represent such information. 
8. As mèntioned in point 1, a forensics pro cess con tains several phases that 
depend on and relate to each other. Each entity is identified by a URI 
namespace to which it belongs. An entity appearing in a phase may be the 
same entity in another phase. The result is multiple URis identifying the same 
entity (i .e. , same idea as point 5). These URis are called URI aliases. In this 
case, LD relies on setting RDF links between URI aliases using the 
"owl:sameAs" that connect these URis to refer to the same entity. The 
advantages of this option in CoC representation are: 
a. Social function : investigation process is a common task between 
different players . The descriptions of the same resource provided by 
different players allow different views and opinions to be expressed. 
b. Traceability: using different URis for the same entity allows judges that 
use the CoC published data to know what a particular player in the 
investigation process has to say · about a specifie entity of the case in 
hand. 
20 http://lov.okfn.org/dataset/lov/ 
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The same occurs, not only at the level of URI, but also at the level of terms (i.e., 
point 4-b ). Players of the forensics pro cess may disco ver at a later point that the 
build-in vocabularies contain terms similar to those that they have created. 
Players could relate both terms, stating that both terms actually refer to the same 
concept using the OWL ("owl:equivalentClass ", "owl:equivalentProperty ") and 
RDFS vocabularies ("rdfs: subclassOf", "rdfs:subPropertyOf"). 
9. Semantic web contains also provenance metadata (e.g., DC and FOAF) that 
can be published and consumed in the web of data (Hartig et Zhao, 2010). 
These metadata can answer the 5Ws and 1H questions at the level of the data 
origin (see Chapter 2). These vocabularies can be used concurrently with the 
forensics data to describe their provenance and answer the questions of the 
forensic investigation. 
10. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the work presented in (Giova, 2011) presents the 
idea to translate the AFF4 into RDF resources in order to improve digital 
forensics pro cess. · The RDF is the standard format of the semantic web, thus 
the translation of the AFF4 into RDF mode] means that the AFF4 will contain 
a set of triples presented in the same structure used by the semantic web 
(subject, predicate and object). This will facilitate interoperability between the 
AFF4 format generated by a forensic tool and translated into RDF format and 
the forensic information described by the technician from the other side 
(Gayed et al., 2012a). 
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Figure 3.3 RDF model for AFF4 vocabulary 
Figure 3.3 depicts the translation of AFF4 format into RDF model 21• This format 
contains a name space (vocabulary) called "aff4:" where different predicate terms 
are well-defined such as size, type, interface, timestamp, etc. For example, the 
main information in this graph is the one related to a suspected file, its size, its 
type, its interface, etc. Wherefore, this information can be integrated easily with 
CoC information associated to a forensic phase (Gayed et al. , 2012a). 
Finally, the LD is the new moderation of the educational research. Constructing a 
system using LDP has severa! advantages for the possibility of creating and 
integrating educational resources . This fact will be useful in a future work for an 
enhancement of the awareness of judges of the digital evidence, and also for the 
technicians during information publishing (i.e., this thesis assumes that the 
technicians own this knowledge). Also these advantages can be considered the 
reasons that led to the emergence ofLinked Education (LE): 
a. Interoperability: one of the fundamental of the LDP is the interlinking of 
data that is based on a set of weil established principles and W3C 
standards ( e.g. RDF and SP ARQL) and use of URis, which promote the 
2 1 http://forensicswiki .org/wiki/ AFF4 
-----------------
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interoperability between data on the web. This fact allows the construction 
of a well-interlinked data for the educational domain through the 
identification of potentiallinks between individual resources . 
b. Unified Interface Scheme: as mentioned before, several linked data-
consuming patterns with unified interface (e.g., SPARQL) can be 
implemented to provide added-value services for the consumer (i .e., 
judges and role players). 
c. Interaction and collaboration: as consequences from (b ), the LDP 
promote that the providers of data (i .e., role players) and consumers are 
able to interact. 
d. Dereferenciability: resources represented usmg the URis are 
dereferenceable, where more information describing such resources can be 
retrieved. This improves the subject matter. 
3.2.2 Correspondence between forensic phase and ontology 
It is necessary to explain how a forensic phase is corresponding to an ontology. As 
shown in Figure 3.4, each forensic phase will have a COlTesponding lightweight 
ontology. Each lightweight ontology has a set of categories, which will be equivalent 
to a set of forensic tasks. A category in the vocabulary should be described using a set 
of terms. These terms are the proprietary terms describing a forensic task. 
Foronslc Phaao Ontotogy 
Figure 3.4 
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Correspondence between cyber forensic phase and Ontology 
(Gayed et al., 2014b) 
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Ontology (vocabulary) may contain a set of categories. Each category contains a set 
of terms to present this category. For example, the well-known vocabulary FOAF 
(Brickley et Miller, 2014), contains a set of categories like FOAF Basics, "Persona! 
Info", "Online Accounts", "Projects and Groups", and "Documents and Images". 
There exist well-defined terms to express each category. For example, the category of 
Online Accounts is described by a set of terms, sorne of which are terms of type class 
( e.g., "OnlineAccounf', "OnlineChatAccounf', "OnlineGamingAccounf', etc.) and 
others that are terms of type property ( e.g., "plan", "based _ near", " tapie _interest", 
''publications", "knows", etc.). 
Same analogy is used by a forensic phase. For example the "Acquisition phase", it 
contains a set of forensic tasks needed to accomplish this phase, such as state 
preservation, backup and copy. These can be described through different terms. For 
example, for state preservation, sorne terms can be defined with type property (e.g., 
"SN") and others will be of type classes (e.g., "Media"). For example the Media has 
102 
a seriai number of type string, where Media is a class and a serial number is property 
term. 
3.2.3 Creating proprietary terms 
In a domain like CF, it is rare to find forensic terms or well-known vocabularies 
describing it, because it is still in its infancy and development. Thus, CF is a domain 
that requires the definition of new proprietary terms (Gayed et al., 2014b). As shown 
in Figure 3.4, each forensic task is described using a set of terms. These terms are 
selected by the technicians and can be of type class or of type property. The root 
definitions of those terms are defined using well-known vocabularies of the semantic 
web. 
Before creating custom terms, the container and category should be defined first. The 
container is the lightweight ontology that contains different categories to which these 
terms belong. The container and all its subcomponents are also custom creations. 
Custom terms cannot be added to or created for well-defined ontologies (e.g., FOAF, 
DC, RDFS, etc.). However, they may be appended to another custom ontology 
created by another technician of the forensic phase. In this way, a collaboration 
among technicians takes place. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the selection of terms is a subjective task. Bach role 
player has his own point of view to select and defi ne his terms. Redundancy of terms 
does not affect the quality of published data due to the two reasons mentioned in 
Section 2.2.1.5: terms can be dereferenceable and can be mapped. 
Terms are not overloaded by different ontology axioms. The RDFS++ constructors 
will be used to define terms using the vocabularies of the semantic web. Also, terms 
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will be defined using unique URL and will belong to a unique domain (see the 
criterion of creating proprietary terms in Section 2.2.1.5). 
Also, Chapter 2 depicted the difference between 303 URis and hash URis. Rash 
URis will be used to identify the forensic resources because they have the advantage 
of reducing the number of necessary RTTP round trips, which in turn reduces access 
latency (Sauermann et al. , 2011). 
The disadvantage of the hash URI approach is that the descriptions of all resources 
that share the same non-fragment URI part are always returned to the client together, 
irrespective of whether the client is interested in only one URI or all. In the current 
context, where judges have lirnited knowledge about ICT field, it is an advantage to 
use the Rash URis versus 303 URLs, because it is better to return to judges all 
resources that share the same non-fragment URI part. 
To create new proprietary term we need to define its properties and relationships, and 
this is called the terminological definition of the term (i.e., T -Box). After defining the 
proprietary term, we can use it to publish various triples and this is called the 
assertion level (A-Box). 
3.3 Adding provenance metadata to the e-CoC 
State of the art in Chapter 2 explained different techniques to add provenance 
metadata to the published information. Generally, the provenance metadata can be 
added on the level ofT-Box, on the level of A-Box or on both levels. This means that 
the provenance metadata can be added during the creation of terms or during their 
usage to publish different information. 
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The Named Graph technique is the most simple and straightforward approach to add 
provenance metadata to the published information. It is based on the idea to group a 
set of triples together and identify them using a URI, allowing descriptions to be 
made for this set of triples. Hence, technicians can group and manage group of triples 
together using this approach to describe a forensic task or forensic phase. By 
grouping these triples, technicians can annotate them using different provenance 
vocabularies (Berry et al., 2003). 
To illustrate how the NG can be applied in this context, we can select any forensic 
phase from any forensic model. For example, the authentication phase of the Kruse 
model (Gayed et al., 2013a, 2015) can be represented by a set of triples. 
Figure 3.5 indicates an abstract diagram depicting the grouping of triples and naming 
them by a graph with the integration of provenance metadata ( e.g., injection of terms 
from provenance vocabularies like DC, or FOAF). Each phase will also contain inner 
and outer links that relate ail CoCs to each other. 
This figure depicts how a Named Graph (NG) can be applied for a forensic process 
(e.g., the Kruse model). This figure contains three forensic phases : acquisition, 
authentication, and analysis. Each of them, expressed as NG, contains a set of triples. 
These triples can be grouped together and minted using URI reference (e.g., NG for 
authentication phase is the NGAuth that contains a set of triples grouped and minted by 
URI). Each NG representing a forensic phase can be associated with one or more 
metadata terms, which can be imported from well-defined vocabulary (i.e., see also 
Figure 2.9 and 2.1 0). 
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http://mydomain.com/AcquisitionNG.rdf 
http:/ /mydomain .com/AuthenticationNG.rdf 
NG Authentication 
de : creator foaf: holdsAccount 
Ann Marie 31 Dec 2014 ped ro @forensic .com 
NIST 
http:/ /mydomain.com/ AnalysisNG.rdf 
Figure 3.5 Named Graphs for the Kruse Model (Gayed et al., 2013a, 2015) 
Table 3.1 summarizes the Figure 3.5 and shows the URis used to mint each forensic 
phase. 
Table 3.1 Forensic Named Graph 
Provenance 
Forensic Phase Minted to 
Vocabulary 
Authentication http:/ /mydomain/ AuthenticationNG.rdf Dublin Core 
Acquisition http:/ /mydomain/ AcquisitionNG.rdf Friend of a friend 
Analysis http: //mydomain/AnalysisNG.rdf Dublin Core 
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The provenance metadata determine the ongm of published data. Thus, they are 
considered to be ancillary services that can provide supplementary information to the 
knowledge domain. This information allows the consumers to find and interpret the 
origin of different resources. Provenance vocabularies will be integrated within the 
CF domain to establish trust among role players and judges with respect to the shared 
information. 
In this context, the technicians are responsible to add different provenance metadata 
to describe their forensic information. Each technician is responsible to provide 
complete and correct information about the origin and contents ofhis CoC(s) in order 
to make such information admissible in a court oflaw. 
Determining the origin of information is crucial on the open share scale (i.e., open 
science, open government, and intellectual property and copyright), where the 
consumer needs to ensure who exactly published the represented information. Indeed, 
the published information needs to be tracked and veri:fied in order to ensure its 
creditability. Therefore, determining the origin of information being published is 
mandatory to make the consumer confident towards the information in hand. Usually, 
this occurs automatically, thanks to software systems. They process and record sorne 
basic facts about the terms/resources. 
However, on a closed scale, the case is totally different. Sharing forensic information 
among judges and role players should take place on a closed scale (i.e., LCD, see 
Section 3.4), whereby a neutral side owns a server where the CF-CoC resides, 
validates the identities of the role players and judges before participating in the 
forensic investigation process. 
A fier validation, the neutral si de is confirmed by the identities of publishers from the 
prosecutors and defenders; the publishing and consuming of represented information 
will be limited among consumer and publishers. 
----- ------------------------ ------
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In this context, adding provenance metadata does not necessitate automation and can 
be done manually by annotating the forensic information. Such metadata will be 
trusted information since the publishers and consumers are both identified and well-
known. 
Briefly, the provenance metadata can be added at different levels. They can be added 
manually during the design of terms (i.e., to describe the term itself), during the 
publication of terms as a reference in a con crete dataset ( e.g. , CoC) to use on the 
semantic web (i.e., to add more information about the data being published) or after 
grouping a set of triples together and naming them using URI reference as a reference 
in a con crete dataset ( e.g., e-CoC) . 
3.4 Consumption patterns 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there exist four patterns to consume the data. The 
framework proposed in this dissertation will use these four patterns to aid judges and 
role players to consume and understand all published resources. 
Judges should be separated from the technical details related to these patterns. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, browsing on the web of datais the same idea ofbrowsing on 
the web of documents. Browsing the web of data is navigating through links to 
discover more resources and this means that the resources are named using URis and 
that links are discovered through HTTP. Bath are components from the technology 
stack of LDP. Wherefore, the browsing of RDF resources can be applied to let judges 
consume these forensics resources. 
On the other hand, crawling will allow judges to search different resources using 
keywords. Crawling will be implemented to let judges search for a specifie resource, 
whether on the level ofT-Box or A-Box. 
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The query pattern is used to retrieve explicit resources from the RDF data. However, 
reasoning is used to infer implicit information from the RDF dataset. In both cases, it 
is not necessary that consumers should be aware of how to write a SP ARQL code or 
understand the entailment rules. The proposed framework will implement the 
reasoning pattern based on the entailment rules discussed in Section 2.2.1.4. 
3.5 Adapting Public-Key Infrastructure to Linked Opened Data (LOD) 
This section discusses how digital certificates can be applied to LOD in order to 
publish and consume data on a closed scale (Gayed et al., 2014a). It depicts how 
digital certificates are used to restrict the access to these resources while keeping their 
resolvability to discover and navigate among other resources. After doing this task, 
the published information will be consumed on a closed scale called Linked Closed 
Data (LCD) (see Section 2.5). 
Generally, the digital certificates will be used to serve the neutra! side to ensure the 
identities of the publishers (i.e. , role players) and consumers (i.e., judges and role 
players). The identities of technicians and judges need to be verified before the 
investigation process and prior to using the CF-CoC system (i.e. , before publishers 
start creating and publishing their forensic information). Also, the identity of 
prosecutor and defender will be identified once they are engaged after collecting the 
evidence. Once this is realized, all the published resources will be shared with the 
authorized parties. 
The next paragraphs will depict the adaptation of digital certification to LOD from 
two sides: (i) the access to resources themselves, and (ii) the access of publishers (i.e., 
role players) and consumer (i.e., judges). 
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Referring to Figure 2.5 of the linking open data cloud diagram, several interrelated 
datasets can be found that use outer and/or inner links. Each dataset is published in a 
unique domain owned only by the publisher of this dataset over the WWW space. 
Each dataset contains a set of URI-defined resources that are interrelated within that 
dataset or to an outer dataset. 
Now, imagine that the owner of a dataset wants to publish resources using the 
technology stack/LDP of the LD (URI, HTTP, and RDF) and have such resources 
resolvable within the LOD cloud, but at the same time, he wishes to publish them in a 
manner so that anonymous parties on the web cannot access them. 
The idea of both features co-exjsting, resolvability and access restrictions of 
resources, resides in the digital certificates. The latter can be used to restrict the 
resolvability of resources in a one-way manner. 
A resource r is forward resolvable in a domain d when this resource explores and 
discovers other resources on other domains, this means that the resource r is forward 
deferenceable. A resource r is back:ward resolvable when other resources on other 
domains are able to explore and discover the resource r in the domain d, this means 
that the resource r is backward deferenceable. Wherefore, to restrict access of 
resources on the web, the access should be forward resolvable not backward 
resolvable. 
The same concept can be applied between datasets/resources in the LOD cloud using 
digital certificates, where each dataset owns a digital certificate(s). The publisher of 
the resources can accomplish his publication task through an enhanced technology 
stack using a secure access protocol (i.e. , HTTPS). Therefore, the current technology 
stack is transformed from (URI, HTTP, and RDF) to (URI, HTTPS, and RDF). 
A hypothetical scenario will be as follows : assume on the LD that there is a server 
(i.e. , where publishers publish their information) and there are consumers and both 
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already have a cornrnon trusted party to issue their certificates. The server has a 
domain name given by an IP (i.e. , for simplicity consider this IP corresponds to a 
domain string name in the LOD cloud22). The server owner ( e.g., the publisher 
himself) of this domain only wants someone called "Persan X'' to be able to consume 
the published resources from his domain within the LOD cloud. In this case, the 
owner restricts access to the resources to only this specifie consumer (i.e. , X), while 
keeping the deferenceability of his resources to other resources on other domains The 
owner of the server will also be able to move back to his domain using the backward 
link, because he owns the server certificate for this domain. Any other anonymous 
party outside this domain will not be able to access the resources of the server. If the 
server owner wants a new person, else than "Persan X'', to access his resources, this 
new person should also have a client certificate signed by the same trusted party. 
Talking in an LD manner, we can not only consider the server and client side as 
persons (i .e., server owner, who owns server certificate and "Persan X'' who wants to 
access these restricted resources), but as datasets or resources within these datasets 
that can be interlinked together using inner and outer links (i .e., by movmg 
backward/forward from and to the publisher resources). In addition, another 
important point should be underlined: "Persan Xldataset/resaurces" can also react as 
a server side, if we look at the picture from the inverse direction. This will be 
explained in the next paragraphs. 
22 Domain owned by Tamer Gayed: www.cyberforensics-coc.com 
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Client/Server certificate exchange between two datasets (Gayed et 
al., 2014a) 
Thus, Person X/dataset/resource may also have a server certificate for his/its domain 
and only allow access to a person/dataset/resource that bas a client certificate to 
his/its domain. 
To illustrate on this idea, Figure 2.5 of the LOD cloud is enlarged, resulting in Figure 
3 .6. Let us consider that there are two datasets DS 1 and DS2 residing in two different 
domains. Each domain represents a dataset. Both of them are interrelated using inner 
and outer links. As well, both datasets are related With other datasets in the LOD 
cloud. 
To elaborate the idea in terms of datasets, let us consider two datasets: DS 1 and DS2. 
Each of them can be a client and a server at the same time and bas client and server 
certificate. An outer link connects both datasets together in both directions. When 
DS 1 is the client and DS2 is the server, the former will be able to resolve the 
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resources of the latter. However, any other datasets that do not have client certificates 
like DS 1; will not be able to resolve resources from DS2. This means that the 
resources of DS2 have access restriction and resolvable only by DS 1 or any other 
dataset that has a client certificate. This is also the same case when DS2 is the client 
and DS 1 is the server. In this scenario, the server and client certificates of DS 1 and 
DS2 made the resources of both datasets forward resolvable, not backward 
resolvable. 
Furthermore, the certificates can not only be used at the leve! of datasets (i.e., 
including all resources ), but they can also be issued at the lev el of a specifie resource 
within the datasets. This can be realized by issuing the certificate using one of the 
three URI patterns provided in Section 2.2.1. 
The next part presents a scenario where the neutra! side will share digital certificates 
with judges and role players. The technical details of this part will be explained in 
Section 6.4 to describe how this scenario can be implemented and realized (Gayed et 
al., 2013a). Assuming that the neutra! side already selected the issuer institution: 
1. Role players: technician, prosecutor, and defender, each of them, sends a 
request to the neutra! si de that hosts the CF -CoC system, in order to get a 
client certificate. 
2. The neutra! side receives the requests and communicates with the CA to issue 
the client certificates for the role player. Also, the neutra! side requests a 
server certificate for its host and a client certificate for the judge if the latter 
will be engaged. 
3. CA issues the certificates and communicates with role players, neutra! side, 
and judge to pro vide the requested certificates. 
Referring to the same idea presented in Figure 2.12, Alice and Bob are now 
corresponding to the role players (i.e., clients including judges, prosecutors and 
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defenders) and just assume that they will have also an intermediate party, neutral 
side, who is responsible to communicate with the CA. The CA is the certificate 
authority that the neutral side selects to issue client and server certificates. 
3.5.1 Why use the PKI approach? 
Aside from the general advantages mentioned in Section 2.5.2, there exist technical 
reasons motivating us to use the PKI approach rather any secret-key system (Kamin 
et al. , 1983). A lot of secret-key systems proposed in the literature including the 
Kerberos secret-key (Bellovin et Merritt, 1990), Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
(Coppersmith, 1994), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Rijmen et Daemen, 
2001; Miller et al. , 2009), etc. 
The PKI approach is designed mainly to secure communication over a non-secure 
communication channel without having to share a secret key. This is accomplished by 
generating a public-private-key pair (will be explained in Chapter 6, Section 6.4). 
Simply, one is used for encryption and the other is used for decryption. Both of them 
are mathematically related, but no one can infer one key from another. Because a pair 
ofkeys is required, this approach is called "asymmetric cryptography". 
In the classic approach (i .e., with any secret-key system), a single key is used for both 
encryption and decryption. Thus, this key must be transmitted through a 
communication channel, because the same key is used to encrypt the message by the 
sender, and decrypt this message by the receiver. Because a single key is used for 
both functions, this system is called "symmetric cryptography". The transmission of 
this key raises the risk of vulnerability and increases the possibility of revealing it. 
However, in the PKI approach, private-keys never need to be transmitted or shared 
with anyone. 
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As mentioned in Section 2.5.2, the PKI approach can be used to sign information 
through various digital signature algorithrns in order to ensure its integrity and 
confirm the identity of the signer (i.e., authentication of sender and receiver). This is 
not the case with any secret-key system, where the authentication process requires the 
sharing of sorne secret or selecting a trust third. This raises the suspicion that at 
anytime, any party may refuse the authentic message by claiming that the secret was 
somehow compromised. However, this problem is promoted by the PKI approach, 
and it can avoid this type of repudiation. This problem is promoted because the PKI 
links senders to their messages. Senders sign messages with their private key and 
therefore, all messages signed with the sender' s private key originated with that 
specifie individual. The reason for this is that each user has sole responsibility to 
protect his own private-key and not share it with any other party. Hence, PKI ensures 
that an author cannot refute that they signed or encrypted a particular message once it 
has been sent, which explains why this mechanism is called "non-repudiation". 
There are two threats to the PKI approach; both of them are not considered 
disadvantages for this approach, because both of them can be avoided by using sorne 
precautions. The first threat PKI may encounter is the possibility to attack the 
certificate authority' key pair: This can be avoided by using long keys, and the CA 
should change them regularly. The second threat is if someone pretends to be 
someone else in order to obtain a certificate from the CA. For example, let us say 
Alice generates a public-key pairs and sends a request to the CA using the public-key 
to generate a digital certificate. At this time, if the CA is fooled and sends her said 
certificate, Alice can access Bob's information, because the CA issued Bob 's 
certificate is the same party who issued Alice' certificate. The precaution that should 
be taken by the CA is to verify that the certificate request did indeed come from its 
purported requester (i .e., asking sorne confidential questions or stating sorne 
identification requirements and policies) . 
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In the real world, certificate requests are sent from requesters to the CA by generating 
the key pairs. This thesis assumes that each role player sends his public-key to the 
neutra! side to issue a certificate from the CA. These steps are encapsulated together 
using the OpenSSL tool (i.e., this will be explained in detail in Chapter 6). 
3.6 Proposed framework 
The above sections (Section 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5) discussed all research problems 
and the research methodology for each problem. They discussed several points, 
including: how the tangible resources can be represented to accommodate the digital 
technologies using the LDP; how to foster trustworthiness among role players and 
judges by adding provenance metadata to the forensic information; how the lack of 
technical knowledge on digital evidence can be compensated by different 
consumption patterns of the semantic web; and how the represented information can 
be secured and shared on a closed-scale using PKI. 
The proposed framework should reflect all these points . The use case diagram in 
Figure 3.7 shows and summarizes the main tasks that should be supported by the 
proposed framework, as well as the actors of each use case. 
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Neutra! 
Role Player Party 
Judge 
Figure 3.7 Use cases diagram ofCF-CoC 
The CF-CoC framework presented in Figure 3.8 consists of several modules. Each 
module is responsible to perform a set of tasks. The nwnber assigned to each module 
is just for numeration (e.g., the PKI module is number six). The order presented in 
this figure starts by creating new proprietary terms (Module 2) using the vocabularies 
of the semantic web (Module 1 ), and they are annotated using provenance metadata 
(Module 4) . Once those terms are created, they can be used to publish different 
forensic triples (Module 3). These triples can also be annotated using provenance 
metadata (Module 4). After publishing the forensic triples, they can be consumed 
117 
using different consumption patterns (Module 5). The Public-key Infrastructure 
module is used to publish and consume the information on a closed scale. 
Figure 3.8 CF-CoC framework (Gayed, Lounis et al. 2013b) 
As shown in Figure 3.8, the CF-CoC framework contains six modules. Each module 
reflects a solution for a problem. Table 3.2 indicates problem the module's 
framework resolves. 
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Table 3.2 Research problems and corresponding solutions 
Problem Module 1 Solution 
Accommodation with digital Creating proprietary terms and publishing RDF 
technologies statements (Module 1,2 and 3) 
Fostering trustworthiness among 
Provenance metadata (Module 4) 
role players and juries 
Juries awareness about digital 
Consumption Patterns (Module 5) 
evidence 
Security of CoCs information PKI Certificates (Module 6) 
The solution of the first problem is presented in the first three modules of the 
framework. These modules are responsible for creating and defining all proprietary 
terms related to the victim and forensic parts with aid from the well-defined 
vocabularies of the semantic web. 
The solution of the second problem is presented in the Module 4 of the framework, 
and this module adds different provenance metadata during the creation of terms, as 
well as during the use of such terms, to publish and describe the forensic information. 
The third problem will be resolved through the consumption patterns module, and 
this is the fifth module of the framework. Different tasks will be implemented inside 
this module, such as browsing and serialization, crawling, reasoning, and querying. 
The last problem will be resolved through the sixth module of the framework. This 
module is responsible for transforming the LOD to LCD by restricting the access to 
different resources among the role players and judges. 
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3. 7 The framework environment 
The CF-CoC framework is implemented using the "Persona! Home Page" (Php) and 
"easyRDF '23 , "Graphiz" tool, and its graph objects are used within the "easyRDF ' to 
produce and draw different RDF models. In addition, the operating system used is 
Windows, along with the Internet Information Services (IIS)24 and the OpenSSL 
toof5. IlS simulate the machine as a server, and the OpenSSL tool, which is widely 
used in implementing the Transport Layer Security (TLS), is used to create the digital 
certificates. Figure 3.9 shows the user interface of the CF-CoC implemented system. 
Figure 3.9 User interface of CF -CoC system 
... 
23 http://www.easyrdf.org 
24 http://www.iis.net 
25 https://www.openssl.org/ 
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research methodology for the research problems. It 
presents different facts to prove the four hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1. It started 
by discussing the severa] advantages of LDP and how such advantages can be 
exploited to serve the forensic information. It discussed how the named graph with 
provenance metadata can be applied to the forensic information to foster 
trustworthiness among role players and judges. In addition, it noted that the different 
consumption patterns of LD can be bended to help the judges to consume and 
understand the represented information. Furthermore, it discussed how digital 
certificates can be adapted to consume the published information from open scale to 
closed scale while keeping the resolvability advantages of resources. The aim of this 
adaptation was for consuming forensic information on1y among the role players and 
judges. Finally, it ended by a proposed framework that conciliates all research 
problems through different solution modules. 
Therefore, the next three chapters will discuss the design and implementation of all 
modules in the framework. Chapter 4 depicts the first three modules that implement 
and explain· the process of selecting, defining and publishing proprietary terms to 
represent the tangible CoC information. Chapter 4 will implement the annotation of 
different metadata throughout this process. Chapter 5 will discuss and implement the 
different consumption patterns used to consume the represented information. Lastly, 
Chapter 6 will explain how digital certificates can be issued by the Certificate 
Authority (CA) to restrict access to represented resources. 
CHAPTER IV 
CREA TING AND PUBLISHING PROPRIETARY TERMS USING 
LIGHTWEIGHT ONTOLOGY AND ANNOT A TING THEM USING 
PROVENANCE METADATA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses how to create and publish proprietary terms using the RDF++ 
constructors and how to annota te them using provenance vocabularies of the semantic 
web. It mainly discusses the first three use cases presented in Figure 3.7. Figure 4.1 
depicts the activity diagram of creating and annotating proprietary terms 
Deûnln~ ~ro~nela~ letms ~u~lls~ln~ ~ro~rle!a~ !erms Anno!aijon us ln~ ~rovenante me!a!àala 
Figure 4.1 Activity diagram of creating and annotating proprietary terms 
It starts by determining the forensic terms from the tangible CoC. Each technician 
participating in a forensic investigation process should select and determine the 
forensic terms describing his own chain of custody. This task is subjective and 
intellectual. This means that it depends on the perception of the role player to 
describe and select the proper terms that can describe his forensic information. 
Before the role player starts to determine the forensic terms, he may search for other 
terms on other ontologies created by other role players to describe different or same 
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concepts/abjects of the wor1d. In case of redundancy of terms describing the same 
object, this will not affect the quality of LD due to the two reasons mentioned in 
Section 2.2.1.5: terms can be dereferenceable and mapped. 
The T-Box phase: after determining the terms, the role player starts to define his own 
proprietary terms over three steps. First, he should create the container of his terms 
(i .e., to which phase the terms will belong). Then, he creates the category of the terms 
(i.e., to which task the terms will belong). Finally, he starts to define the terms using 
the different constructors ofRDF++. 
The A-Box phase: after creating the proprietary terms, the role player starts to use 
them to publish and describe his chain of custody, together with the aid of different 
well-defined vocabularies of the semantic web. 
Along the definition and publication of terms, the role player can inject different 
provenance metadata vocabularies to anno tate the forensic information during the T-
Box and A-Box phases. For instance, the current framework will use the most 
popular provenance vocabularies, such as DC and FOAF. 
In the following sections, an example for a tangible CoC will be used. This CoC is 
owned by a certain technician and contains sorne information related to a forensic 
phase. This chapter depicts how the technician can represent and transform this 
tangible document to an e-CoC by the aid of the CF -CoC framework. 
Let ' s consider the following case study example for a CoC. It presents the 
preservation task retrieved from the acquisition phase of the Kruse model: 
"The name of the first responder in the acquisition phase is Jean-Pierre. He is the 
role player of this phase, and he preserved the state of the digital media, PDA deviee, 
which has the SN: OG-4023-32-362. The date he did this task is March 5th 2014" 
(Gayed et al. , 2013b, 2014b, 2015). 
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Before the role player starts his work to select and define the terms from this CoC, an 
exchange of digital certificates must take place between CA, neutral side that hosts 
the CF-CoC system, judge and role players. The CA should issue digital certificates 
for role players and judge to publish and consume in a secure manner the forensic 
information on the web of data. 
The above tangible CoC will also be considered along the next two chapters to 
illustrate how the represented information can be consumed using different 
consumption patterns (Chapter 5) and in a secure way (Chapter 6) . This example is 
also structured in a way that tries to encompass alllightweight ontology constructors. 
4.2 Selection of terms 
The tangible CoC provided in last section is retrieved from the Kruse model. It 
describes sorne information from its preservation forensic phase. 
The first step to create an e-CoC from this tangible CoC is to identify the terms (see 
Table 4.1) (i.e., as we mentioned in Section 4.1, identifying proprietary terms are a 
subjective task and may differ from the perception of one creator to another). 
This case study con tains T -Box and A-Box information. Terms of T -Box are of type 
class and property. Also it contains the term name of forensic phase, which will be of 
type Ontology abject. This case contains sorne terms that should be defined to 
describe instance of data. For example, the "FirstResponder" term defined in table 
4.1 are defined using known vocabulary of the semantic web to instantiate members 
and publish triples. This is also the same case for a term like the "RolePlayer". 
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Table 4.1 Proprietary terms of preservation task 
Box Type Termname Term Type 
FirstResponder Class 
RolePlayer Class 
Acquisition Ontology Object 
T-Box 
DigitalMedia Class 
preserve 1 preservedBy Property 
SN Property 
Jean-Pierre Resource/Instance 
PDA deviee Resource/Instance 
A-Box Literai String 
OG-4023-32-362 
(Plain/Typed) 
The "Digita!Media" is also another term of type class that can be instanciated to 
describe different data instances, such a different media deviees (i.e., hard disk, 
thurnb drive, digital camera, etc.) 
For the properties, Table 4. 1 shows sorne property terms like the "preserve " term. 
Sirnply the terms of type property are the terms that can establish a relation between 
the subject and object in RDF rnodel. For example in this case, the preserve term can 
relate the player who did the preservation task with the preserved digital media. 
----------------------· 
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A property term can be explained by other points of view. It may be presented in the 
form of passive voice (e.g. , "copy" and "copiedBy") , or it may describe or add 
supplementary information to an abject (e.g. , the age of the role player is 58 years old 
and it is a predicate for adding supplementary information about the role player). 
4.3 Defining proprietary terms 
As mentioned in Section 4.1 , this task will be performed over three steps. Firstly, the 
role player defines the ontology, then the category, and finally, the terms. Before this 
process starts, the role player should have his own client certificate and a CA public 
certificate installed on his machine to access the CF-CoC system, provided to him 
from the CA authority. This will be explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
4.3.1 Creation of ontology object (vocabulary) 
The task of creating ontologies is about to create the ontology object or the 
vocabulary of the acquisition phase (see Figure 3.4). The domain name field is 
required to mint the ontology to a unique domain name owned by a neutral part (i.e. , 
second aspect in Section 2.2.1 .5), The screen for creating the ontology object is 
shown in Figure 4.2. For simplicity, the domain narne shown below is the local IP 
where the CF-CoC system is residing. 
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Cn•a te Foreusic P h ase 
Object Type : Ontology 
Root Folder : vocab / 
Domain Name : • ·--~ ~ https:i/127.0.0. 1 :d 
-·-·- ·- -· -------··----
Publi her 1 Role P layer : Select your certificate: "' l 1 Browse J Submit Cert J 
jJean-P1erre Value Type J Resource :::J 
,----··-----· ·---- ·- -Ontology/Phase Nrune : * jAcquisihon ( Specify the CoC phase name 1 e.g. acquisition) 
Label: " jAcqu•s•t•on Phase ( Spec ify the phase de cription 1 e.g. acquisi tion 
r-
vocabulary) 
Creation 1 Pulishing mm 
Date:+ 5 March 2014 
L - --- - 1 --' Create New Ontology ··- --.. - ·- ·- ·--
Figure 4.2 Screen for creating an ontology 
Figure 3.4 shows that ontology is corresponding to a forensic phase. As shown on 
Figure 4.1, this task is about creating a forensic phase of type ontology. Usually, a 
domain name is composed of a string of characters that can also be substituted by its 
corresponding Internet Protocol (IP) address. 
The role player should also submit his own digital certificate provided to him and 
select if this resource will be a terminal resource or a non terminal resource. If it is a 
terminal resource, the role player can add extra information about himself using 
different terms (custom or build-in terms) . 
The name and label of the forensic phase should be defined to identify this ontology. 
Also sorne provenance metadata may be added to mention the creation date of this 
ontology. Sorne other field may be added to this module to give the opportunity to 
the role player to describe more information about this container (i.e., 
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Ontology/forensic phase). Once all the necessary information is completed, the role 
player confirms the creation of the forensic phase as shawn in Figure 4.3. 
A cquis ition Ontology created s ucc e ssfully 
Figure 4.3 RDF screen madel of the acquisition ontology 
This graph and all the following RDF figures are generated by using the "Graphviz" 
module26, which is integrated within the CF-CaC system. 
After creating the acquisition ontology, the role player proceeds to the task module to 
create terms and append them to this new ontology abject. 
Before going further, an important note should be mentioned on creating proprietary 
terms: it is about the URl used to identify the ontology. This is a URI of type hash, 
and any new term will be appended to this string of characters ( e.g., if for example a 
new term X is defined, then this term X will be appended to the suffix position of the 
mentioned URI) . For simplicity, the abstract URI of the domain (i.e., 
26 http://www.graphviz.org 
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https://127.0.0.1 /vocab) will be replaced by its name space (i.e., "cf-cac:") proposed 
by the CF-CoC system. 
4.3.2 Creation of new terms 
This task relates to four essential entries. The first entry is the term name. The second 
entry is selecting to which ontology the role player will append his new proprietary 
term. The third entry specifies the category/forensic task (see Figure 3.4 and Figure 
4.4). The category could be one of the three tasks provided in Section 2.2.2.1 
(preservation, recovery, or copy). In this field, the user may select 'New' to create a 
new category or select 'Existing' to import an existing category defined in another 
vocabulary ( ontology), created by another role player (i.e., two different forensic 
phases may have common category/task) . The last field is the selection of term type 
(i.e. , a term can be a property or a class). 
Create New Forensic Tenn 
Term Narne : * ( Specify the name of the new term ) 
ln Ontology : * 1-Please Selec t -3 ( Specify in wlùcb ontology you defme a new term ) 
Categmy : "' 
Figure 4.4 Screen for creating a proprietary term 
------------
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Referring to Table 4.1 , there exist seven terminological terms that should be defined 
(i.e., T-Box 'row). There exist two types of ontologies in the CF-CoC system, the 
custom ontologies created by different role players, and the built-in ontologies 
created for the semantic web. A role player cannot append a proprietary terms to 
built-in vocabularies; he can append them to custom vocabularies. 
The build-in ontologies, called also well-known vocabularies, are those that already 
exist on the semantic web. Their terms should be reused to describe data wherever 
possible, rather than reinvented ( e.g., Friend of a Friend and Dublin Core). 
4.3.2.1 Class terms 
Table 4.1 contains three te1ms of class type. This section discusses how such terms 
are defined. In this section, the root definition of any term of class type is a class from 
a well-defined vocabulary of the semantic web. 
• The "RolePlayer" term: 
The "RolePlayer " will be defined as a term of class type and a subclass of the 
class Person of the FOAF (friend of a friend) ontology (McGuinness et Van 
Harmelen, 2004; Brickley et Miller, 2014). In·addition, the "RolePlayer " term 
will belong to a forensic task called "Preservation" and it is a new category 
(i.e. , forensic task) in this forensic phase (i .e., "Acquisition") . Label and 
comment can be added to identify, give a hint about the term, or why it is 
created by the role player. 
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Create i'\ew f'orensic Term 
-·· 
-
Tenn. ·rune: ·· IRolePiayer ( Spocify the nrune of the new tenn ) 
ln Ontology : • 1 Acquisition :::J ( Spedfy ùt which outology you define a now term ) 
Category :% 1 r. . ' ew 
r Existing 
IIPresel\-ation 
Tonn Typo : • jc rass :::J ( Specify the type of the new tenn) 
RDF-Scbema Vocabular:· 
From 1 BUIIt-in Ontology :::1 
P" Subclass-of Ontology Nam< j Friend_of_a_Fnend (foaf) :a 
Class Name 1 Person (FOAF Basics) :::1 
P" Labcl jElno- a label for ùte ro-m IRolePiayer 
P Commont Ent<r a comment for tho tenu jE a ch phase has a role pla 
1 Create New T erm 1 
Figure 4.5 Screen for creating the "RoleP!ayer" class 
• The "FirstResponder" term: 
The "FirstResponder " term is a term that describes a specifie role played by 
the role player. As has been mentioned, the role player may be an officer; 
investigator, expert witness, prosecutor, defender, etc (see Section 1.1). Thus, 
the "FirstResponder" is a sub-class of the predefined "RoleP!ayer" terrn. This 
term, also, will be appended to the acquisition container and belongs to the 
predefined category "Preservation", which belongs to the same ontology (see 
Figure 4.6). 
131 
Crea te . ew Fot·ensic lerm 
Tmn Kame :"* jFirstResponder ( Speeify me name of me new tenn ) 
ln Ontology : • 1 Acquisition ::1 ( Specify in wlùch ontology you detine a new lerm ) 
Category : • 
(' New 
r. Existing 1 Acquisition ::::J J Preser1ation ::::1 
Trnu Type . • J Class ::J ( Specify Ùle [}1Je ofdte new tenn ) 
RDF-Sc.hema Vocabula ry 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P' Subclass-of Ontology Name 1 Acquisrtion (cf-coc-Acq) ::::1 
Class Name 1 RolePiayer (Presetvalion) ::::1 
rv Label Enter a label for d1e term jFirstResponder 
rv Couunent Enter· a comment for the term player of Acquisition phasE 
JI Create New Term 1 
Figure 4.6 Screen for creating the "FirstResponder" class 
As noticed, during the definition of these two classes, the most important 
constructors related to this definition is the sub class constructor of the RDFS 
vocabulary (i. e., "rdfs:subClassOf") . 
Referring to Section 2.2.1.2, if the player of the preservation task in the 
acquisition phase is called "Pierre" and he is of type "FirstResponder" T(Pierre, 
rdf type, FirstResponder), this implies that he is also of type "RolePlayer" 
T(Pierre, rdftype, RolePlayer), because the "FirstResponder" is of type class and 
it is a subclass of the class "RolePlayer". 
• The "Digita!Media" term: 
This term can be used to describe any type of media deviee used in the 
forensic process. This term can be defined as a subclass of "owl:Thing ". The 
latter is considered in the OWL vocabulary as a root of the overall taxonomy 
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of resources, and every individual in the OWL world is a member of this class 
(see Figure 4.7) . 
~. re :'\ew Forens!<: Terrn 
TenuNœne ; • IDigitalf.lec!ia ( Specify the =~ of che new tam) 
ln Ontology : "' 1 Acquisiticn 3 ( Sptcify Îll wbich onro!ogy you ddine a new tenu) 
Categocy: ~ rx~ ~ r. E.'tisling ion .:11 Presemtion 
..:J 
lrermType : · Class • ( Specify the 1}~ of lite new tenu) 
RDF-Scb~ma \'o(abubry 
From 1 Built-in Ontology 3 
P' ubdass·of Ontology ~ame 1 Ontology_ Web _Language (owl) :J 
ClassNœne 1 Thing$ (Owl Semantrcs) ..:J 
P' Labd Enter a label for the renu IOig1tal Media 
rv Collllllem Enter a comment for lite tenu loM Oe\i(e Med1a 1 
1 Create Uew Tetm 1 
Figure 4.7 Screen for creating the "DigitaLMedia" class 
4.3.2.2 Property terms 
Table 4.1 contains three terms of property type. This section discusses how such 
terms are defined. In this section, the root definition of any term of property type is a 
class from a well-defined vocabulary of the semantic web. In case of defining 
property terms, the domain of subject and the range of abjects should be determined. 
Other OWL vocabularies can be used to enrich the property terms with lightweight 
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axwms such as "owl:inverseOf", "owl:Functiona!Property ", and 
"InverseFuntiona!Property " (i .e., will be explained in Chapter 5). 
As has been mentioned, the terms of property type are terms that can relate subjects 
with abjects, add supplementary information between subjects and abjects (i.e., 
lightweight axioms), or provide inverse relation with another predicate. There are two 
important constructors when defining terms of property type: the 
"owl:ObjectProperty" and "rdfs:subPropertyOf". The former is used to indicate that 
the term defined is of type property and the latter that the defined term has a 
relationship with another property. 
• The "preserve" term: 
The "preserve" term 1s a task (i .e. , verb, action) meamng that someone 
preserves something. In this case, the first responder can preserve the status of 
a digital media at first hand of his forensic task. Thus, the domain and range 
of this term can be easily defined by the role player to record and describe 
"who" preserved "what''. Simply said, the domain will be a class of type 
''foafPerson ", and the range will be a class oftype "owl:Thing". 
According to the terms defined above, the domain can be the 
"FirstResponder" class, and the range can be the "DigitalMedia" class. 
Domain and range values can also have type ''foafPerson " and "owl:Thing ", 
respectively. 
As well, the ''preserve" term can inherit from a well-defined vocabulary term 
called foafmade. According to the definition of this constructor in (i.e., 
http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/#term_made), it defines something that is made by 
an agent. This means it relates an agent to something. 
Figure 4.8 explains how this term can be defined, and shows that an extra 
constructor 1s also selected. This constructor 1s the 
"owl:InverseFunctionalProperty " (i.e., this will be explained in Chapter 5 
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with another constructor "FunctionalProperty" to discuss another use case 
example in Chapter 5). The same idea can be applied to the passive voice of 
the term (i.e. , ''preservedBy"). 
, "~" " -...... ~ -~ " •,m" "· 
Home 1 ~ 1 RDF 1 Provenance 1 PKI 1 ~ 1 H 1 
-- Tenns Statements Metadata Certdicates ficabons !:!!l!2 
IProperty Name 1 made (Documents and Images) 
.:J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 
.:J 
rv Range Ontology l'ame IAcqu1silion (cf-cac-Acq) 
...:.1 
ClassName 1 DigitaiMedia (PreseNation) 
...:.1 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
rv Domain Ontology Name !Acquisition (cf-cac-Acq) 3 
ClassName 1 FirstResponder (Presef\-ation} ...:J 
1 P"Labd Enter a label for the tom jpreseNe 
1 rv Comment Enter a comment for the t<nn IFR pre selVe DM 
OWI. Vocabulary 
From 1 Custom Ontology ...:.1 
P lm-use-of Ontology !rune !Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) 
.:J 
Property Name 1 preseiV!ld8y (PreseNation) 3 
r F w.tctional Property 
rv hwerse FW>ctional 
Property 
Figure 4.8 Screen for creating the ''preserve" property 
As shown in Figure 4.7, the range and domain of the ''preserve" term are terms 
selected from the custom ontology created and discussed in Section 4.3 .1. 
• The ''preservedBy" term: 
Same explanations given for the "preserve" term can be applied to the 
''preservedBy" term. It has the opposite meaning of ''preserve" term. The 
owl:inverseof is used with ''preservedBy" to show the inverse with the 
"preserve ". If the ''preserve" predicate is tagged to be 
"inverseFuntionalProperty" then the ''preservedBy" 1s tagged to be 
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"Functiona!Property". Also, the domain and range will also be inversed. In 
such case, when the fi.rst responder preserves a digital deviee, it is also correct 
to say that the digital deviee is preserved by the first responder. This means 
that the domain of ''preservedBy" term will be "Digita!Media" class and its 
range will be "FirstResponder" class (see Figure 4.9). 
· ·, _~, "·. ~-If 
Home 1 ~ 1 RDF 1 Provenance 1 PKJ 1 ~ 1 Hel 
- Terms Statements Metadata Cerbficates !:.!!ill! 
p•ropeny 
..:.J ~ ::.p~cay !he cype ot me new ~~) 
RDF-Schewa \'ocabulary 
IF rom 1 Built-in Ontology 3 
Fi Subpropeny-of !Ontology Name 1 Frieod _of_ a _f ri end (loaO 3 
IPropeny Name !made (Documents and Images) 3 
IFrom !Custom Ontology .:J 
Fi Range IOntology Name !Acqutsition (cf-coc-Aeq) :] 
!c ta;s !\ame IFirstResponder (Presetvalion) :::J 
IF rom 1 Custom Ontology .:J 
Fi Domain IOntology Name !Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) 3 
lctass Name 1 DigitaiMedia (Presetvation) 3 
P Label IEmer a label for the term lpœsef\'!ld by 
Fi Conunrut !Enter a colll1llent for the term IDM presetYedBy DM 
OWJ. Yorabulary 
r Inverse-of 
Fi Functional Property 
•1 
Figure 4.9 Screen for creating the ''preservedBy" property 
The task of selecting which constructors can be used to tag property terms 
( e.g., ''preserve", ''preservedBy") is a subjective task as long as it is reflecting 
a feasible case. It may differ from one role player to another. For example, in 
the screens shown above, the ''preserve" lS tagged as 
"InverseFunctiona!Property", this is a case when a role player, creator of the 
term, wants that each deviee is the abject of an action (preserve) by a single 
role player. However, if the role player wants that each role player is the 
subject of an action that preserves one single deviee, this means that each role 
----------- ------
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player can preserve only one deviee. Chapter 5 gives an example of tagging 
the "preserve" property with "Functiona!Property" . 
• The "SN' term: 
The last term of the T-Box mentioned in Table 4.1 is the seriai number. This 
property can provide supplementary information about the subject of type 
"owl:Thing ". This means that an RDF triple containing the SN term can be 
provided to specify extra information to a media deviee. 
In this case, the domain of the "SN' term will be the subject of type 
"owl:Thing " and the range will be a string of characters that identify this 
deviee of type "rdfs:Literal". "SN' is also a sub-property of the identifier 
predicate of the DC (dc:identifier) . 
This type of term may also be associated to another constructor such as 
"owl:InverseFuncti:ona!Property ". This constructor adds an axiom to the 
property term. The reason of using this constructor with this term will be 
explained in Chapter 5. Figure 4.10 shows how the "SN' term is defined . 
• • 0 _·'· -~ ... ~__ ., • • 
tl2!!!.e 1 ~ 1 !il_;,~.!.~~ 1 p Mfttadi!!l! 1 c fKI "!!.IdS 1 ~ 1 tm!~! 
\Property N111Ue fidentifier (http.l/porl orgldclterms/1denufier) 
l------·-·-~~~~---·----j8~iÏ;:ï;, .. QntQio~·y.......... -·--- ··-·--3 
Onto logy Nrunc: 1 Ra.ource,_Oescription_Framewari<,_Schema (rdts) iJ 
Class Name 1 Lite: rai (Litaral Values of Sumg and lnteoem) 3 
From Custom Ontology .:J 
P' D omain Ontology Nwnc 1 Ar.quisitlon (cf-coc-Acq} .. 
C las.s Nrune 1 Digital Madia (Pre<UNahon) ::;:) 
P" Labd Enter a.lo.bel iOr the tenn Jsenal l'lumber 
··p:·-;;~-----· Enter a comruent for Üle len.ll Gjs:::'N ~.de;:::nt:;;:ifi;:::es';;D~M==J:..•;--· .. -··---····-·-·---·-
P' lm-o-se-of 
r Fw,ctional 
Property 
-'
:From lcustom Ontology 
Ontology i'\ome IAcqui.sJhon (cf~oc·Acq) :::::J 
_ Property l'rune 1 pressrvedBy (Preservation) i] 
P' Inv~se FWlCtionnl 
Figure 4.10 Screen for creating the "SN" property 
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The next two figures (Figure 4.11 and 4.12) illustrate the T -Box ontology for 
the "SN' and ''preserve" predicates: 
Figure 4.11 T-Box of"SN' property 
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Figure 4.12 The T-Box of the ''preserve" property 
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As has been noticed, during the definition of terms, sorne provenance vocabularies 
are used such as FOAF and DC. The usage of such vocabularies refers to the 
possibility to inject different provenance terms during the creation of proprietary 
terms. The terms provided are not that rnuch used to annotate and add supplernentary 
information to the forensic terms being defined as they are used to define the terms 
thernselves. 
4.4 Publication of proprietary terms 
Module three is a straightforward module. AU custorn terms that have been defined in 
the proprietary terms module (T-Box) can be used to publish and describe the CoC in 
form of ROF triples . Not only custorn terms are used to publish RDF staternents, but 
also terms from the well-known vocabularies can be used to publish such RDF 
staternents. Next figure shows the class diagrarn of an e-CoC. 
e~coc 
1 
Triple 
t 
Subject Predle te ObJeçt 
Figure 4.13 Class diagrarn of e-CoC 
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The main tasks in this module are the publication of terms. Publication of terms is 
about selecting the subject, predicate (property), and abject. For mapping between 
terms, different constructors from OWL vocabulary can be used such as 
"equivalentProperty ", "equivalentClass ", and "sameAs " (see Table 2.2). 
The property slot of the triple defines the abject values of the subject. On its left 
(subject), we define the domain, and on its right (abject) we define the range (see 
Table 2.1 ), also su bel asses are defined. 
For instance, the property term ''preserve" defined in the T-Box, has 
"FirstResponder" class (subject) as domain, and "DigitalMedia" class (abject) as 
range. Thus, any resource selected/created by the publisher in the subject slot ofRDF 
triple will be of type "FirstResponder", which is a subclass of "RolePlayer", which is 
a subclass of class "Persan" defined in the FOAF vocabulary; see Figure 4.12. 
As shawn in Figure 4.14, there are three slots. The predicate slot shows that role 
players can select the property from one of two types of ontologies, whether from 
built-in ontologies, or from custom ontologies. 
The selection of a predicate is the primary selection to construct the RDF triple. After 
that, the role player defines the subject and abject of the triple. 
----- --------------------- -------
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Publish RDF Tdples 
1 Subject 1 P redica te 1 Object 
r New Resource r New Resourcelliteral 
From 
! -select Oolology Type· 
.:.1 
. . • . .. .. r Existing Resource ~ ~uilt· in Ontology 
1 
r Existing Resotlfcelliteral 
Cuslom Ootoloqy 
1 Publish and Oraw 1 
Figure 4.14 Screen for publishing RDF triples 
As mentioned, the predicate bas already its domain and range published within the 
definition of the term. The system automatically aids the role players to know/remind 
him about both values of the domain and range to facilitate him the choice of 
resources for subject and resources/literals for object he can propose to publish his 
RDF triple. 
For example if the role player wants to select the predicate of "SN', he starts to select 
from the predicate slot the ontology type (i.e., custom), then from the ontology name, 
he selects the ontology to which the "SN' term belongs (i.e., acquisition). 
Once the predicate slot is selected, the system displays the domain (subject) and 
range (object) slots. This will be very useful for role players who want to use terms 
defined by other role players, on other ontologies, to properly publish and understand 
the role and aim of such terms (See Figure 4.15). 
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C New Resource 
r Exi ting Resource 
Domain : DigitaiMedia 
Figure 4.15 
Predlcate 
From 
1 Custom Ontology 3 
Ontology Name 
!Acquisition (cf-coc·Acq) 3 
Property Name 1 SN (PreseMtion) 
Pubbsh and Oraw 1 
Object 
t New Resourcetlitera! 
r Existing Resource/Literal 
Range : Litera! 
Screen showing domain and range of a proprietary term 
After the role player selects the predicate, he starts to select the subject and object. A 
role player can select an existing URI resource or define new resource to the custom 
ontology. If he selects to create new resource, the only ontology that will appear to 
him is the one that he created after he installed the digital certificates. However, if the 
role player selects an existing resource, he can select an existing resource from stored 
in the system. This means that a role player can not publish a resource in another 
forensic phase, but he is able to use an existing resource published by another role 
player in another forensic phase. Also, the system guides the role players to identify 
the type of resources/individuals through the range and domain of the selected 
predicate. 
The second main task of this module is mapping between terms. The predicate slot of 
this triple will be one of the three constructors mentioned in Chapter 2 (i.e. , 
"owl:equivalentProperty ", "owl:equivalentClass ", and "owl:sameAs ", see Table 
2.2). The "owl:equivalentProperty ", "owl:equivalentClass " are used on the level of 
T-Box. However, "owl:sameAs" can be used on both levels to map between 
properties and classes on the level ofT-Box, and between individuals on the level of 
A-Box. Only on OWL Full, where a class can be treated as instances (a class can be 
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treated simultaneously as a collection of individuals and as in individual in its own 
right), we can use the owl:sameAs to define class equality and indicating two 
concepts have the same intentional meaning. 
For "owl:equivalentClass ", if the role player uses this constructor, then he is going to 
map between two classes ( does not mean same identity, but same class extensions, 
this means that both classes contain exactly the same set ofindividuals). 
If a role player uses the "owl:equivalentProperty ", then he is going to map between 
two properties (do es not mean same identity, but same property extensions, this 
means that both properties have the same values). 
As explained in chapter two, it is unrealistic to assume everybody will use the same 
name to refer to individuals. That would require sorne grand design, which is contrary 
to the spirit of the web. The said mapping constructors (classes, properties, and 
individuals) will be very useful within the CF-CoC system. They will not be only 
used to map various terms, defined by different role players, but they can be exploited 
to automate the mapping process instead relying on role players to detect 
equivalentlequated terms. This can be easily achieved. For equivalence between class 
terms, the system can compare between classes to identify those that have same set of 
individuals. For equivalence between property terms, the system can compare among 
between properties to identify those that have same values. For equating between 
classes, properties, and individuals, the owl:sameAs can be used directly (case of 
OWLFull). 
Figure 4.16 shows the e-CoC (A-Box) of the forensic preservation task. This 
generated ontology does not answer all the questions of CoC. It answers on1y the 
Who: Jean-Pierre, What: PDA deviee, and When: publication date of ontology. In 
order to have the answers to other questions, more terms need to be determined and 
defined. In this figure, the "cf-cac-Acq " is the prefix namespace of the acquisition 
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ontology. "Jean-Pierre" is an instance/resource from the "FirstResponder" class (i.e., 
which is a sub-class of the "RolePlayer" class), "PDA deviee" is an instance of 
"Digita!Media" (i.e., which is sub-class from "owl: Thing" class. Any user-defined · 
class is implicitly a subclass of owl:Thing), and ''preservedBy" is the inverse property 
of the ''preserve" property. "SN'' is a "Functiona!Property" where its domain is the 
"PDA deviee" and its range is "OG4023-32-362" (i.e. , which is a string typed literai 
of Litera! class). In addition, the forensic information coming from a forensic tool 
(e.g., AFF4), can also be integrated in the same CF-CoC framework (see Figure 3.3). 
cf-coc-Acq:preserve 
Jean-Pierre 
OG-4023-32-362 
cf-coc-Acq:SN 
Figure 4.16 A-Box ontology of the forensic preservation task (e-CoCAcq) 
4.5 Annotation using provenance metadata 
This section discusses the fourth module (UC2) presented in Figure 3.7. Along the 
definition and publication of terms, different provenance metadata can be added. The 
CF-CoC system uses the named graph method to add provenance metadata to a set of 
triples by naming them using URI (see Section 3.2). 
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An example of metadata added to the level of terms presented in Figure 4.16, where 
the DC vocabulary is used to answer when the ontology is published and who 
published it. Provenance metadata can be attached during the phase ofT-Box and A-
Box. 
Figure 4.16 is a good example to add provenance metadata using the named graph 
method. This figure represents the e-CoC of the state preservation task in the 
acquisition phase. As explained in Figure 3.5, it provides abstract models for the 
named graph. The NGacquisition is the named graph of the acquisition phase, which 
contains three tasks. One of them is the preservation task provided in Figure 4.16. 
Figure 4.17 depicts how provenance metadata are added to a named graph. The CF-
CaC assigns automatically the URL address to each ontology by adding a suffix NG 
to the ontology URL. For example, if the URL of acquisition ontology is 
"https://1 27.0.0.1 /Acquisition.rdf', the URL of the acquisition ontology will be 
"https://127.0.0.1/AcquisitionNG.rdf' . In the same screen, the CF-CoC requires to 
select the ontology from which the role player can select the desired property from 
different provenance vocabularies (e.g., DC, FOAF). 
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Figure 4.17 Screen for adding provenance metadata to the NG 
This screen task willlead to an annotated graph similar to the one provided in Figure 
2.9, but for the acquisition named graph. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained how the CF-CoC system can create forensic proprietary terms. 
After creating such terms, this chapter discussed how to use such terms to publish 
forensic information and annotate them using provenance metadata. 
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The next chapter will discuss how the e-CoC will be consumed by judges and role 
players using different consumption patterns. These patterns will aid them to 
consume the published information and navigate between different represented 
resources to get more information and understand the case in hand. 

CHAPTER V 
CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the fifth module of the CoC framework. As mentioned, the LD 
is a style of publishing information that makes them easy to interlink, discover, and 
consume represented resources. This is achieved by making URis, which identif)r 
data items, dereferenceable into more RDF descriptions resources (see Section 2.2.1 , 
3.2.3 and 4.3.1). The four patterns that can be used by consumers of the web of data 
are: browsing, searching, querying, and reasoning. Figure 5.1 shows the use case of 
pattern consumption (UCS): 
Consumlng the publlshed informaHon UC5 
Rote Players Judge 
Machine 
Figure 5.1 Use case diagram of consumption patterns 
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As mentioned, the consumers are the role players, judge, and machine. The role 
players and judge can use ali patterns to consume the represented information. The 
reasoning pattern is the only pattern that can be used by judge and role players, but 
also can be used by the machine to infer implicit information. 
The consumed information is the forensic information presented by the role players 
and inferred by the machine. After defining and publishing the forensic information 
(see Chapter 4), the role players and judge can consume the represented resources 
using such patterns. In addition to these patterns, an extra option has been added to 
the framework, with the browsing module, it is the generation of serialized code from 
RDF models using different serialization RDF languages (see Section 2.2.1 ). 
Consumption PaHerns 
• Browsing and Serializing 
• Crawllng 
• Reaso!Ung 
• Ouening 
Figure 5.2 Screen for consumption patterns 
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The main objective of this chapter is to present how role players and judge can 
consume and understand the forensic resources . The used patterns must be adapted to 
their knowledge level. This chapter discusses how these patterns are used within the 
CF-CoC system in a way that can facilitate the consumption of such resources and 
exempt consumers (i.e. , especially the judge) to know details related to each pattern. 
Each pattern is explained apart through the same example provided in Chapter 4. The 
above figure (Figure 5.2) shows the screen of different consumption patterns in the 
CF-CoC system. 
5.2 Browsing and serializing 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the browse pattern of LD is the same idea of browsing 
web documents. Both use the style of "follow-your-nose" to navigate between 
documents and resources . With this module, consumer will not need to know or learn 
about the different semantic browsers (see Section 2.4.1). 
The browsing module implemented in this system aliows the consumers to expand 
(i.e. , dereference) the represented resources in order to get and understand the 
meaning of such resources. Consumer will also be able to see ali the e-CoC published 
using these represented resources. 
Figure 5.3 shows the screen for browsing. In this screen the CF-CoC system asks the 
consumers, on which ontology (i.e. , forensic phase), they would like to browse 
resources. There are two main choices for consumers: whether to list ali forensic 
phases published by ali role players, or to select a specifie phase to list ali related 
resources. Once this choice is performed, the system displays the results of the 
selection. 
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Fol'ensic Information Consumption 
Figure 5.3 Screen for browsing 
In Figure 5.3 , if the consumers select "All phases", the system will display all e-CoCs 
published by role players (technicians) during the forensic investigation. As shown in 
the above figure, there are currently two forensic phases published and 
recorded/stored by the role players on the system. The screen resulted from this 
selection allows consumers to visualize all RDF models related to each forensic phase 
(see Figure 5.4). These RDF models are those related to the forensic phase and their 
provenance metadata. 
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Fol'ensic Information Consumption 
F orensic Phase : * IIPJI Phases iJ 
!Forensic Phases Names jView Forensic PbaseiProrenance Vocabulary of Forensic Phase. 
1 Acquisition 1 \iiew Now 1 ~ 
1 Authentication 1 View Now J View~w 
1 View Ali Published Data {CoC) : View and Serialize Now 
Figure 5.4 Screen of ali forensic phases 
When consumers click on the "view forensic phase", they will get information about 
the definition of this forensic phase, such as who published, when it was published, 
what is the name and its label (See Figure 4.3). 
In addition, they may also discover more information about each graph apart by 
clicking on the link "view provenance vocabulary". This will provide them more 
metadata information about the e-CoC associa:ted to each phase as shown in Figure 
5.5 . These metadata may answer more questions related to the forensic and 
provenance information. 
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foafî1mily _name 
Figure 5.5 Screen for viewing provenance vocabulary 
Furthermore, beside these two types of RDF models, the system can also display the 
data instances of e-CoCs related to all forensic phases stored in the system (A-Box), 
through the link "view and serialize". This link can display to consumers all RDF 
triples of published data (e-CoCs) in one screen, which are added with their 
serialization codes. These codes serialize-down the RDF graphs (e.g., N3, Turtle, 
RDF/XML, etc.). The generated serialized code in the current example is the 
RDF/XML, because it is the most popular serialized code of the semantic web 
Arguably beside JSON-Linked Data (see Figure 5.6). Next figure, Figure 5.6, shows 
the RDF model of published data, and Figure 5.7 shows its corresponding serialized 
code. 
Extra information has been added to the current tangible CoC (see Chapter 4) to 
elaborate how the system can generate for consumers all the e-CoCs published by the 
role players. For example, new information has been published, called "iPad'' and 
"Persona!Digita!Assistanf' . The "iPad'' has also the same seriai number for the 
"PDA deviee". The "Persona!Digita!Assistan f' is another preserved media deviee 
within the preservation task. Also, besicles the current forensic phase (i.e., 
acquisition), another forensic phase called "authentication p hase" has been provided. 
The role player of this phase is called "Peter", who authenticated the same media 
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deviee "PersonalDigitalAssistant", preserved by "Jean-Pierre". "Peter" also 
recorded the hash code "OX49E9DEC3" generated from his authentication task (i .e. , 
assuming that the "authenticate" and "hash" terms have been defined on the T-Box 
level). 
Figure 5.6 e-CoCs for two forensic phases 
This information has been added to the graph to underline two points. Firstly, the 
generation of one or more e-CoC in one RDF model. Secondly, how two e-CoCs 
representing two different forensic phases are linked together (i .e., through 
"PersonalDigitalAssistant'' object slot). This is considered as an indirect 
improvement that the forensic phases are dependent and their investigation tasks can 
be performed in collaboration between role players (i.e. , a media deviee is firstly 
preserved, and then this same deviee is authenticated later by another role player) . 
Authentication phase tasks will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
From Figures 5.6 and 5.7, it is noticed that there are two namespaces. One for the 
acquisition phase called "cf-cac-Acq:" and contains sorne terms such as "SN' and 
''preserve", that the role player has defined in his vocabulary to publish his own CoC 
information. The second namespace is for the authentication phase and called "cf-
coc-Auth:", which contains two terms: "authenticated'' and "hash" . Using these 
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different views, consumers therefore can have a global virtualized picture of the e-
CoCs published by role players (technicians) during the investigation process. 
<?xml version= " l . O" eneoding= "utf - 8 " ?> 
<rdf : RDF xmlns : rdf=http : //www . w3 . o r g/1999/02/22 - r df- syntax- ns# 
xmlns : ef - eoe- Aeq=" https : //eyberfo r ensies - eoe/Aequisition/ " 
xmlns : ef - eoe- Aut=" https : //eyberfor ens i es - eoe/Authentieation/" 
xmlns : rdfs= "http : //www . w3 . org/2000/10/XMLSehema# " > 
<rdf : Deseription rdf : about= " iPad " > 
<ef - eoe- Aeq : SN 
rdf : datatype=" http : //www . w3 . org/2000/10/XMLSehema#string" >OG4023 -
32 - 362 </ef - eoe- Aeq : SN> 
</rdf : Deseription> 
<rdf : Deseription rdf : about= " PDA deviee " > 
<ef - eoe- Aeq : SN 
rdf : datatype=" http : //www . w3 . org/2000/10/XMLSehema#string" >OG4023 -
32 - 362 </ef - eoe- Aeq : SN> 
</rdf : Deseription> 
<rdf : Deseription rdf : about= " Jean- Pierre " > 
<ef - eoe- Aeq : preserve rdf : resouree= " PDA deviee " /> 
<ef - eoe- Aeq : preserve rdf : resouree= '' PersonalDigitalAssistant " /> 
</rdf : Deseription> 
<rdf : Description rdf : about= " Peter " > 
<cf - coc- Aut : authenticated 
rdf : resource= " PersonalDigitalAssistant " /> 
</rdf : Description> 
<rdf : Description rdf : about= " PersonalDigitalAssistant '' > 
<cf - coc- Aut : hash 
rdf : datatype=" http : //www . w3 . org/2000/10/XMLSchema#string" >Ox49E9DE 
C3 <cf - coc- Aut> 
</rdf : Description> 
</rdf : RDF> 
Figure 5.7 RDF/XML of e-CoC for the preservation 
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The above part discussed the case of the role player/judge selects "al! phases". Next 
part discusses when the role player/judge selects a specifie forensic phase ( e.g. 
'Acquisition' , 'Authentication' ). In the case of the second selection in Figure 5.3; if 
consurners select a specifie forensic phase, this will help them to expand/dereference 
different terms described by role players . As mentioned, the root definitions of such 
resources are defined from a well-defined vocabulary of the semantic web. This is 
shown in Figure 5.8. 
Forensic Information Consumption 
jForensic Pha e : • ji Acquisition :::J 
IForenslc Tasks For Acquisition Phase ! Described by Resource(s) 
httgs://12 7 .O.O.l!VocabiAcguisition#RolePiaver 
httQs://127.0.0.1/Vocab/Acguisition#FirstResQonder 
Prese1vation h!iQs://117 .0 . 0.1/Vocab/Acguisition#Di~tallvledia htt!ls:l/127 .0.0.1!Vocab1Acguisition#SN 
htms://127 .0.0.1/Vocab/Acguisition#QreservedBv 
httpsJ/12 7 .0.0.1/V ocab/Acguisitiou#greseJve 
Figure 5.8 Screen showing the resources of preservation task 
As shown in the above figure, the acquisition phase contains different resources 
defined by the role players. Let's assume that the consumers after displaying the e-
CoCs in Figure 5.6 need to get more information about the published resources. This 
screen will allow them to dereference different resources in order to get more 
information about the published resources. 
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• The "FirstResponder": 
When the consumers dereference this resource, the system will navigate them 
(follow-their-nose) to the root definition of this term. 
Re ource rRL : ht1J> :f/1 .0.0.1 oc b/ · cqui ition Fi tRe pond r 
Figure 5.9 
T~rm T~l'f: 
tabCiusof: 
Cbn 
Screen for "FirstResponder" resource expansion 
The Figure 5.9 shows that the "FirstResponder" term is a subclass of the 
"RolePlayer". The latter is also an expanded resource. If consumers continue 
to follow-their-noses, they will get the root definition (FirstResponder is sub-
class of RolePlayer, which is sub-class of class Persan) as shown in Figure 
5.10 and Figure 5.11. 
e ourc ·RL : llttp ://127.0.0.1 o ~. b/- c. ui ition Rol Pl ' r 
lau 
b bu of : 
Figure 5.10 Screen for "RolePlayer" resource expansion 
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Finally, by expanding "Persan", the consumers arrive to the root definition of 
the "FirstRespander", as shawn in Figure 5.11 . 
J~ hU:~:/f;m.cfiMC<d/0. 1/:tesm_Ptl'i«l "' . , .. 
Class: foaf:Person 
Person . A person. 
Status: stable 
in·range 
-of: foatknows 
in· foaf:geekcode foaf:firstName foaf:sumame foatfami~1 name foaf:plan foatimg domain· foar.mversBrtggs . . foatworkplaceHomepage foaf:work!nfoHomepage 
of· foaf:schooiHomepage foaf:knows foaf:interest foaf:topic inlerest foat:pub!ications 
· foatcurrentProject foaf:pasfProject 
The toaf: Fe mm class represents people. Something is a toat: Per5on if it is a person. We 
don1 nilpic about whether thet re a live, dead, real, or imaginary. The toar: Pmon class is a 
sub.class of the foaf :Aqent dass, since ali people are considered 'a genis' in FOAF. 
~] 
Figure 5.11 Screen for "Persan" definition 
• The "RalePlayer" ; 
It is the same idea as that of"FirstRespander" term. See Figure 5.10 and 5.11. 
• The "Digita!Media" : 
When consumers dereference this resource, the system will navigate them to 
the root definition of this term. As has been explained, it is the same idea of 
expansion till reaching the root definition of the resource. 
------ --·--
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Ali the above terms are of type class. The next part of the dissertation discusses 
resources of type property, and how they are presented to the consumers. In this part, 
more information is provided to consumers, such as domain and range of the term: 
• The "SN': 
The "SN' term 1s a property defined by the role player of the acquisition 
phase. This predicate is the serial number of a digital deviee and it is tagged 
with "owl:lnverseFunctionalProperty" constructor (see Figure 5.12). The 
reason for using this constructor with this predicate will be explained in 
Section 5.4. 
Resource URL: https://127.0.0.1/Vocab/Acquisition#SN 
Tenu 
Type: 
Sub 
Property 
of: 
Domain: 
Range: 
Property , lm·erse Functional Propel'ty 
Digitali\-fedia 
1 
Be law are the instances of class -~ ~t·edicate l Below are the instances of class 
DigitalMedia Liteml 
i,f-_P_D..,.-A_de-:-H-:-'ce_(:....A,_;cq:....ui_sit_io:-n_Ph.,..a_se.:.._) _[r--:cf:-.co_c_-A_cq.;_·_SN-'r[_o_G_.J0_2_3-_32_-3_6_2 ..:..(A_cq.;_u.,..is,...,iiio_n_P
7
ha_se..:.)--'l 
![ iPad (Acquisition Phase) [ cf-cac-Acq-SN 1 00 4023-32-362 (Acquisition Phase) 
Figure 5.12 Screen for "SN' resource expansion 
As shown in Figure 5.12, the domain and range of the property "SN' are 
mentioned, and can also be expanded to their root definitions . Also, this 
screen shows all the related instances of this property and for which forensic 
phase such instances have been defi.ned. In addition, the RDF graph of those 
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instances is also drawn on the same screen, as shown in the figure below 
(Figure 5.13). 
Figure 5.13 Screen for RDF instances of "SN' property 
• The ''preserve" term : 
The ''preserve" term is a property defined by the role player of the acquisition 
phase. This chapter tags this term with "owl:Functiona!Property" constructor 
(see Figure 5.14) to illustrate the case if the role player selects this constructor 
instead of "owl:InverseFunctina!Property" as explained in Chapter 4. This 
will be explained in Section 5.4. 
Also, this screen shows all the related instances of this property and for which 
forensic phase such instances have been defined. In addition, the RDF graph 
of those instances is also drawn on the same screen, as shown in the figure 
below (Figure 5.14). 
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Resource URL: https://127.0.0.1/Vocab/Acquisition#preserve 
Term Type: Property , Functlonal l'roperty 
Sub l'roperty of: made 
Domain: FirstResponder 
Range : DigltalMcdJa 
Inverse of: prescrvedBv 
1 Below arc the instances of class r 
... 
l'redicate l Bclow arc the instances of class FirstResponder . DigitalMedia [ Jean-Pierre (Acquisition Phase) .l[cf-coc-Acq-preserve [ PDA deviee (Acquisition Phase) 
[ Jean-Pierre (Acquisition Phase) [cf-coc-Acq-preserve [ Persona!DigitaL'\ssiswnt (Acg\Jisition Phase) 
Figure 5.14 Screen for ''preserve" resource expansion 
As well, the instances of the acquisition forensic phase are also shown m 
Figure 5.14, accompanied by its corresponding RDF model (see Figure 5.15). 
In Figure 5.15, the role player "Jean-Pierre" is described as a resource in the 
definition of the acquisition phase. The system recognizes the ontologies and 
the proprietary terms published by each role player. PDA deviee and 
PersonalDigitalAssistant are instances of the class "Digita!Media". 
Figure 5.15 Screen for RDF instances of"SN' property 
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The system detects this information by reading the fields of the digital 
certificate submitted by the role player (see Chapter 6). One of these fields is 
the name of its owner. Thus, the system reads the certificate to identify who 
worked on different ontologies. 
On the other hand, the "Persona!Digita!Assistanf' IS another resource 
published during the acquisition phase, not the authentication one. This is due 
to the fact that the role player of the acquisition phase is the one who starts to 
use this resource to describe this media deviee. Later, "Pierre" who is the role 
player of the authentication phase, can use the same resource published in the 
acquisition phase to perform another task called the authentication. 
5.3 Crawling 
Browsing is not the only pattern to discover or request information. Crawling or 
searching by a keyword can be another pattern to discover such information. 
Crawling is searching by a specifie keyword (see Section 2.4.2). It allows consumers 
to search specifie information. The information requested will be displayed within its 
RDF triple and can be one of the three slots of the RDF (see Figure 5.16). 
164 
Enter a Resource.literal Keyword for Crawling Triples: 
(Enter 0 o to Crawl ali Triples) 
Craw!Now 
Figure 5.16 Screen for crawling resources/literals 
The system also allows consumers to display all triples stored in the system through 
the delimiter symbol "%". Figure 5.17 shows a screen resulted from crawling triples 
using the keyword: 
Enter a Resource/l..iteral Keyword for Crawliug Triples: • 
Jean-Pierre 
(Acquisition) 
Figure 5.17 
(Enter% to Crawl ali Triples) 
!preserve 
1 Crawl ow 
Triples 
presen ·e 
(Acquisition) 
Screen for crawling the "preserve" term 
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In this figure, a consumer can crawl using the "preserve" property. The system then 
displays all role players who preserved different digital media. Similarly, when a 
consumer crawls using "Jean-Pierre"; he will get the same results appearing above 
(i.e., what are the different digital deviees that were considered by "Jean-Pierre"). 
Using crawling, the requested information may appear in one or more slot at the time. 
This means that ali related triples containing this keyword will also be displayed (See 
Figure 5.18). 
Enter a Literai Keyword for Crawling Triples: • 
(Enter 0 o to Crawl aD Triples) 
jPOAdevice 
CrawtNow 
1 Tl"iples 
1 PDA de1ice (Acquisition) .-1 - S-N-1 (-A-cq<-lis-iti-on-) -r~-OG_-1_02-3-3-2--36-2-(A_c_(jlllS_Ï_tio-n) 
1 Jean· Pierre (Acquisition) 1 preserve (Acquisition) 1 PDA de1·ice (Acquisition) 
Figure 5.18 Screen for crawling using the "PDA deviee" 
As shown in Figure 5.18, the consumer crawls by using the "PDA deviee" keyword. 
The system displayed two different triples. First triple shows the "PDA deviee" 
appeared on the subject slot and the second triple the "PDA deviee" appeared on the 
object slot. In addition, each slot is also appended by the name of the forensic phase 
to which the crawled term belongs. 
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5.4 Reasoning 
Another pattern provided in the CF-CoC system, is the possibility for consumers to 
infer implicit information from the published triples. Inference rules are implemented 
within this section according to the rules mentioned in section 2.2.1.4. 
As shown in Figure 5.19, the system asks the consumer on which ontology he wants 
to run the reasoning engine. 
F orensic Information Consumption 
Orer ForèllSic Phase : 
Reasonmg Now 
Figure 5.19 Screen for reasoning on a forensic phase 
Consumer selects from this screen the forensic phase on which he wants to infer extra 
information from the published triples. Based on the same example provided in 
Chapter 4, if the consumer selects the acquisition phase, the reasoning engine will run 
on ail defined terms and their related instances in this phase. 
----------------- -- ---------------- ---- ---
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The constructors that are not yet explained, are the two constructors 
"owl:FunctionalProperty " and "owl:InverseFunctionalProperty" associated to 
"preserve" and "SN', respectively. 
• The ''preserve" term : 
The ''preserve" property is a predicate defined using "owl:ObjectProperty " 
and at the same time it is also defined using the constructor of 
"owl:FunctionalProperty ". When a property is tagged using this latter 
constructor, it means that for each subject in the triple where the "preserve " 
property is a predicate there can be at most one object. (Note: this is an 
example of using the owl:FunctionalProperty with the ''preserve" term. ln 
chapter 4 the owl:InverseFuncationalProperty is used with the ''preserve" 
term, but in this illustration, the owl:FunctionalProperty is used. Also, see 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3). 
Referring to the Figure 5.15, it is shown that the role player "Jean-Pierre" 
preserved two media deviees, "PDA deviee" and the 
"PersonalDigitalAssistant". Both triples are described using the ''preserve" 
property, which is tagged the "owl:FunctionalProperty " constructor. Thus, 
the system will consider and display to the consumers that both terms have the 
same identity, but they are presented using two different syntaxes. 
To illustrate on this idea using the entailment rule ofTable 2.3: 
If p(x,y) and p(x,z) => y=z 
If preserve (Jean-Pierre, PDA deviee) and preserve (Jean-Pierre, 
PersonalDigitalAssistant) => PDA deviee= PersonalDigitalAssistant) 
This rule depends totally on how the role players defined the "preserve" term. 
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, it is assumed that the role players are 
al ways aware of the lightweight constructors ofRDFS++. In this case, the role 
players restricts, that each role player can use the "preserve " term with only 
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one deviee. According to this example, when a role player uses another term 
syntax to describe the same deviee then bath strings will be equated to each 
others. 
Because the term can be used by one or more role players from other forensic 
phase, the role players may use the constructor 
owl:JnverseFunctionalProperty to restrict the preservation task to only the 
owner of the term. When a property is tagged using this latter constructor, it 
means that for each abject in the triple where the "preserve" property is a 
predicate there can be at most one subject. Thus, when consumers consume 
triples containing this predicate, the system will notify them that ali related 
subjects to this term are the same. 
• SN: 
The "SN ' property is a predicate defined using "owl:ObjectProperty " and at 
the same time it ts also defined usmg the constructor of 
"owl:InverseFunctionalProperty ". When a property is tagged using this latter 
constructor, it means that in the triple where the "SN' property is a predicate, 
the abject will have one and only one subject (See Table 2.2 and Table 2.3). 
Referring to the Figure 5.13 , the literai abject "OG4023-32-362" is the same 
for two different media deviees, the "!Pad'' and the "PDA deviee" . Bath 
triples are described using the "SN" property, which is tagged by the 
"owl:InverseFunctionalProperty" constructor. Thus, the system will consider 
and display to the consumer that bath terms are semantically the same, but 
they are presented using two different syntaxes. 
To illustrate on this idea using the entailment rule of Table 2.3: 
If p(y,x) and p(z,x) => y=z 
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If SN(IPad, OG4023-32-362) and SN(PDA deviee,OG4023-32-362) => 
iPad = PDA deviee 
Beeause the range of the objeet slot, where "SN'' is a predieate, is of type 
Litera!, and is used to identify one and only one deviee, the role players may 
use to tag this property using the "owl:InverseFunctiona!Property " (i.e., to 
restriet that all literais provided by "SN'' predieate uniquely identify one 
subjeet). Figure 5.20 shows a sereen displaying the result from both 
eonstruetors. 
- ' ~ \ ~_.{~\ 
~ .~,B2E .~,eKI .~ 1 
I.ru.!nli ~  ~ ~
Forensic Information Consum}>tion 
Reas on Over F orensic Phase : • Il Acquisition :::J 
Reasoning Now 
Reasoning on presen·e Properiv 
The subjecr J eau-Pierre (Acq uisition) bas sa me objects : 
• PDA de,ice (Acquisition) 
• Persona!D~ssistant (Acquisition) 
Reasoning on • • ProJlertv 
· The object OG4023-J2-362 (Acquisition) bas same s ubjects : 
• PDA de•ice (Acquisition) 
. • iPad (Acquisition) 
Figure 5.20 Sereen for reasoning on "preserve" and "SN'' 
Thus, from both terms, the system ean deduee implieit information, that the three 
mentioned terms: "IPad", "PDA deviee", and "Persona!Digita!Assistanf' are all the 
same. The reason is that "PDA deviee" is "Persona!Digita!Assistant", and "!Pad'' is 
"PDA" deviee, implies that "IPad'' is "Persona!Digita!Assistant". Based on the role 
player definitions of these predieates, the three terms are deseribing the same world 
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concept, but using different terms. Thus, owl:sameAs can be used to map these terms 
together. 
Other information can also be inferred by the system: 
• "Jean-Pierre" is of type "FirstResponder" and "FirstResponder" is a subclass 
of type "RolePlayer'', implies that "Jean-Pierre" is also of type "RolePlayer". 
• "Jean-Pierre" preserve "!Pacf' and "preserve" is a sub-property of "made" 
property, implies that "Jean-Pierre" made "!Pad''. 
• ''preserve" domain is "FirstResponder" and "Jean-Pierre" ''preserve" 
"Persona!Digita!Assistant", implies "Jean-Pierre" is a "FirstResponder". 
• ''preserve" range 1s "Digita!Media" and "Jean-Pierre" ''preserve" 
"Persona!Digita!Assistant", implies "Persona!Digita!Assistant" IS a 
"Digita!M edia". 
These are not the only infonnation that the system can infer. More triples could be 
inferred, depending on the number of constructors defined and the number of 
resources and literais published by the role players. 
5.5 Querying 
The last pattern that will be discussed in this chapter is querying. Usually, the word 
query in the LD refers to SP ARQL query to retrieve explicit information from the 
RDF store. The remaining part will discuss how a consumer can retrieve explicit 
information in the CF-CoC without writing down SPARQL code. 
The idea is based on searching a specifie literai (in object slot) or re ources (in 
ubject, predicate, or object) on each slot. This will be very useful when the consumer 
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do not know what literallresource he should type to crawl certain information. This 
may happen at the beginning of his survey over the cyber criminal case. 
Thus, a consumer can go to this screen to display explicit information published by 
the role players. Each slot they select can display ail information related to this slot. 
He can also display the default option "Ali" to display ail triples in the system (see 
Figure 5.21) 
. . . _·' - -' ' -
H 1 ~ 1 BQ.E 1 Provenance 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 uno.. 
!:!Q!!l!l ~ ~ Mtdta ~ = 
Forensic Information Cousumption 
Subject Predicare Object 
1· Ali Subjects (de faulQ· :::J 1 1· Ali Predicate (dsfault) • ::J T 1· Ali Objects (defauiO • 3 
OueryNow 
PDA d e"ice SN OG~023-32-362 
iPad SN OG .t02.>-32-3 62 
Jean-Pierre preserve PDAde:.ice 
Jenn-Pierté preset'\"é PersonalDigiralAssisrnnt 
Figure 5.21 Screen showing ail RDF triples 
If for example, a consumer needs to query using the abject slot, he can select a 
specifie abject from this slot, and the system will display ail related triples, where this 
value of query appears as an abject in all triples (See Figure 5.22). 
Ail combinations are possible to query different information. The only difference 
between this pattern and the crawl pattern is in the awareness of consumers about the 
information published in the system. If the consumer knows what he wants to find, he 
can th en use the crawl consumption pattern, and if he does not know about what are 
the resources published by the role players, he can start to query from a set of 
mentioned resources and literais. 
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fol"ensic Information Consumption 
Subject 
1 Jean·Pierre 
1 
1 Predicate 
3 1 1· Ali Predicats (default) • .::] 
1 OueryNow 1 
Jean-Pierre preserYe PDAdevice 
PersolllllDigitalA.ssistant Jean-Pierre preserve 
Object 
1· Ali Objects {default) • :::J 
Figure 5.22 Screen for querying upon subject slot 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed different consumption patterns provided by the CF-CoC 
system. The aim of this chapter was to explain how the system can help each role 
player to consume the published resources published by other role players and aid 
consumers in the court to understand and discover all published information. 
The consumption patterns discussed in this chapter are: browsing, crawling, 
reasoning and querying. Browsing is to navigate through different resources and 
expand them to understand their root definitions . Crawling is to search by a specifie 
keyword. Reasoning is to infer implicit information from explicit information. 
Finally, querying is to search by keywords already displayed by the system. 
The next chapter will discuss how the published linked data are bent to be consumed 
on a closed scale using PKI. 
-------------------- ----- -------
CHAPTERVI 
LINKED CLOSED DATA USING PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains how the Linked Data Principles (LDP) that are used to publish 
and represent information on a large scale (i.e. , the case of LOD project) can be 
bended to publish such information on a closed scale (i.e., this scale is called Linked 
Closed Data, LCD). 
As mentioned, the position of this chapter in this dissertation does not mean that this 
task cornes after the representation task and consumption of resources . Indeed, the 
task discussed in this chapter cornes before starting the investigation process and it is 
realized all over the forensic investigation, since the seizure of events, until the 
consumption of published resources by judge in a court of law. The restriction and 
accommodation of resources on closed scale will be accomplished by using the 
digital certificates. 
The digital certificates will be generated using the OpenSSL toof7. Three types of 
certificates will be generated. The Certificate Authority (CA) certificate, called also 
the self-signed certificate or root certificate, the server certificate, and the client 
certificate. 
27 https://www.openssl.org/ 
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Usually, the CA certificate can be generated for public or private cornrnunity in order 
to sign server and client certificate. The CA certificate generated for each cornrnunity 
is essentially the same, except that it differs and based on the following fact: "On 
whom the requesters put their trusts". Therefore, the generation of CA certificates and 
the signing of client and server certificates, follow the same procedures with all 
) 
cornrnuni ti es. 
In the current context, a scenario (see Section 3.5) has been proposed among a neutral 
side that hosts the CF-CoC, role players, and judge to share digital certificates. This 
scenario is enrolled between them under the assumption that the neutral part is 
responsible to select the CA provider. After a neutral part selects the CA provîder, it 
requests a server certificate for its CF-CoC system and requests a client certificate for 
the judge. Role players are also responsible to send their requests for client 
certificates to the same CA provider. Role players should have client certificates to 
access and consume such information. 
Due to the cost of issuing digital certificates from a public reputed institution, this 
dissertation assumes a virtual/imaginary institution called CF-CA. Its CA certificate 
will be generated manually to sign both server and client certificates. 
Generally, the CF-CoC system resides on a unique domainlnamespace on the web 
cloud owned by a neutra! side. The latter installs a server certificate to secure the 
published information. The CA is responsible to issue and signs the server certificate 
for the neutral side; a client certificate for judge, and client certificates for all role 
players. 
Before the investigation process takes place, the neutra! side receives a list of all role 
players who are going to participate in the forensic investigation. The neutral side in 
tum sends this list to the CA. The latter compares this list with the requests received 
from the role player and issues their client certificates. 
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6.2 Creation phases 
Generally, the creation of a digital certificate passes by four phases (see Figure 6.1) 
using the OpenSSL tool. Firstly, the certificate requester generates its own pair of 
keys (i .e., .key file) , then creates a request (i.e., .req or .csr format file) to the trusted 
party to issue for him a certification file (i.e. , .crt). Also, same procedures can be 
applied to the CA. The only difference for generating the CA certificate will be on its 
certification request. The request is sent and signed by the CA itself (i.e. , that is why 
this type of certificate is called self-signed certificate). 
The trusted party (i.e. , CA) signs the requests and tssues the corresponding 
certificates using its own private-key. The created certificate is then transformed to an 
exportable format (i.e., .p12 format) for sending it to the requesters (i.e., neutral side 
that hosts the system and role players). 
Predefined 
configuration file 
( openssl.cnf) 
Private key of 
trusted Party 
(CA.key) 
__.. 
~ 
rtificate CA Ce 
(C A.crt) 
1 Requester generates his own 
key pairs 
l Req uester .key 
Requester generates his own 
Request to the CA 
Requester.req 
Signing the certificate 
request by the trusted party 
Requester.crt 
Export/Transform 
the certification to an 
exportable format 
l 
Requester.p12 
Figure 6.1 Procedures for creating a digital certificate using the OpenSSL tool 
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6.2.1 Creation of self-signed certificate 
Before starting, the CA key is generated; RootCA.key will be of length 2048 bits (256 
bytes) : 
openssl genrsa -out RootCA.key 2048 
The RootCA.key is then used to generate the certificate request RootCA.csr by 
providing the country name (i.e. , C=CA), the organization name (i.e. , O=CA 
Provider), and the common name of the certificate (i .e., CN=CF-CA) (see Figure 
6.2). 
openssl req -new -key RootCA.key -out RootCA.csr -conjig openssl.cnf-subj 
"/C=CAIO=CA Proivder Institution/CN=CF-CA/" 
After generating the RootCA.csr, the request is signed using the RootCA.key to 
generate the requested certificate (crt format, RootCA.crt). In this type of certificate, 
the CA itselfwill sign the certificate, that's why it is called a self-signed certificate: 
openssl req -x509 -days 365 -in RootCA.csr -out RootCA.crt -key RootCA.key -config 
opensslCA.cnf-extensions v3_ca 
Finally, the exportable format .pl2 is generated to transform the RootCA.crt into an 
exportable format RootCA.pl2 
openssl pkcsl2 -export -in RootCA.crt -inkey RootCA.key -certfile RootCA.crt -out 
RootCA.pl2 
Certiflcate , , :;;: 
General 1 Details 1 Cert ification Path J 
This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s): 
• Ali issuance policles 
• Ali appficatîon policies 
l xssued to: CF·CA 1 
l lssued by: CF-CA 1 
Valid from 20 15-04-06 to 2017-04-05 
OK 
Figure 6.2 The CA self-signed certificate 
6.2.2 Creation of server certificate 
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The server certificate is created for two goals:· it lets the role player ensures the 
identity of the server, and it is used to check for the client certificate (see Figure 6.3). 
We assume that the server name corresponds to a domain28 . This certificate will be 
issued for the neutral side (that hosts the system) to install it on his server. This server 
will host the CF-CoC system, which will be used by the role player. Thus, the CA 
will issue and sign a certificate for this domain name. 
28 Domain owned by Tamer Gayed : www.cyberforensics-coc.com 
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Firstly, the Server.key is generated using the following command: 
openssl genrsa -out Server.key 2048 
The Server.key is then used to generate the certificate request Server.csr by providing 
the country name (i .e., C=CA), the organization name (i.e. , O=CA Provider), and the 
common name of the certificate (i.e., CN=Neutralside). 
openssl req -new -key Server.key -out Server.csr -config openssl.cnf -subj 
"/C=CAIO=CA Provider/CN=Neutralside/" 
After generating the Server.csr, the request is signed using the CA certificate 
RootCA.crt and the key RootCA.key to generate the requested certificate (i.e. , 
Server.crt). 
openssl ca -days 365 -in server.csr -cert RootCA.crt - out Server.crt -keyfile 
RootCA.key -config opensslserver.cnf -extensions server 
llssu.ed by: CF-CA 
v fi'OfTI t3/07/2016 to Otsto-.12017 
Figure 6.3 The server digital certificate 
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Because the server certificate is signed by the CA, the openssl command uses a build-
in parameter called 'ca' to declare that the server certificate will be signed by the CA 
using its key (i.e., RootCA.key). 
6.2.3 Creation of client certificate 
The role player authenticates himself to the server through the client certificate. Role 
player can be a technician, prosecutor or defender. Without this certificate, the role 
player will not be able to access the CF-CoC system to construct ontologies for each 
forensic phase and publish resources (see Figure 6.4). 
Firstly, the Client.key is generated using the following command: 
openssl genrsa -out Client. key 2048 
The Client.key is then used to generate the certificate request Client.csr by providing 
the country name (i.e., C=CA), the organization name (i.e., O=CA Provider), and the 
common name of the certificate (i.e., CN=Jean-Pierre). 
openssl req -new -key Client. key -out Client.csr -config openssl.cnf -subj 
"IC=CAIO=CA Provider /CN=Jean-Pierre/" 
After generating the Client.csr, the request is signed usmg the CA certificate 
(RootCA .crt) and key (RootCA.key) to generate the requested certificate (i.e. , 
Server.crt). 
openssl ca -days 365 -in Client.csr -cert RootCA.crt -out client.crt -keyfile RootCA.key 
-config opensslclient.cnf -extensions client 
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GenM<!!I 1 Details 1 Certlilcatlon Path 1 
~ 
Certiflcate Information 
This certific a te is intended for the foUowing purpose(s): 
• Proves your identity to ~ remote compUter 
1 Issu e d t o: Jean-Pierre j 
1 I ssu e d by: CF ·CA J 
Va Ud from 2015-04-06 to 2017-04-05 
~Vou h <>ve <> private lœy th& corresponds to this certlficate . 
OK 
Figure 6.4 The client digital certificate 
As shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3 , and 6.4, each certificate has its own purpose. The 
purpose of a certificate depends on its type. The certificate type is defined using the -
extension during the creation of .crt certificate. The -extension parameter caUs the 
proper module for each certificate type. For example, it calls the openss!CA.cnf, 
openss!Server.cnf, and opensslClient. cnf for the CA, server, and client certifi.cates, 
respective! y. However, the openssl.cnf contains the general configuration of all types 
of certificates. 
6.3 Installation of the digital certificates 
Before insta11ing the certificates, the CA sends to the neutra! side and role players 
their own certificates. The neutra! side installs his certificate on his server and role 
players install their certificates on their browsers. 
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6.3.1 Installation of self-signed certificate: 
Because the CA certificate in this context is created manually and not issued by a 
public reputed institution, it will not be recognized by the client browsers. Therefore, 
the client and server certificates will not work since they are signed by custom CA 
provider. Thus, the CF-CA sends its self-signed certificate (i.e. , .pl2 format without 
the private-key of the CA certificate) to the neutral side (i.e., server) and role players 
(i.e., clients) to install iton their machines. 
By clicking on the .pl2 file (i.e., exportable format) , a wizard will be launched to 
install the CA certificate under the trusted root fo l der of the current browsers for both 
server and clients. By firstly installing the CA self-signed certificate (i.e. , CF-CA), 
the browsers of clients and server machines will automatically identify the issuer (i.e. , 
custom provider) of the client and server certificates. 
6.3.2 Installation of server certificate 
The CA sends the server certificate to the judge. The latter then starts the installation 
of the server certificate. The installation of the server certificate on windows 
operating system passes by two phases: 
• Running the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) 29 . 
• Installing the root certification authority certificate manually30. 
• Installing the server certificate31. 
29 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms751408.aspx 
30 https://support.microsoft. com/en-us/kb/186812#/en-us/kb/1868 12 
31 https://support. microsoft.co m/en-us/kb/892987 
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Installation of this type of certificate is not accomplished by a judge. It is performed 
only once by a neutral side. After installing the server certificate, the neutral side is 
viewed only over a secure channel because it is secured using Secure Socket Module 
(SSL). Next figure (Figure 6.5) shows what happens when the host name is accessed 
without secured HTTP (i.e. , http://Neutralside). 
As shown in next figure, the server is not accessible through the classic HTTP. Page 
should be accessed through secure channel (i.e., SSL) usmg HTTPS 
(https: / /Neutralside ). 
Flle Favorites Tools HeJp 
i' Favorit'es: 1 ~ ,.. SugQested Sit os --
~ T h e _paQe mu:st be vfewed over se·cure chennel 
The page must be vievved over a secure 
channe l 
The page you are t.rying to vie requires the use of ... hrtp.s ... in the 
address. 
P lease t:ry the following : 
• T ry Q~in by t:yping htt:ps: / / at the beoinning of the add r ess 
you 8 r e attempti g to reach. 
HTTP 403 . ..!.- Forbidden: SSL r equired 
Internet I nforn,ation Services. 
Technical lnfonT~at-ion (for support. .pers.onnef) 
• B.z!ICkOr"O UI"' d : 
This error indicates thet the paoe you are. trying to acce.ss ïs 
secu r ed ~Nith Secur e Soc et:s L~yer (SSL) .. 
• l\11ore infor n'lation: 
f':f 1erosoft Suppgrt 
Figure 6.5 Access to CF-CoC host server using HTTP 
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6.3.3 Installation of client certificate 
Once the page is accessed through a secure channel, it requires client digital 
certificate (i.e., role player or judge). If the client certificate is not installed on the 
machine that is trying to access this secure page, the local browser of the machine 
will ask the user (i.e., role player or judger) to install/have a client certificate. See 
Figure 6.6. 
T'Oo.ls H e lp 
S ugoosted S ·itcs -
T he page r"eq uires .et cUen t cart:ïFic.ete 
T h e page req ui res a e ll en ce r t l f' i ca t e 
The page you are trying t:o vi.aw requi re.s the use oF a client: 
certifie8'ttl!: .. 
Please. t:ry t:he f'ollo~ïng: 
- C:hek the .B..s:.~h button to t:rv gain, tF you have ïn.st.elled 
your eltent certiFico.te . 
- :CF you befie-e vou .should be. :eoble o vievv t:hi.s: direc:t:ory or 
p;e.ge .. pie s:.e conr. C'l: ~h..e. 'V'Jeb 6#it:e .ftdi"T''inistr~t:c:u'" by (..Ising the 
e-n,ail address or phone. numb-er ti.st:ed on the 127 o o 1 
Meme page_ 
HTTP 403~7 - Forbïdden: Clier.t: c:e...-tiftcl!:lte rea " ... red 
.rnt:ernet tnfcu-..,...,~t:ior~~ Se.-v-îce~ 
Technteol .Inf'orrn tion (t=or support: personnel) 
- S o ckgrovnd : 
This err-or o-c::curs when the r esource vou .e:re ;e.ttemp ing t .o 
aec:ess r equires your brovv.ser c:o ha"e Secu re So.ckecs 
L.eyer (SSL.) client .c:-ef""'t"ific:.ac:e t"hat: the server recognize.s. 
,....1ore inForm<l!lt.ion: 
M ! SCQ=&Q ft; S uppprt 
Figure 6.6 Access to CF-CoC host server using HTTPS 
The installation of the client certificate is similar to the installation of server 
certificate, except that in this case the wizard installs the certificate in the client/ 
persona! fol der of the browser. 
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6.4 Working scenarios of the digital certificates 
This section explains two scenanos, each of them following the way of digital 
certificates are working from certain point of view. First scenario illustrates m 
technical details of the abstract scenario mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.5: 
1. Assuming that the side that hosts the CF-CoC already selected the issuer 
institution and made a request for a server certificate for its host. 
2. Technicians, who are authorized to gather information, send requests to the 
neutra! side that hosts the CF-CoC system, to issue client certificates. In tum, 
this neutra! side sends such requests to the CA, in order to issue for the 
technicians the clients certificates. 
3. Meanwhile, each role player generates a public-private-key pair ( {Ku-P, KR-
P} ), where P is all information identifying the player (i.e., R is private, and U 
is public). 
4. Each role player stores the private-key in a secure storage to keep its integrity 
and confidentiality, and then sends a request containing the public-key Ku-P 
and P to the CA selected by the neutra! side. 
5. The player' s public-key and its identifying information P are signed by the 
CA authority using its ({KR-CA} ) private-key. 
6. The resulting data structure is retumed to the role player. R-CA {P, Ku-P} is 
called the public-key certificate of the role player, and the authority is called a 
public-key certification authority (i.e. , symbols outside brackets mean the 
signature of the data structure) . The latter is installed together with the client 
certificate. 
7. After technicians finish their tasks and publish the information (e-CoC), they 
communicate with the prosecutor. The latter sends a request to the neutra! side 
for a client certificate to start using CF-CoC system (same steps from 2-6). 
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8. After the prosecutor receives the certificate, he starts to use the CF-CoC 
system to consume the published information. Prosecutor has a duty to build 
and publish the proofs (inculpatory evidence) against the accused. 
9. After the prosecutor finishes his task, he communicates ·with the defense, 
which also sends a request to the neutra! side for a client certificate to start 
consuming the published information. 
1 O. If the defense disputes the evidence by showing counter evidence to thwart 
prosecutor ( exculpatory evidence), the judge is engaged and sends a request to 
the neutra! party for a client certificate to start using CF-CoC system (same 
step from 2-6). 
11. After Judge receives the certificate, he starts to use the CF-CoC to consume 
the information published by the technicians, prosecutor and defenders and 
cali the technicians to listen their testimonies about the e-CoC. 
The second scenario explains how role players and judge access the CF-CoC system 
using their client certificates: 
1. A role player/judge accesses the site by typing the URL of the server using 
the secure socket channel (see Figure 6.5). 
2. Because the remote server (i.e., where the CF-CoC web application is hosted) 
owns a server certificate, it requires then that each client wishing to access 
this domain, also owns a client certificate owned by the same trusted party (In 
this case, the CF-CA), otherwise the browser responds with a blank page 
asking to install client certificates (see Figure 6.6). 
3. Once the server identifies the client certificate, it redirects the client to the 
CF-CoC web application (see Figure 6.7) . 
4. The role player, at this time, accesses the application. He starts 
publishing/consuming the ontologies and creating terms concemed with the 
forensic phase in hand (see Chapter 4). 
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As it is shown in next, Figure 6.7, the server certificate is installed and shown at the 
top of the screen as a yellow lock. By clicking on the lock, it will show who issued 
the certificate (i.e. , CA) for this page and to whom it was issued. 
Once the role player fmishes the publication task, the resources is available to the 
judge for consumption, as he owns a server certificate of the server, which allows him 
to view and access such resources published on his server. For example, the terms 
defined in Chapter 4, such as ''preserve", "DigitalMedia" , etc., will be resolvable to 
more extra resources on the same domain (e.g., ''preservedBy", "FirstResponder", 
etc.) orto extemal domains (e.g. , the domain. of FOAF, OWL, etc.). However, at the 
same time such resources will not be accessible from outer domains. 
Figure 6.7 Redirection to the restricted resources 
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Furthermore, the created certificates are used to restrict all resources belonging to the 
domain where the CF-CoC is residing. A certificate can be created not only for all 
resources on the server, but it can be issued for a specifie resource on that server. For 
example, if there is a resource 'x' in DSl , then the field of the certificate called 
"issued to" (see Figure 6.3) will be assigned the complete URL of the resource 'x' 
( e.g., CN=N eutralside/resources/x). 
6.5 Heartbleed: an error in the OpenSSL tool 
An error should be highlighted and considered before ending this chapter related to 
the OpenSSL tool. This error is called the "heartbleed bug". This bug has been 
registered in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures system (CVE) as CVE-
2014-0160 (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), 2014). 
In december 2011, a developer working on the OpenSSL called "Robin Seggelmann" 
32 made a programing error in the module implementing the TLS heartbeat protocol 
in the OpenSSL 2012 version33 • This error is classified as a buffer over-read34 (i.e., a 
situation where more data can be read than shoud be allowed), which allows hackers 
to get information transmitted by users from previous requests (e.g., those that are 
still stored in the temporary memory, session cookies, usemames and passwords, or 
sometimes may reveal the encryption keys). This error was considered a big gap in 
32 https: //support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/892987 
33 https: //support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/892987 
34 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/892987 
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the module of heartbeat, that's why they called it heartbleed35 (i .e. , TLS heartbeat 
extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server). 
This error affected sorne websites and web-servers and allowed for two years to gain 
access to persona! information on the web (i.e., those web sites and servers that used 
issued certificates between the period 2012 until April2014, using this version). 
This error was discovered in the late 2013 by two working teams from Google and 
the other from a Finnish company." They kept it secret until they re-implemented 
again the heartbeat module of the TLS. 
Nowadays, this gap has been resolved in the new version of OpenSSL (1.0.1g). For 
those who used the old version, OpenSSL, they launched a command for upgrading 
the defective version to the new version 1.0.1g and issued new digital certificates 
using the corrected version. Today, the main concem of researchers is to know how 
many frauds are accomplished through this gap, which something difficult to reveal, . 
because spying on the heartbeat does not leave any trace. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed in detail how the technology stack/linked data principles of the 
linked data are adapted to publish data into a closed cale while keeping the 
resolvability of these published resources. The idea is elaborated on the same case 
study provided in chapter 4 (i.e., same role players). 
The represented resources are shared on closed scale between role players and the 
judge through the public-key infrastructure approach. This chapter opens the door to 
35 https://support.microsoft. com/en-us/kb/892987 
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a research representing the counter part of the LOD, called the LCD, which share all 
the advantages of the LOD, but with consumption restriction. 
Therefore, the technology stack (URI, HTTP, and RDF) is enhanced to include a 
secure access mechanism (URI, HTTPS, and RDF). The work presented in this 
chapter is a bridge connecting dual works; the work proposed in (Cobden et al. , 2011; 
Rajabi et al. , 2012). In addition, it underlines that the digital certificates cannat be 
issued only for datasets, but also for resources within these datasets. Finally, this 
work also provides with technical details the complete scenario of how to use digital 
certificates to bend resources from LOD to LCD, in arder to reach the compromise 
question between resolvability resources and their access restrictions . 

CHAPTERVII 
APPLYING THE CF-COC SYSTEM ON A COMPLETE FORENSIC 
PRO CESS 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 formulated the hypotheses of this research. Chapter 2 collected the facts 
related to each problem and discussed them through different related works from 
literature. Chapter 3 analyzed and adapted such facts to reaching conclusions in the 
form of solutions toward the concemed problems. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 stimulated the 
production of desired information in the light of Chapter 3 and based on the facts 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The present chapter will discuss a complete experimentation to bring forth the desired 
information and improve the formulated hypotheses provided in chapter 1. This will 
be applied on a complete forensic model, to transform the tangible CoC associated to 
each phase into e-CoC, annotating it using different provenance metadata, and 
consume it on a closed scale by using different consumption patterns. 
The same CoC provided in Chapter 3 and implemented along Chapter 4, 5, and 6, 
will be resumed to cover a complete forensic model in order to improve and validate 
the hypotheses proposed in chapter 1. 
Referring to Chapter 2, different forensic models have been presented in Table 2.4. 
This chapter resumes and considers the Kruse model, because it encompasses the 
three essential forensic phases of any forensic investigation. This chapter will 
-------------------
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consider the remammg tasks of the acquisition phase such as recovery and 
copy/backup. In the authentication phase, two tasks are considered to generate 
checksum and comparing them. Finally in the analysis phase, the backup deviee is 
examined in order to extract forensic information in the form accompanied with 
AFF 4 format. 
Based on the same footsteps of Figure 2.6, the Kruse model includes three forensic 
phases; each forensic phase con tains a set of tasks. 
"An IT company recalls a company specialized in cyber forensic to investigate and 
restore all excel sheetfilesfrom a PDA deviee. This deviee was using by an employee 
that has be en fi red recent/y from work and when he left, the IT company did not fi nd 
those on his deviee. The employee was not authorized to delete or hide such type of 
files, because they are considered as intellectual sheets for this ri company. The 
cyber forensic company dedicated this investigation task to sorne role players called: 
Jean-Pierre, Peter, and Robert. Those role players applied the Kruse madel in their 
investigation proeess. Jean-Pierre worked on preserving the deviee and did a classic 
recovery and restored sorne ward document files. The excel files were not between 
such resto red files. Jean-Pierre was not able to find the excel files, then he decided to 
escalate this issue to Pierre and Robert to make further investigations. Jean-Pierre 
then did a backup of the primary deviee on a secondary one. He provided bath 
deviees to Peter, who is an authenticator of digital media. Peter checked the integrity 
of bath deviees before analyzing of the secondary/backup deviee by Robert. After 
Peter finished checking the integrity, he provided the backup deviee to Robert. Robert 
in his turn analyzed the secondary deviee using a forensic tool called Encase. This 
forensic tool is able to detect and extract more and complicated information from the 
media deviee. He was able to notice through this tool that the size of the stored 
information is not reflecting its allocated size on the deviee. By using further 
investigations, he discovered that the fired employee used a program called secret 
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dis/(36 ta create a hidden partition within the current partition, where he hid ail the 
excel sheet files." 
Jean-Pierre 
1 Acquisition 
r--------// 
Chain of Custody 
Role Player: Jean-Pierre 
« Jean-Pierre preserved the 
state of the digital media 
PDA deviee, which has the 
SN: OG-4023032-362. The 
date he did this task was 5 
March 2014. After he 
preserved it , he restored ali 
deleted files from this 
suspected deviee but he did 
not find t he requested files. 
He fou nd deleted word 
files . He made then a 
backup from the suspected 
deviee on a Hard disk of a 
laptop as a backup deviee 
for further investigations» 
Figure 7.1 
Peter Robert 
' 1 Authentication Jt----..:~~:: Analysis 1 .J 
,....-------/~ ,_--J7\:__ 
Chain of Custody 
Role Player : Pet er 
« Peter in his tu rn, the first 
thing he did when he 
received both media, is to 
check their integri ty by 
applying a hash algorithm 
called MD5 to generate a 
checksum for both deviees. 
Afte r he fini shed, he st arted 
to compare both 
checksums, to ensure that 
the backup deviee has not 
been altered compared to 
the source deviee. Hash For 
both med ia is OX49 E9DEC3» 
Chain of Custody 
Role Player : Robert 
« Robert examined the 
configuration of the backup 
deviee using a forensic tool 
called Encase and he 
extracted the data size: 100 
Mega. He discovered th at it 
does not match with the 
real allocated size of the 
data itself on the hard 
drive: 105 M ega. There 
was a hidden partition of 5 
Mega on the hard drive 
created by a software 
called secret disk, where 
the requested excel files 
are located» 
The tangible CoCs of the Kruse mode! 
36 http: //www.guidingtech.com/6765/hide-files-invisible-partition-secret-disk/ 
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Figure 7.1 con tains two parts; the upper part in the figure shows the use cases 
instances of the Kruse mode! and their role players. The lower part shows the 
corresponding CoC for each phase on the Kruse mode! that the role players will 
transform into e-CoCs using the CF -CoC system. Each phase containing a set of 
tasks. The acquisition phase contains preserve, recover, and backup. The 
authentication includes the generation of checksum for both primary and secondary 
deviee and then compares them. Analysis includes examining the secondary deviee. 
Previous chapters (i.e., Chapter 4, 5, and 6), each one apart, explained the usage of 
CF -CoC system, how to transform the CoC into e-CoC, and anno tate them, consume 
the published information using different consumption patterns, and bent such 
information on a closed scale. In this chapter, the complete picture combining all 
these tasks together is provided on a complete forensic process, in order to depict 
how the CF-CoC system proves all proposed hypothesis and depicts the solutions to 
answer research problems. 
Next sections are presented based on the sequence of activities timeline. It starts by 
creating the client certificates for the technicians (i .e., by the CA through the neutra! 
si de. The technicians start to use CF -CoC to describe and publish their findings and 
annotate the published information using provenance metadata. Once the technicians 
finish their investigation and create the e-CoCs, they share the collected evidence and 
documents with the prosecutor. The latter communicates with defender and in case of 
dispute; the judge is engaged to get the testimony of the technicians. The example 
provided in this chapter will give a complete example of how technicians use the 
system to publish information (same idea for any other role players such as 
prosecutor and defender), and how the published information is consumed by the 
judge. 
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7.2 Identification of role players and judge 
Before the forensic investigation starts, the issue and sharing of certificates takes 
place. Therefore, each party sends a list containing the name of their role players to 
the neutral side. The latter, in turn, sends both lists to the CA to issue their 
corresponding certificates. Also the neutral side asks from CA to issue a server 
certificate of the CF -CoC host and a client certificate for the judge. 
Thus, for each role player there is a corresponding client certificate, one server 
certificate for the neutral side server, and a client certificate for judge. According to 
the use case mentioned above, five digital certificates will be issued by the CA (i.e., 
four client certificates and one server certificate). For client certificates: one for Jean-
Pierre who is responsible to work on the acquisition phase, one for Peter who is 
responsible to work on the authentication phase, and the third is for Robert who is 
responsible to work on the analysis phase, and one client certificate for the judge. 
One server certificate issued for the neutral side, the owner of the CF-CoC host/serve. 
Finally, there is also a root certificate (i.e. , of the CA itself) that is used to sign all 
certificates (i.e., clients and server). 
After the CA issues all these certificates, they are all exported in .pl2 formats and 
sent to the neutral side to expedite to the role players and judge. The neutral side at 
this time is responsible to install its server certificate on the CF-CoC host. Once all 
certificates are issued and installed, each role player is able to start using the CF-CoC 
system to record the results of his forensic investigation. 
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Figure 7.2 Screen showing sorne client certificates 
The above figure, Figure 7.2, shows all the client certificates on the same screen, this 
is because all client certificates are tested and installed on only one machine, the fact 
that leads to show all the available certificates ready to communicate with the server 
certificate (i.e., they should have the same issuer, CF-CA) installed on the host of 
neutral side (i.e. , in the figure below, it is the https://Neutralside). Once the server 
identifies the client certificate, it redirects the client (i .e., role player or judge) to the 
CF-CoC web application (see Figure 6.7). If a client certificate is not identified by 
the server certificate this will lead to situation illustrated in the Figure 6.6, and at this 
time neither the role players nor the judge will be able to use the CF-CoC to publish 
and secure the forensic information. 
----~----
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By using digital certificates, role players and judge are able to use the LDP, which are 
used to publish data publicly, to publish and consume forensic information on a 
closed scale. They answered the hypothesis #4 of securing the CoC information. Role 
players and judge are able through digital certificates to restrict the access to the 
forensic information while exploiting the advantages of using LDP for resolvability 
and representation, authenticate players to the neutral side server, and then restrict the 
consumption of information on a closed sca}e. 
7.3 Publishing Co Cs using CF -CoC 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the role players start the publication task by selecting and 
determining which terms they are going to use, and by defining them using the 
vocabulary of the semantic web in order to record and publish forensic information. 
As explained, the task of determining the forensic terms is subjective and differs from 
one role player to another. For example, as shown in the next table, the role player of 
the acquisition phase select the terms "SuspectedDevice" and "SecondaryDevice", to 
refer to the primary and backup deviee. Other role players may use other terms to 
define both deviees. Role players start to select the terms and then start to define them 
using the lightweight ontology vocabularies (i .e., RDFS++). Referring to the tangible 
documents provided in Figure 7.1 , each role player defines his own terms (i.e. , 
proprietary terms), their types (i.e. , class, property), and assigns their constraints (i.e. , 
tagged them using RDFS constructors) and use the CF-CoC to create them. Those 
custom terms are called proprietary terms. 
In the next table (where "p" stands for a property and "C" stands for a class), each 
task in a forensic phase is described through a set of terms. This set of terms 
describes different pieces of forensic information. The main axis of each task is the 
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property term. For example, the recovery task is defined by the recover verb. The 
subjects and objects of each verb (i.e., each task), are described by domain and range 
classes. 
Table 7.1 shows the term selected by the role players to create, record and publish 
their e-CoCs. For the acquisition phase, terms are mentioned in Table 4.1. The role 
player ("FirstResponder") of this phase needs to determine more terms related to the 
other two forensic tasks (i.e. , Recovery and Backup). For the recovery task, "Jean-
Pierre" determined new terms. He determined new class term called 
"SuspectedDevice" beside the one "Digita!Media" defined in the preservation task, 
and he defined the "SuspectedDevice" to be a subclass of the "Digita!Media" . For the 
recovery task itself, he will define a property term called "recover", where its domain 
is a subclass from "Role player" and its range will be a subclass of "Digita!Media". 
The thing that he is going to recover will be a set of deleted files. He will define a 
new class called "DeletedFiles", which is a subclass of "DeLetedResource", which is 
a subclass of "FileDataObject" defined in an existing and well-defined vocabulary 
called NEPOMUK File Ontology (NFO) ( ontology that deals with files and other 
desktop resources, whose super-class is the "FileDataObjecf' class that represents 
files from sorne digital storage medium)37 . "Jean-Pierre" defines a custom property 
called "containsRecover" as a sub-property of the property ''format" imported from 
the Dublin (DCMI, 2015) that is used to describe either the physical or digital 
manifestation of a resource. He defined the domain class of this custom property to 
be the "Digita!Media", and its range will be a new custom class called 
"DeletedFiles", which is a subclass of the class "DeletedResource" imported from the 
name space "nfo". This means that Jean-Pierre needs to describe any digital media 
contains partitions and different files type. 
37 http: //www.semanticdesktop.org/ontologies/2007/03/22/nfo/ 
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Table 7.1 Forensic terms ofKruse model 
~ ~ T-Box A-Box 
"' e<J 
"' ..d e<J 
~ ~ 
~ RolePlayer (C), 
0 
·.g FirstResponder(C),DigitalMedia(C), SN(p ), 
t:; 
<!) preservedBy (p ), preserve(p) Cl) 
<!) 
1-< Jean-Pierre, PDA P-. 
~ è recover (p ), SuspectedDevice (C), 
deviee, 
0 
. ...... <!) LaptopHD, .-<;:::: ;> 
containsRecover (p ), DeletedFiles ( C) Cl) 0 
·a (.) 
cr' <!) 004023-32-362, (.) ~ 
< Word Files 
0.. 
.Q 
(.) backup (p), BackupDevice (C), backupTo (p) ro ÇQ 
'-.. 
;:>. 
o. 
0 
u 
PrimaryDevice (C) + SecondaryDevice (C) + 
authenticatePrimary(P) + 
s authenticateSecondary(p) + hashingPrimary (p) Peter, ;::::l 
Cl) Personal_Digital_ ~ 
+ hashingSecondary (p) + lmagefilePrimary (C) (.) 
<!) 
...Cl Assistant, 
0 u + ImagefileSecondary (C) checksumPrimary (p) 0 <!) 
. ...... Hard_ disk_laptop ...... ...... ro ro + checksumSecondary (p) chckalgorithmPrimary -~ 1-< <!) 
...... 0 HDL _image.img, 0 <!) (p) + chckalgorithmSecondary (p) + <!) 0 
...Cl 
...... PDA _image.img, ;::::l 
Authenticator (C) ~ 
MD5, 
OX49E9DEC3, 
<!) 
owl :sameAs @ 
0.. 
s 
0 
u 
200 
Analyzer (C), analyze (p), analyzedBy (p), Robert, hidden 
part, Excel files, 
ForensicTool (C), dataS ize (p ), totalSize (p ), 
-~ <!) Encase, 100 
en N HiddenPartition (C), contains (p), ;;:.... ;;:.... 
'"@ '"@ Mega, 5 Mega, 
~ ~ hiddenContains (p), hiddenUsing (p), hiddenSize 105 Mega, 
(p) 
Secured disk 
In the backup task, "Jean-Pierre" found that he needs to define more terms to 
describe this task. He defined a new term called "BackupDevice" which will be a 
subclass of the "Digita!Media" class, and a "copy" property whose domain will be a 
subclass from the "Role player" class and range will be a subclass of "Digita!Media". 
He also defined a new property term called "CopyTo", where its domain will be the 
source deviee (i.e., "SuspectedDevice") and its range will be the destination deviee 
(i.e., "BackupDevice") . 
The second forensic phase is the authentication one. In this phase, the role player 
"Peter" defined his role by using a class called "Authenticator", which is a subclass 
of "RolePlayer". He defined new terms for the suspected and backup deviees. He did 
not notice terms defined by "Jean-Pierre", he defined his own terms for both deviees: 
"PrimaryDevice" and "SecondaryDevice". In such case, this will not change anything 
if a role player reveals that both terms are referring to the same concept, a mapping 
using "sameAs" constructor can be used to relate both terms together. In this phase, 
there are two main forensic tasks to verify the integrity of both deviees: generate the 
checksum for each deviee (i.e., suspected and backup deviees), then compare both 
checksum to ensure that they are identical, which means that the backup deviee is not 
altered or tampered and consistent with the source deviee. 
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In generating the checksum, "Peter" is an authenticator, so he defined his role as a 
subclass from the "RolePlayer" class, which is defined by "Jean-Pierre" in the 
preservation task of the acquisition phase. 
The role player "Peter " defined also two new property terms called 
"authenticatePrimary" and "authenticateSecondary". Both are sub-properties of the 
"made" property imported from FOAF vocabulary. The domain and range of both of 
them are "RolePlayer" and "FileDataObject'', respectively. The "FileDataObject" 
class is also a sub-class of"rdfs :Resource", which is the class ofall resources. 
The authenticator "Peter" also defined two new terms for the "SuspectedDevice" and 
"BackupDevice", the "PrimaryDevice for the former and "SecondaryDevice" for the 
later. He defined these two new terms instead to use the term "Digita!Media". 
He defined the "hashingPrimary" for the "PrimaryDevice" and the 
"hashingSecondary" for the "SecondaryDevice". The domain and range of each of 
them are sub-classes of "FileDataObject'' being verified and "ImagefilePrimary" and 
"ImagefileSecondary" being generated, respectively 
The authenticator "Peter " defined two classes for the image files the 
"ImagefilePrimary" and "ImagefileSecondary". Each of them will be a sub-class of 
"FileHash" class defined in NEPOMUK File Ontology. The "ImagefilePrimary" 1 
"ImagefileSecondary" is a custom class referring to the image file fingerprint 
generated from the hashing task and generating the checksum. 
For the checksum algorithms "Peter" also defined "chckalgorithmPrimary" 1 
"chckalgorithmSecondary" (property), which will be a sub-property of the property 
called "hasA lgorithm" defined in the NFO ontology. Its domain will be the image file 
"ImagefilePrimary" 1 "ImagefileSecondary" class generating from hashing and its 
range will be the name of this algorithm inherited from XML Schema Datatype 
(W3C, 2006). 
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Also, he defined a property term called "checksumPrimary " 1 "checksumSecondary" 
that shows the hashing value of the image fingerprint (i.e. , known by checksum or 
hashing value). It will be a sub-property of "hasValue" property defined in the 
NEPOMUK File Ontology, with as domain "ImagefilePrimary" 1 
"ImagefileSecondary" and as range the checksum string itself inherited from XML 
Schema Datatype. Finally, he will use the "owl:sameAs " to assert the checksum 
generated from both deviees. 
Finally, the analyzer "Robert" of the analysis forensic phase will use the same term 
used by "Peter" to identify the backup deviee (i.e.; secondary deviee). He also 
defined two properties "analyze" and "analyzedBy" property to describe who did 
what. 
A "ForensicTool" class is also defined by "Robert" to refer to the tool used in the 
forensic investigation. A "dataSize" property term referring to the current allocation 
of data, "tota!Size" property will be used to refer to the real size of data on the hard 
drive. 
The analyzer "Roberf' defined "contains" property that will be used to describe the 
content of any partition (not hidden) . Also, he defined the class "HiddenPartition" to 
refer to hidden part of the hard drive and "hiddenContains" property to express the 
fact that this part contains hidden information. The tool used to hide this part on the 
hard disk will be explained through the term of "hiddenUsing" property, and finally 
the size of the hidden partition will be explained through the "hiddenSize" property. 
This will explain in detail in Section 7.3.3 of the analysis phase. 
Next sections will explain the remaining tasks for the acquisition phase (i.e., recovery 
and backup) and the tasks of authentication and analysis. Preservation task has been 
discus ed a an example along chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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7.3.1 The acquisition phase 
As explained, the acquisition phase contains three forensic tasks: the preservation of 
media, its recovery and its backup. Next sections discuss each section apart. 
7.3.1.1 Recovery 
The recovery task is the second task a:fter the preservation task in the acquisition 
phase. In the recover task, Jean-Pierre starts to define the "SuspectedDevice" to be a 
subclass of the "DigitalMedia" defined under the preservation category task (see 
Figure 7.3) . 
Create ::\"ew forensic Term 
IT<!IlllName :* jsuspectedD!l'lice ( Specify the name of the new term) 
!In Ontology : t 1 Acquisition .::J ( Specify in wlùch ontology you define a new tenu) 
lcategory : 
î- New IRecovery 
r Existing 
lr<!Illl Type : • jclass .:] ( Specify U1e type of the new term ) 
IRDF-Schema \'ocabulary 
From 1 Custom Ontology ::J 
P' Subclass-of Ontology Name 1 Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) .:J 
Class Name 1 Digital Media (Preser~at ion) .:J 
IP'Label Enter a label for the tenn lsuspected deviee 
1 P' Conunent Enter a conunent for U1e term IThe source dll'lice 1 
1 
Create NewTerm 1 
Figure 7.3 Screen for creating "SuspectedDevice" class 
By creating the new class term "SuspectedDevice", the system shows its associated 
RDF model (see Figure 7.4): 
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Figure 7.4 RDF Model for "SuspectedDevice" class 
He also defined a property terrn "recover", he tagged this term to be a 
"FunctionalProperty ", because in this task the role player recovers only one deviee, 
the source deviee. As shown in Figure 7.5, , "Jean-Pierre" defined the recovery task 
in the acquisition phase and he defined this property as a sub-property of the property 
"made" defined in the FOAF namespace. He selected as range the "SuspectedDevice" 
that he came to define and the domain is the "FirstResponder", which is a subclass of 
"RolePlayer". 
jTennName : "' 
lu Ourology : • 
Category : • 
jTenn Type : ·• 
JJrecover ( Specify the nrune of the ne w tenu) 
W Acquisition 3 ( Specify in wh.ich onrology you define a new tenn ) 
1 
<New 1 
r. Existing Jr.A:-::c-:-qu71s-:::1t~ion-----:::J--, Jr;:R;-::-e-:-:c,:-:,e:-:ry::----- ---3-, 
[ÏP~;;;,;-- -·---·- --:3 ( Specify the type of the uew tenn) ·------
RDF-Sche nt3 -\'ocabut:t r:~ 
From 1 Built -in Ontology :;j 
J;7 Subproperty-of Ontology Nrune 1 Friend of a_Friend (foa f) 
Property ~ame j made (Documents and Images) 
From 1 Custom Ontology :::J 
J;7 Range Ontology l'ame 1 AcquiSitiOn (cf-coc-Acq) 3 
Class ::-<ame 1 SuspectedDevice (Recovery) :::J 
3 
= 
Figure 7.5 Screen for creating "recover" property 
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Figure 7.6 RDF Model for the "recover" property 
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By creating the new property term "recover", the system shows the associated RDF 
model (see Figure 7.6). 
Jean-Pierre defined also a class term called "DeletedFiles", which is a subclass of the 
"nfo:DeletedResource" class (i .e., see Figure 7.7). 
Create :'\ew Foren tc Tenn 
Tenn 1 ame: * loeletedFiles ( Specify the uame of the new tenn ) 
lu Outology : ~ 1 Acqu1~tion .::1 ( Specify in which ontology yon define a new tenu) 
Category: • l'New 
<ô Existiug 1 Acquisition .::J 1 Recovery 
.::1 
Tenn Type: * lclass .::1 ( Specify the type of ù1e new tenn ) 
RDF-Scbema Vocabulary 
From 1 Bu1n.m Ontology 
.::1 
P" Subclass-of Ontology . ame 1 NEPOMUK FILE Ontotogy(nfo) 
.::1 
ClassName 1 DeletedResource (F1Ies) .::J 
P" Label Enter a label for the tenu ldeteted files 
F Cotlllllent Enter a comment fo r the tenn lmes have been deleted 
Create NewTerm 1 
Figure 7.7 Screen for creating the "DeletedFiles" class 
By creating the new class term "DeletedFiles", the system shows the associated RDF 
model (see Figure 7.8): 
deleted file.· file.· have been deletecl 
Figure 7.8 RDF Model for the "DeletedFiles" class 
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Jean-Pierre defined, as well , a new property term called "containsRecover" to 
describe the results of the recovered files from the "SuspectedDevice" . Thus, the 
domain of this property will be the "SuspectedDevice", whereas its range will be the 
deleted files presented in the "DeletedFiles" class. Figure 7.9 indicates the definition 
of this property term: 
Create Xew Forensic Tenn 
!Tenu Name: * ~ ~ontainsRecover ( Specify the name of tl1e new tenu) 
lu Outology : * !Acquisition ..::J ( Specify in which outology you defiue a new tenu) 
Category: * 
( ew 
(i Exi ting 1 Acquisition ::J 1 Recovery __ .:j 
1 T enn Type : * Il Property ..:J ( Specify the ~rpe of tl1e new tenu ) 
RDF-Scbema VocabulaiJ' 
From 1 Buitt-in Ontology .:J 
F Subproperty·of Outology ame] Oublin_Core (de) ~ 
Property ame 1 format (http://purl.org/ddtermslformat) 
-- - ·-
..::J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
FRange Ontology Name 1 Acquisition (cf.coc-Acq) ..:J 
Class Name 1 OeletedFiles {Recovel)') 
..::J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
F Domaiu Ontology Name 1 Acquisition (cf.coc-Acq) ..::J 
ClassName 1 SuspectedDevice (Recovery) ..::J 
FI RhPI F n!Pr ~ IRhPI fnr thP tPnn lresutts 
Figure 7.9 Screen for creating "containsRecover" property 
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7.3 .1.2 Backup 
Backup is the third task of the acquisition phase, after preservation and recovery. In 
this task, the role player performs a backup on the suspected deviee by copying it to a 
backup deviee. Jean-Pierre, the role player of this phase, defines a property term 
describing the task itself, called "backup" whose domain will be the 
"FirstResponder" class defined in the preservation task · and range will be the 
"SuspectedDevice". The term of backup task "backup" is tagged also using the 
constructor "Functiona!Property", to restrict this task to only one source deviee. In 
this case we assume that the first responder makes a backup for only one suspected 
deviee during the investigation phase. This means that the backup deviee (i .e., 
primary/source/suspected) is the only deviee that obeys to this type of task (see 
Figure 7.11). 
T enn Name : * 
lu Outology : * 
Category: * 
!renn Type: * 
Jbackup ( Specify the name of the new term) 
1 Acquisi tion .:J ( Specify in which ontology you define a new tenu ) 
(New 
re Existing 1 Acquisition !.:JI Backup 
1 Property ..:J ( Specify the type of the new tenu ) 
IRDF-Schema Vocabulary 
From 1 Bui~-in Ontology 3 
P" Subproperty-of Ontology Name 1 Friend_of_a_Friend (foaO 
Property Name 1 made (Documents and Images) 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
Ontology Name 1 Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) :::] 
Class Name J SuspectedOevice (Recovery) i:J 
From 1 Custom Ontology iJ 
P" Domain Ontology Na me 1 Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) ..:::J 
Class Name 1 FirstResponder (PreseiVation) 3 
1 P" Label IEnter a label for the tenn lbackup 
..:J 
3 
Figure 7.11 Screen for creating the "backup" property 
,.--------------------------------------------------- ----------------------- --------
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Figure 7.12 RDF model for the "backup" property 
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The last two terms that are defined by "Jean-Pierre" are the "BackupDevice" class 
and "backupTo" property. The definition of the "BackupDevice" class term is similar 
to the class "SuspectedDevice". It is also a sub-class of the "Digita!Media" class 
defined in the preservation task (See Figure 7.3 and 7.4). 
The "backupTo" is a property used to explain what will be the source and the backup 
deviee in the backup task. Thus, the domain of this term will be the 
"SuspectedDevice" class and its range will be the "BackupDevice" (see Figure 7.13). 
This property is tagged using the constructors owl:Functiona!Property and 
owl:InverseFuntiona!Property, to assess a one to one relationship (i .e., like the one to 
one cardinality). A source deviee can not be a backup on more than one deviee, and at 
the same time the backup deviee can not be a backup to more than one source deviee. 
It is a one to one relationship between both deviees. 
Jrenn Name: * lbackupTo ( Speci~' the nrune of the new tenu ) 
In Ontology : ~ 1 Acquisition .:J ( Specify in which ontology you define a new tenu) 
Category: * r 1 ew 
l1 Ac qui siti on (i Existing tl [Backup .:J 
Tenu Type: * I.Property .:J ( Specify the type of the new tenu ) 
RDF-Schema Vocabulary 
From 1 Buin-in Ontology .:J 
F Subproperty-of Ontology Name 1 Friend of a_Friend ifoaQ .:J 
Property Name 1 made (Documents and Images) 
.:J 
~ From 1 Custom Ontology 3 Ontology ame 1 Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) :::] Class ·ame 1 BackupDevice (Backup) .:J 
F From 1 Custom Ontology 3 Ontology ame 1 Acquisition (cf.coc-Acq) .:J Class Name 1 SuspectedDevice (Recovery) .:J 
1 F Label !Enter a label for the tem1 Jbackup to 
'--------
Figure 7.13 Screen for creating the "backupTo" property 
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Figure 7.14 RDF model for the "backupTo" property 
By creating the new property term "backup", the system shows the associated RDF 
model (see Figure 7.12): 
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7.3.1.3 The e-CoC of the acquisition phase 
After the definition ofterms, Jean-Pierre starts using the defined terms to publish and 
generate the e-CoC of his forensic phase. What he did during his acquisition phase, 
aside from the preservation task explained in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 can be summarized 
into a set of triples: 
1. Jean-Pierre recover PDA deviee 
2. PDA deviee containsRecover wordfiles 
3. Jean-Pierre backup PDA deviee 
4. PDA deviee backupTo Harddisk 
Next figure shows an example of how to publish and generate the second triple and 
underline two main characteristics. As explained before, the main vector to publish an 
RDF triple is the predicate slot. First, once the role player selects the predicate, the 
system advises him about the subject (i.e. , domain) and object (i .e., range) of this 
predicate. In this figure, when the role player selects the "containsRecover" property, 
the systems shows that the domain of this property is the "SuspectedDevice" class 
and its range is the "DeletedFiles" class. Then the role player can select the subject 
that he is going to publish from the triple that has been defined before in the 
acquisition phase, or it will be a new resource to define. If it is a new resource then he 
will select the first option, if not, he will browse if he or another players already 
defined a resource by which he will publish his triple with the predicate in question. 
In the case of Figure 7.15, the role player selected in the subj ect slot, and he found 
that the PDA deviee was already created by himself during the preservation task (i.e., 
see Chapter 4), while in the object slot he defined a new literai or resource which will 
be an instance from the "DeletedFiles" class. 
Both characteristics facilitate the publication task and help the role player avoid 
redundancy and later allow mapping between instances. 
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Publish RDF Triple 
1 Subject 1 Predicate 1 Obj ect 
î ::-lew Resource \o Kew Res<>urcetliteral 
From 
lcustom Ontology 
.:::J [word Files 
Outology Name 1 Acquisition 
.::1 
1 1 Acquisition (cf-coc·Acq) 
..:1 
ti E.~isting Resource Property Natne J containsRecover (Recovery) ..:1 r E.'tistin~ Resourc iliteral 
!Acquisition _::Il PDA deviee _:1 
Domain : SuspectedDevice 
1 
Range : Deletedfiles 
1 1 Publish and Draw 1 
Figure 7.15 Screen ofpublishing a triple using the "containsRecover" predicate 
After publishing the above four triples, combined with those triples of the 
preservation task (see Chapter 4), the system generates the e-CoC, and its 
serialization code using RDF/XML (i.e., future option of the framework) of the 
acquisition phase (see Figure 7.16 and 7.17). 
cf-coc· Acq:presetve 
cf·coc·Acq:contaùlsRecover f·coc-Acq:backupTo 
Figure 7.16 e-CoC of the acquisition phase 
-------~-----------------------
<?xml version= " l . O" eneoding= "utf- 8 " ?> 
<rdf : RDF 
xrnlns : rdf= "http : //www . w3 . org/1999/02/22 - rdf- syntax- ns# " > 
xrnlns : ef - eoe- Aeq=https : //eyberforensies - eoe/Aequisition/ 
xrnlns : rdfs= "http : //www . w3 . org/2000/10/XMLSeherna# " > 
<rdf : Deseription rdf : about= " Jean- Pierre " > 
<ef- eoe- Aeq : baekup rdf : resouree= " PDA deviee " /> 
<ef - eoe- Aeq : reeover rdf:resouree= " PDA deviee " /> 
<ef- eoe- Aeq : preserve rdf : resouree= " PDA deviee " /> 
</rdf : Deseription> 
<rdf : Deseription rdf : about= " PDA deviee " > 
<ef- eoe- Aeq : SN 
rdf : datatype=nhttp : //www . w3 . org/2000/10/XMLSeherna#st r ingn>OG4023 -
32 - 362 
</ef - eoe- Aeq : SN> 
ef - eoe- Aeq : eontainsReeover rdf : resouree= "Word Files " /> 
<ef- eoe- Aeq : baekupTo rdf : resouree= "Laptop HO " /> 
</rdf : Deseription> 
</ rdf : RDF> 
Figure 7.17 RDF/XML of the e-CoC of the acquisition phase 
7.3.2 The authentication phase 
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The role player of this phase is "Peter"; he is the authenticator of the primary and 
secondary deviees. An authenticator is responsible to check the integrity of both 
deviees to ensure that they are not tampered. This phase contains two forensic tasks: 
generate checksum and compare checksum. First, he defined the ontology abject of 
the authentication phase (i .e. , container) to append all his custom terms to this abject 
(i .e., same idea as Figure 4.2 and 4.3). 
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7.3.2.1 Generate checksum 
First term, the role player Peter defined is the class term "Authenticator''. He defined 
this role to be a subclass from the "RolePlayer" class defined by Jean-Pierre in the 
acquisition phase (see Figure 7.18). 
lrenn Name: * jAuthenticator ( Specify tl1e name of tl1e new tenu) 
!ru Outology : * Il Authentication .::] ( Specify in which ontology you define a new tenu) 
lcategory : * 
(ô New !Generale Checksum 
r E.xisting 
lrenn Type : * Jctass .::] ( Specify the type of the new tenu) 
IRDF-Scbema Vocabulary 
From 1 Custom Ontology iJ 
P" ubclass-of Ontology Name !Acquisition (d-eoc.Acq) .::] 
Class Name J RolePiayer (Preservation) 
..:J 
P"Label Enter a label for tl1e tenn ]Authenticate 
!7Comment Enter a comment for tl1e lerm jcheck integrityl 
1 1 
Create New Term 1 
Figure 7.18 Screen for creating the "Authenticator" class 
By creating the new class term "Authenticator", the system shows the associated 
RDF model (see Figure 7.19): 
Figure 7.19 RDF model for the "Authenticator" class 
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Peter starts to create two classes to represent the primary and the secondary deviees. 
He defines his own terms to refer to the original deviee and the backup deviee. From 
his point of view they will not inherit from the class "Digita!Media" (i.e., which is a 
subclass of owl:Things), but he will define bath terms using another way. He decides 
that they will be subclass from the "FileDataObjecf' class, which is a subclass of the 
class "Resource" defined in the RDFS vocabulary (see Figure 7.20). 
jrenu Name: * 
jiu Ontology: * 
Category: * 
Tenu Type: * 
IPrimaryOevice ( Specify the uame of the new tenu ) 
jAuthentication ..:.1 ( Specify iu which ontology you defiue a new tenu) 
..::J 1 Generale Checksum 
Class ~ ( Specify the type of the new tenu) 
RDF-Schema Vocabula1-r 
From 1 Buin-in Ontology 3 
P" Subclass-of Outology t ame 1 NEPOMUK FILE Ontology (nlo) 
Class Name 1 FileDataObject (Medta) 3 
P" Label jEnter a label for the tenu !source 
P" Comment Enter a comment for the tenu !source Dev 
Crea te New Term 
Figure 7.20 Screen for creating the "PrimaryDevice" class 
By creating the new class term "PrimaryDevice", the system shows the associated 
RDF madel (see Figure 7.21). Figure 7.20 and Figure 7.21 can also illustrate the idea 
of creating a "SecondaryDevice". 
Som·ce 
Figure 7.21 RDF madel for the "PrimaryDevice" class 
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"Peter" wants to define the authenticate task itself. So he defines a new property terrn 
called "authenticatePrimary" and "authenticateSecondary" . He defines its domain to 
be "Authenticator" and the range to be whether the class "PrimaryDevice" and the 
class of the secondary deviee "SecondaryDevice". Both are subclasses of the 
"FileDataObject" class (see Figure 7.22). 
TennName: * lauthenticatePrimary ( Specify tl1e name of fue new tenn) 
jIn Outo 1 ogy : * Authentication ~ ( Specify iu which outology you defi ne a new tenu ) 
le .. !New 
1 ategory: ~ 
r. Exi ting 1 Authentication ~ 1 Generale Checksum ~ 
jTem.1 Type : * 1 Property .::J ( Specify the type of the new tetm ) 
jRDF-Scbema Vocabulary 
From 1 Buin.in Ontology 3 
P' Subproperty-of Ontology Name 1 Friend_of_a_Friend (foaf) d 
Property Name 1 made (Documents and Images) 3 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
Ontology Name 1 Authentication (cf-coc-Aut) ~ 
Clas ame 1 PrimaryDevice (Generale Checksum)3 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P' Domain Ontology ame 1 Authentication (cf.coc.Aut) ~ 
Class • ame 1 Authenticator (Generale Checksum) 3 
Figure 7.22 Screen for creating the "authenticatePrimary" property 
By creating the new property terrn "authenticatePrimary", the system shows the 
associated RDF model (see Figure 7.23) : 
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Figure 7.23 RDF model for the "authenticatePrimary" property 
The same definition will be applied to the property "authenticateSecondary" but with 
the range of"SecondaryDevice". 
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Peter defines also a property term for the hashing process, one for hashing the 
primary deviee using "hashingPrimary" and the second for hashing the secondary 
deviee using "hashingSecondary". It concems generating image fingerprint files for 
both deviees. The domain of these properties will be "PrimaryDevice" , and 
"SecondaryDevice", respectively. The range will be two new custom classes named 
"ImagefilePrimary" and "ImagejileSecondary", which are subclasses of a well-
defined class in the NFO called "FileHash" (see Figure 7.24). The same idea is 
applied, as shown below, for the secondary deviee. 
Before explaining the "hashingPrimary" (i.e., same case for "hashingSecondary "), 
next figures (Figure 7.24 and 7.25) show how to define the "ImagejilePrimary" (i.e., 
same case for "ImagejileSecondary "). 
lrenu Name : ~ lllmagefilePrimary ( Specify the nanJe of the new tenu ) 
lin Ontology : ; I!Authentication _:1 ( Specify in which ontology you define a new term ) 
Category: ~ C New 
r. Existiug 1 Authenticat10n :..:J 1 Generale Checksum _:1 
!Tenu Type: * jCiass .:::J ( Specify the type of the new tenu ) 
jRDF- chema Vocabulary 
From 1 Built-in Ontology 
.:::J 
F Subcla s-of Outology ame j NEPOMUK_FILE_Ontology (nfo) _:1 
Class r ame 1 FileHash (Hash) 
.:::1 
FLabel Enter a label for tl1e tenu jimgfilePr. 
FCommeut Enter a comment for tl1e tenu lfingerprint of S 
1 
Create NewTerm 1 
Figure 7.24 Screen for creating the "ImagejilePrimary" class 
The RDF model of Figure 7.24 is shown below: 
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Figure 7.25 RDF Model for the "ImagefilePrimary" class 
The next figure shows the definition of the hashing process. It shows the 
"hashingPrimary". The same idea shown below for the primary deviee is also applied 
for the seeondary deviee for "hashingSecondary". This property is tagged to a 
Funetional and InverseFunctionalproperty, sinee eaeh media deviee after hashing has 
one and only one image file (* .img) and any image file is generating from only one 
deviee at a time. 
1 Tenu Na me : * jlhashingPrimary ( Specify the name of the new term) 
fu Ontology : • 1 Authentication ..:J ( Specify in which ontology you defi ne a new lerm) 
rNew 
Ci Existing 11 Authentication ..:J [Generale Checksum Category: * 
lrenn Type : * Il Property ..:J ( Specify the type of the new tenu) 
IRDF-Schema Vocabulary 
From 1 Built-in Ontology iJ 
P" Subproperty-of Ontology Nrune J NEPOMUK_F ILE_Onlology (nfo) :..:J 
Property ame [ hasHash (Hash) iJ 
From 1 Custom Ontotogy · .:] 
Ontology Name 1 Authentication (d-coc-Aut).:] 
Class r ame ltmagefilePrimary (Generale Checksum) 3 
F From lcustomOntotogy iJ Ontology Nrune 1 Authentication (d-coc-Aut).:] Cla s r ame 1 PrimaryDevice (Generale Checksum) 3 
j F Label jEnter a label for the tenn lhashing 
1 F Comment IEtlter a cotmnent for the tenn lhash process 
Figure 7.26 Sereen for ereating the "hashingPrimary" property 
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Figure 7.27 RDF madel for "hashingPrimary" property 
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The hashing algorithm generates also a checksum string from the fingerprint image 
file. This is considered the value of the hashing process. Peter creates a new property 
term to define the checksum value. This term is called "checksum", which is a sub-
property of a well-defined property called "has Value" in NEPOMUK File. Its domain 
will be the class of "ImagefilePrimary/secondary" and its range will be a string class 
for characters imported from the vocabulary XSL Schema (W3C, 2006). Figure 7.28 
and 7.29 shows the definition of the checksum property for the primary deviee. The 
same idea is also applied to the checksum property for the secondary deviee. 
The "checksumPrimary" property is also tagged to "Functiona!Property" and 
"InverseFunctionalProperty", because each fingerprint image file has a unique 
checksum value, and this unique value could not be the same for any other deviee 
using the hash algorithm (see Figure 7.28 and Figure 7.29). 
Tenu Name : * lchecksumPrimary ( Specizy the name of the new tenn ) 
jin Outology : * IAuthentication 3 ( Specizy in which ontology you define a new tenn) 
rNew 
(i Existing 1 Authentication _:!l Genera te Checksum Category: * 
jretm Type: ~ 1 Property ..:1 ( Specizy tlte type of tl1e new tenu) 
jRDF-Schema Vocabulary 
From 1 Buitt.in Ontology ..:1 
P' Subproperty·of Outology Name 1 NEPOMUK_FILE_ Ontology (nfo) 
Property Name 1 hasValue (hash) 3 
From 1 Bui ·in Ontology 3 
P'Range Ontology ·rune 1 XML_Schema (xsd) 
Class Name 1 String (string) 3 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P' Domain Outology Nrune 1 Authenticatlon (cf-coc-Aut) ..:1 
Class Name [ lmagefilePrimary (Generale Checksum} 3 
1 P' Label jEuter a label for the tenu [checksum 
Figure 7.28 Screen for creating the "checksumPrimary" property 
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Figure 7.29 RDF model for the "checksumPrimary" property 
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The hash algorithm used to generate the checksum value is also defined using a 
property term called "chckalgorithmPrimary". This term will be a sub-property of a 
well-defined property term called "hasA!gorithm", with as domain class, image file 
generating from the hashing process and as range, the string class for characters 
imported from the vocabulary XSL Schema (see Figure 7.30 and 7.31) (W3C, 2006). 
The same idea will be applied to the property term "chckalogrithmSecondary". 
lchckalgorithmPrimary ( SpecifY the name of the new tenu ) 
~ ~ 
' 
·-·- ~··--
Category: * 
rNew 
r. Existing 1 Authentication ..:.JI Generale Checksum 
..:.1 
Tenu Type: ~ 1 Property .:.1 ( SpecifY the type of the new tenu ) 
RDF-Schema Vocabu la•-y 
P' Subproperty-of 
!From 1 BUin-m Ontology ..:.1 
Omology Name 1 NEPOMUK FILE Ontology (nfo) 
..:.1 
Property Name 1 hasAigorithm (Hash) 
..:.!. 
From 1 BUIIt-m Ontology ..:.1 
P' Range Outology Name 1 XML Schema (xsd) .:.:J 
ClassName 1 String (string) 
..:.1 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P' Domain Outology Name 1 Aulhentication (cf-coc-Aut) ..:.J 
ClassName l imagefilePrimary (Generale Checksum) ..:.1 
Figure 7.30 Screen for creating the "chckalgorithmPrimary" property 
Figure 7.31 RDF model for the "chckalgorithmPrimary" property 
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7.3.2.2 Compare checksum 
After generating the checksum for the pnmary and secondary deviees, Peter 
compares both values and he finds that they are the same. This means that since the 
backup task took place until they are received by Peter, the backup deviee conforms 
and abides its integrity with the primary deviee. Peter does not define new terms and 
prefers to use the well-defined term "owl:sameAs" to refer that both values are the 
same. 
7.3.2.3 The e-CoC of the authentication phase 
After the definition of terms, Peter starts using these terms to publish and generate the 
e-CoC of his forensic phase. What he did during his authentication phase can be 
summarized into a set of triples: 
1. Peter authenticatePrimary Personal_ Digital_Assistant 
2. Peter authemticateSecondary Hard_drive_laptop 
3. Personal_Digital_Assistant hashingPrimary PDA_image.img 
4. Hard_drive_laptop hashingSecondary HDL_image.img 
5. PDA_image.img checksumPrimary OX49E9DEC3 
6. HDL _image.img checksumSecondary OX49E9DEC3 
7. PDA_image.img chckalgorithmPrimary MD5 
8. HDL_image.img chckalgorithmPrimary MD5 
9. OX49E9DEC3 owl:sameAs OX49E9DEC3 
The following figure shows the e-CoC of the authentication phase. 
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cf·coc·Aut;au!hentica!ePiimaty 
cf·coc· Aut:hashingSecondruy cf·coc·Atlt~uasblngPrimruy 
· cf·coc·Aut.chckalootitluuPrimaiy 
Figure 7.32 e-CoC of the authentication phase 
As mentioned earlier, Peter defines his own terms for the primary and backup 
deviees. This case may happen on the web of data, where a publisher may redefine 
concepts already defined by other publishers, because on the web of data it is 
unrealistic to assume that everybody will use the same name to refer to a certain 
concept. The mapping between terms can be performed using OWL constructor 
"sameAs ". The role players are responsible to relate these terms and the system can 
guide the role players through the reasoning pattern of the consumption module. Next 
figures show (Figure 7.33 and Figure 7.34), how the "Personal_Digital_Assistanf' 
from the authentication phase is mapped into the term "PDA deviee" of the 
acquisition phase, and how the "Hard_ drive _laptop" is related to the "LaptopHD" in 
the acquisition phase: 
-------------------------------
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Publish RDF Triples 
.1 ubject 1 Predicate 1 Object 
r 1\ e\\' R(Source r Xew ResourceLiteral 
From 
1 BuüHn Ontology 3 
Outology Name 
r. E'lliting Resource 
Ontology_ Web_Language (0'111) 
..:1 (' E.xisling Resourc itcral 
Property Name lsameAs (OI'A Semanlics) 3 
!Acquisition ::J 1 Authenticalion ..:1 
1 PDAde\'ice 
.:1 1 Personal_Digitai_Assistant ... :f 
Refer to Vocabulary to get Property Refer to \ 'ocabulary to gel Property 
Domain Rancre 
1 1 Publîsh and Oraw 1 
Figure 7.33 Sereen for mapping the source deviee 
Publisb RDF Triples 
1 Subject 1 Predicate l Object 
r Xew Resource r ?\ew Resource Literai 
From 
1 Bu ill· in Ontology 3 
Ontology X ame 
Ontology_Web_language (oni) . ...:J 
r E'lliting Resource litml r. E:dstîng Rtsource Property Name 1 sameas (Owl Semantics) ::J 
.:J 1 LaptopHD ;J 1 utltentication .:J !Acquisition 
1 Hard_ drive_laptop 
.:J 
1 
Refer o \ ·ocabulary o ge Property Refer o \'ocabulary o ge Property 
Domain Range 
1 Pubhsh and Draw 1 
Figure 7.34 Sereen for mapping the baekup deviee 
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Combining the acquisition and authentication phase together, we will obtain the RDF 
model shown in Figure 7.35. 
cf·coc·Aut:hasilÙiaSecomlmy cf· coc·Aut:IIaslûn~rilnaiy 
cf·coc·Aut:chckalgoiilluuSecon~ruy · 
cf·coc·Aul: IIcblgoiitluuPrilnaty 
Figure 7.35 e-CoC of acquisition and authentication phases 
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7.3.3 The analysis phase 
The role player of the analysis phase is Robert. He is the analyzer of the backup 
deviee sent by Peter, to examine it after ensured from its integrity with the source 
deviee. First, he defines the ontology object of the analysis phase (i.e., container) to 
append all his custom terms to this object (i.e., same idea as Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
7.3.3.1 Analyze 
In the analyze task, first term he defines the "Analyzer" class, which will be a 
subclass of the "RolePlayer" class (i.e., same idea of Figure 7.18. See also Figure 
7.36). 
Jrenu Name : * IAnalyzer ( Specify the name of tl1e new tenn ) 
lin Ontology: ~ IAna~sis j ( Speci~' in which ontology you define a new tenn) 
Categ01y: * ~New If\-~ 
r Exi ting 
Tenu Type : * lclass j ( Specify the ~'Pe of tl1e new tenu ) 
IRDF-Schema \ ocabulaiJ' 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P' Subclass·of Ontology ·ame 1 Acquisition (cf-coc-Acq) j 
Class Name 1 RolePiayer (Preservation) .:J 
1 P' Label Enter a label for the tenn jAna~sis 
1 P' Counuent Enter a collllllent for the lerm IAnalyz.e the backup 
1 1 
Create New T erm 1 
Figure 7.36 Screen for creating the "Analyzer" class 
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By creating the new class term "Analyzer", the system shows the associated RDF 
madel (see Figure 7.37): 
Figure 7.37 RDF madel of the "Analyzer" class 
Then, he defines the property of the analyze task, where its domain will be the 
"Analyzer" class and its range will be "SecondaryDevice" (i.e., he will use the same 
class defined by Peter in the authentication phase). He also tags this property using 
''Functiona!Property''. Th us, aU abjects defined lll a triple where 
"analyze" is the property then they will considered as same abject. See Figure 7.38 . 
!Tenu Name: * llanalyze ( Specifv the name of the new term ) 
. 
In Ontology : * IAnatysis ..::1 ( Specify in which outology you defi ne a new lerm ) 
Categ,ory : $ r 1 ew 
ljAnalysis îo Existing _:::j IAnalyze 
~ ..::1 
Tenu Type : >)' 1 Property ..::1 ( Specify the type of the new term ) 
RDF-Schema Vocabulary 
From 1 Built-in Ontology ..::1 
P" Subproperty-of Outology Name 1 Fnend_of_a_Friend (foat) ..::1 
Property Name 1 made (Documents and Images) 
..::1 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P" Range Ontology Name 1 Authentication (d-coc-Aut) ..::1 
Class Name 1 SecondaryOevice (Generale Checksum) 
..::1 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
P"Domaiu Ontology Name 1 Analysis (cf-coc-Ana) 1::] 
ClassName 1 Analyzer (Analyze) ..::1 
1 P" Label 
--· 
Enter a label for the tenu IAnalyze 
Figure 7.38 Screen for creating the "analyze" property 
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Figure 7.39 RDF model of the "analyze" property 
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As mentioned in Section 7.2, Robert will use the same term used by Peter to represent 
the backup deviee "BackupDevice". He defines a new property called "dataSize" (i.e., 
to refer to the data size 100 Mega), which will be a sub-property of "nie:contentSize" 
defined within the Nepomuk Information Element Ontology (NIE) . Its domain is the 
"SecondaryDevice" and its range is the "xsd:integer" (see Figure 7.40 and its RDF 
madel in Figure 7.41). 
Tenu Name : + lld-;ta.Siz.e 
·------·-----·-·-·--·-·--------
( Specify the name of the new temJ ) 
[t 1 Ontology : * IAnalysis ..::] ( Specify in which omo! ogy you defiue a new tenn) 
c ategory: • rNew !1 Analysis ~ 1 Analyz.e ::J CO" Existiug 
·-- ---····---·-·-·---·-·---·-······--···-··----------------·-···-····-----------····-··--·-·-····--
] Pr;p~rtY ·--·· enn Type: + ~ ( Specify the type of the new tenu) 1'-r
RDF-Schema Vocabuhry 
From 1 Buttt-m Ontology ~ 
F Subproper ty-of Ontology Name 1 NEPOMUK Information Element (nie) ~ 
Proper ty Name 1 contentSiz.e (Siz.e) ~-
From 1 Built-in Ontology .::.! 
FRange Ontology Name J XML_ Schema (xsd) .::.! 
ClassName l tnteger (integer) ~ 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
F D omaiu Outology Name 1 Authent1cation (d-coc-Aut) ~ 
C lass Name 1 SecondaryOevice (Generale Checksum) ~ 
1 FLabel Enter a label for the tenu ldatasize 
Figure 7.40 Screen for creating the "dataSize" property 
Figure 7.41 RDF madel of the "dataS ize" property 
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He defines a class called "ForensicTool", which is a subclass of the class "Software" 
defined in the NFO. Also, he defines a property term called "analyzedBy", which will 
be a sub-property of the foafmade, and its domain will be the "SecondaryDevice" 
and its range will be "ForensicTool". 
lrenn Nam~_:_* __ lanalyzedBy ( Specify the name of the new tenu ) 
····- ····-·-- ···-··--··---·-------
In Ontology : * IAnalysis ..:J ( Specify iu which outology you defiue a new tenu) 
Cnrego1y: ~ <New 
r- E'\isting 1 Analysis ..:J 1 AnalyZe 
..:J 
Jr erm Type : * 1 Property ..:J ( Specify the type of the new tenn ) 
--- . ·---------·-·-
RDF-Schema Vocabulary 
I.Buitt-in Ontology 
..:J 
···-··--·-······-····-···---·-·--·· 
From 
F Subproperty·of Ontology Name 1 Friend of a Friend (foaf) 
..:J 
Properry Name 1 made {Documents and Images) 
..:J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
FRange Ontology Name 1 Analysis (d-coc-Ana) ..:J 
ClassName 1 ForensicTool (Analyze) ..:J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
FDomain Ontology Name 1 Authenticat1on (d-coc-Aut) ..:J 
ClassName 1 SecondaryDevice (Generale Checksum) 
..:J 
1 FLabel lEm er a label for the ten11 IAnalyzed by 
Figure 7.42 Screen for creating the "analyzedBy" property 
Figure 7.43 RDF model of the "analyzedBy" property 
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Robert also defines a new term property called "tota!Size" (see Figure 7.44) to 
describe the real size of data (i .e., In our case, the hidden partition is 5 mega, and the 
unhidden is 100 me ga, so the real total size of data will be 105 me ga, see Figure 7.1 ). 
The property "tota!Size" is the same idea of the "dataSize" property. It will also be 
sub-property of the "nie:contentSize". Its domain will be the "SecondaryDevice" and 
its range is "xsd:integer". 
Figure 7.44 RDF model of the "tota!Size" property 
On the other hand, he defines a new property term called "hiddenSize" to refer to the 
size of the hidden partition in the backup deviee. This property will have a domain 
class referring to the hidden partition and its range will be the size of this hidden 
partition (5 Mega). 
Robert defines as well, a new property terms called "contains". He will use it to state 
that the backup deviee has a hidden partition created by the fired employee. This 
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property will be a sub-property of the property term "hasPart'' defined within the 
Dublin Core vocabulary. The domain of this new property term will be 
"SecondaryDevice" defined by Peter in the authentication phase, and its range will be 
the hidden partition that he found on the hard disk using the Encase forensic tool. But 
before defining the property term "contains", Robert defined the "HiddenPartition" 
class. 
The "HiddenPartition" class will be a subclass of a well-defined class term in the 
NFO ontology called "HardDiskPartition" (see Figure 7.45). 
Tenu -ame: ~ IHiddenParti tion ( SpecifY the name of dte new tenu) 
In Outology : •) IAnalysis .:J ( Specicy in which ontology you define a new tenu) 
Category: * 
r 
. ew 
r- Existing 1 Analysis .:J 1 Analyze 
.:J 
Tenu Type: * Glass .:J ( SpecifY the ty-pe of the new tem1 ) 
IRDF-Scltema Vocabulary 
From 1 Bwn.m Ontology 
.:J 
F Subclass-of Ontology Name 1 NEPOMUK_FILE_Ontology(nfo) .:.1 
ClassName 1 HardDiskPartition (Partition) .:J 
P"label Enter a label fo·r the tenu IHidden Partition 
r-------.. ·--
P" Comment Enter a comment for the tenu !Part h1dden in HDI 
1 Create New Term 1 
Figure 7.45 Screen for creating the "HiddenPartition" class 
Figure 7.46 shows the RDF model of the "HiddenPartition" class. 
Figure 7.46 RDF model of the "HiddenPartition" class 
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Now, Robert will defi.ne the term "contains" with as domain "SecondaryDevice" and 
as range the "HiddenPartition" class (see Figure 7.47 and Figure 7.48). 
Tenu -ame: * llcontains ( Specify tl1e uame of the new tenu ) 
ln Ontology : " IAnalysis _:.1 ( Specify in which ontology you define a new tenu ) 
Categ01y: * <New 
re Existing !IAnalysis _:j 1 Analyze ..:J 
Tenu Type: * 1 Property _:l ( Specify the type of the new tenu) 
RDF -Schema Vocabulary 
From leuilt-in Ontology _:.1 
F Subproperty-of Ontology ame 1 Dublin_ Core (de) _:.1 
Property Name 1 ha sPart (httpJ/purl.org/dc/termslhasPart) ~J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
FRange Ontology r ame 1 Analysis (cf-co~Ana) ...:.J 
Class Name 1 HiddenPart1tion (Analyze) _:.1 
-·--w-•---·--f--·--
1 Custom Ontology 
-· . 
From t.:J 
P"Domaiu Ontology ame 1 Authentication (d-co~Aut) _:j 
iciassName 1 SecondaryOevice (Generale Checksum) _:.1 
1 F Label !Enter a label for U1e tenu lcontams 
Figure 7.47 Screen for creating the "contains" property 
Figure 7.48 RDF model of the "contains" property 
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Attached with the "HiddenPartition" class, Robert creates also properties called 
"hiddenContains" and "hiddenSize". For "hiddenContains", it will be a sub-property 
of "dc:hasPart'' (same idea illustrated by Figure 7.48): its domain will be the class 
"HiddenPartition", and its range will be "nie:JnformationElement", which is a super-
class for all interpretations data abjects (i.e., super-class of all abjects in the NIE 
ontology). The "JnformationElement'' class will refer to all excel files found in the 
hidden partition. For the size ofhidden partition, it is same idea as Figure 7.44. 
!Term ame: • llhiddenConta.ns ( Spec ifY the name of ihe new tenu) 
jrn Ontology: • [f Â;,ai;~;;-- ..::J ( Specify in which ontology you define a uew term) 
Category: * 
r- Existing J Analysis ..::J jAnalyze 
Term Type : • 1 Property ..::J ( SpeciJY the type of the uew term ) 
~~~--~--~~--~~~--------~-------------------------­RDF-Schema Vocabulary 
From 1 BliiH-m o~Ïoto~~ ::::::J 
F Subproperty-of Ontolog:y Name 1 Dublin Core (de) 
P roperty Name 1 hasPart (http://purl org/dcJterms/hasPart) 
From 1 Buin.m Ontology ::::::J 
FRang:e Outology Name J NEPOMUK_Information Element (me) 
Class Name ltnformationEiement (data objectsJ3 
r 
From 1 Custom Ontology 
F D omain Ontology Name 1 Analysts (cf-coc-Ana) ..::J 
Clnss ame 1 HiddenParttlion (Analyw)3 
··p:-L~b~Ï· --------- ,E·~;~~···~···i~b~Ï-tb~-ili~~~-~;~Ï;;;;;-;;~-n~~~tain --------·----------- ···----·----··--
F Comment !Enter 11 CO}lllllent for the tenn 1 hidden contents 
Figure 7.49 Screen for creating the "hiddenContains" property 
Figure 7.50 RDF madel of the "hiddenContains" property 
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Robert also defines a property term, "hiddenSize", as a sub-property of 
"nie:contentSize" (same idea as Figure 7.41 and 7.44). Its domain will be the hidden 
partition class "HiddenPartition" and its range will be "xsd:integer" . 
The last property term Robert needs to define is the term defining the tool used by the 
fired employee to create a hidden part on the hard disk, where he stored the excel 
files . He calls this term "hiddenUsing", and he defines it as a sub-property from the 
property ''foafmade". Its domain is "HiddenPartition" and its range is the class 
"Software", defined in the NFO ontology (see Figure 7.51 and Figure 7.52). 
Jienn 1 ame: $ jlhiddenUsing ( Speci~, the name of tl1e new tenu) 
liu Outolo<>y : * .::1 ( Specify in which outology you define a new tenn ) 
Categoty: ~ î New 
(1 Existiug IAnalysis .:JI Analyze .::1 
Tenu Type : * 1 Property .::1 ( Specify the type of tl1e new tenn ) 
RDF-Schema Vocabulat-y 
From 1 Built-in Ontology .:J 
F Subproperty-of Outology Name 1 Friend_of_a_Frtend (foaO .:J 
Property Name 1 made (Documents and Images) 
.:J 
From !sui~-in Ontology .:J 
FRange Ontology Name j NEPOMUK_FILE_Ontology (nfo) ~ 
Class Name 1 Software (Soflwares) 
.:J 
From 1 Custom Ontology 3 
F Domain Outology ame 1 Analys1s (cf-coc-Ana) ..:J 
Class ame 1 HiddenPartition (Analyze) .:J 
1 P"Label !Enter a label for tl1e te11ll lh1dden usmg 
Figure 7.51 Screen for creating the "hiddenUsing" property 
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7.3.3.2 The e-CoC of the analysis phase 
After the definition of terms, Robert starts using the defined te1ms to publish and 
generate the e-CoC of his forensic phase. What he is doing during this analysis phase 
can be summarized into a set of triples: 
1. Robert analyze Hard_drive_laptop 
2. Hard_drive_laptop dataSize lOO Mega 
3. Hard_drive_laptop analyzedBy Encase Tool 
4. Hard_drive_laptop tota!Size 105 Mega 
5. Hard_ drive _laptop contains hidden part 
6. hidden part hiddenContains Excel Files 
7. hidden part hiddenSize 5 Mega 
8. hidden part hiddenUsing Secret Disk 
Robert wishes also to integrate with his published e-CoC, the evidence format of the 
investigation analysis generated from the forensic tool. Assuming that the evidence is 
a file called "evidence.aff4", and it is in the form of XML format describing different 
fields in the AFF4 namespace (see Figure 7.53). The corresponding RDF model of 
AFF4 is shown in Figure 7.55. Figure 7.54 shows the e-CoC generated by the CF-
CoC, after publishing the above triples. 
<?xml version= " l . O" encoding= " utf - 8 " ?> 
<rdf : AFF4 xmlns : rdf=http : //127 . 0 . 0 . 1/aff4#> 
<aff4 : username>Rob</aff4> 
<aff4 : Media0bject> 
<aff4 :medianame>HardDisk</aff4 :medianame> 
<aff4 : size>5120</aff4 : size> 
</aff4 : Mediaobject> 
</rdf : RDF> 
Figure 7.53 RDF/XML Code for an AFF4 format 
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cf·coc·Ana:analyze 
cf·coc ·Ana:totaiS~e 
cf·coc·..\na:dataSlze 
cf·coc·Ana:luddenSlze 
Figure 7.54 e-CoC of the analysis phase 
Figure 7.55 RDF model for an AFF4 result 
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Robert combines the results of the forensic tool with the e-CoC of the acquisition 
phase. The subject "Robert" is the same instance used in the analysis phase, so the 
"aff4:username " will be added as an extra property to the graph. The "MediaObject" 
is linked to the "Hard_ drive _laptop" and its "hiddenSize", using the "sameAs " 
property of OWL. 
Finally, the three e-CoCs are combined together on the following figure (see Figure 
7.56) : the e-CoC of the acquisition, authentication, and analysis (i .e. , including also 
the AFF4 information) are merged to get the complete e-CoC of the forensic case 
study (i .e. , following the Kruse model provided in Figure 7.1 ). 
As we see in Section 7.3, the CF-CoC system, which is based on representing 
information using LDP and creating RDF models, is able to produce e-CoCs readable 
and consumable by people and machines . The role players of each forensic phase use 
the system to represent and publish the forensic investigation results. A role player is 
able to create his own terms or import terms from other forensic phases created by 
other role players. This allows the creation of interlinked e-CoC between different 
phases, the fact that foster and improve the comprehension of the presented 
information. 
Also, if a role player uses his own terms, he will be able, at a later stage, to combine 
what he published with other phases and getting an interlinked e-CoC by mapping his 
terms with ether terms. In addition, a role player is able to attach results generated 
from forensic tools within the published e-CoC under the same RDF framework. This 
makes that the forensic information obtained by forensic tools interoperable with the 
information published by the role players. 
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7.4 Adding provenance information to e-Co Cs 
Section 7.3 discussed how the CF-CoC system is used to create and publish e-CoCs. 
These e-CoCs contain different forensic information related to the digital evidence in 
hand. Such information answers the five Ws and one H questions related to the 
forensic information. As explained in Chapter 2, there are three comrnon elements 
that make evidence admitted to the court of law: authenticity, relevancy and 
reliability. Other information should be provided to explain the origin of this 
information, and answer the five Ws and one H questions about the origin of such 
information. This section will work to prove the second hypothesis that states the 
provenance information with the published e-CoCs can foster the trustworthiness 
among role players and judge. This will be useful for judge to know supplementary 
information about the forensic information published by the role players ( e.g., when 
they did the publication, why and how they collected this information, what is the 
validity of such information, etc. These questions differ from one phase to another) . 
Generally, the provenance metadata are used to annotate the published information on 
the web then they are extracted from the web using various automated softwares. In 
this dissertation, the CF-CoC system is residing on owned domain somewhere on the 
web and uses the LDP to publish different resources. The system uses the digital 
certificates to restrict the access to these resources (see Section 7.2). The system can 
be used to annotate the provenance metadata but there is no need for automated 
softwares to extract them. 
This section shows the annotation of e-CoCs by the three role players of this 
investigation case: Jean-Pierre, Peter, and Robert. They add supplementary 
information about themselves or about the data origin. The forensic information 
annotated in this section using the vocabularies of Dublin Core and Friend of a Friend 
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Function (FOAF) is based on the Named Graph (NG) approach. Other vocabularies 
can be used to annotate the forensic information. 
7.4.1 Adding provenance rnetadata to the acquisition phase 
Jean-Pierre in his annotation indicates that he is the main contributor of this phase, 
and his role is the first seizure in this investigation process. He also confirms that he 
creates the e-CoC complying with the tangible document itself. Also, the 
investigation is performed on the IT company (see Figure 7:57) 
Figure 7.57 Provenance graph for the acquisition phase 
7.4.2 Adding provenance rnetadata to the authentication phase 
Assuming that Robert, the role player of the analysis phase, should be present during 
checking the integrity of both .devices to confirm that the backup deviee is provided 
to Robert by hand, not by mail, and avoid the suspicion that the deviee has been 
altered along its route. Peter wanted to append this information using provenance 
metadata to confirm that after he finished his task, he provided the backup deviee by 
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band to Robert for analyzing it. He uses a property called "valid'', imported from the 
Dublin Core vocabulary, to confirm that Robert was present when he did the integrity 
tas k. 
He also mentions that the MD5 algorithm is required to accomplish this 
authentication phase. He mentions that the e-CoC for authentication is issued under 
his work license number, and the date he submitted the backup deviee to Robert is 1 st 
ofMay 2015 (see Figure 7.58). 
dc:isRequiredBy lc:valid 
Figure 7.58 Provenance graph for the authentication phase 
7.4.3 Adding provenance metadata to the analysis phase 
Robert in his annotation mentions that he crea tes his e-CoC in 20111 May 2015, he also 
states to refer to the tangible document related to the acquisition phase in arder to 
compare it with the results of the analysis phase (i.e., in the acquisition phase Jean-
Pierre only recovered word files , while in the analysis phase, Robert revealed that 
there were more hidden information on the deviee). In addition, Robert states that his 
e-CoC conforms to the tangible CoC of the analysis phase. He also pro vides the date 
of submission of the backup deviee from Peter, which is the same date he accepted it. 
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Figure 7.59 Provenance graph for the analysis phase 
Other provenance metadata can be injected to each e-CoC to enrich the published 
forensic information. Also, custom property terms can be created to provide more 
information about them. 
7.5 Applying the consomption patterns on the e-CoC of Kruse model case 
study 
After role players publish their forensic information and annotate their e-CoCs using 
the provenance metadata, the judge can consume them using the consumption 
patterns module. As explained, the CF-CoC contains four consumption patterns. Such 
patterns help the judge to consume and understand the digital evidence and improve 
the subject matter, as it was proposed in the third hypothesis of this dissertation. The 
following patterns are not restricted to the judge only, but they can be used by any 
role player of the forensic process. 
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7 .5.1 Browsing the e-CoC of Kru se mo del case study 
Browsing allows the judge to display all phases together or each phase apart. If the 
judge chooses to display all phases together, he will be able to see the complete e-
CoC of the Kruse model (see Figure 7.56), the provenance information associated to 
each forensic phase (see Figure 7.57, Figure 7.58, and Figure 7.59), and to see the 
ontology abject of each forensic phase (i.e. , general information about the forensic 
phase itself, its domain, publication date, and the role player certificate). 
If the judge chooses to select each forensic phase apart, he will be able to navigate 
between different resources describing the forensic phase. This selection is used when 
the judge needs to navigate intemally and get more details about the forensic tasks of 
each forensic phase (see Figure 7.60). 
Forcnsic Infonnation Cousumph' on 
·-···-~---·-·-·······-.. --··········--· Il Acquisiti;n 
....... 
-----····----··--···----····-------
Forensicr Phase:: : • 
.::1 
1 Search 1 
o ceu~IC tas!{); ""or a.cquJSI IO!lJ:"Ilas e 1 uescrweao-yKesour~e(SJ 
.d 
httQs://127.0.0.1/Vocab/Acquisition#RolePlaver 
lntps:l/12 7. 0.0.1/V oc~b/ A_çg_~itio!l#fi!}.!Rf?.PQJ;~_c:i.~~ 
Preservation httQs:// l27.0.0.1N ocab/Acquisition#DüritalMedia httQs:/1127 .0.0.1 /Vocab/Acguisition#SN 
htt[1s:l/12 7 .0. 0 .1/V ocab/ AcguisitiouiiereservedBv 
httes://12 7 .0.0.1/Vocab/Acguisition#preserve 
1 -··--··----· ··---··--- r-----·------------·-----httQs:/1 127 .0.0.1 IV ocab/ Acg:pisition#SuspectedDevice Recove1y https:l/ 12 7.0 .0 .1/V oc ab/ Acgttisition#recover https://127. 0. 0 .1/V ocab/ Acguisil'ion#Deletedfi1es ht(:Qs://127.0.0. 1/Vocab/Acguisition#containsRecover 
1 
Backup 
1 ht(:Qs:/112 7. 0.0 .1/V ocab/ Acguisition#backu!l 
hi ~Jls :/112_? ~0..:~· 1!"_~:ab/~~gttisi~ion#B.~ckt~QDevice 
.:.1 
Figure 7.60 Screen for displaying the acquisition phase resources 
As we see from the above figure, the three tasks of the acquisition phase, with their 
corresponding resources, are displayed when the judge selects the acquisition phase. 
Let's say that the judge do not understand what is the "backup" resource. He simply 
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clicks on the backup deviee and get more information, then navigate among this 
resource (see Figure 7.61). 
As shown in Figure 7.61 , the screen of the backup task illustrates that this task is a 
sub-property of the property "made". Its subject (domain) is a "FirstResponder" and 
its object (range) is the "SuspectedDevice". If the judge cannot understand all this 
information, he reads the comments of the backup resource he gets that "A backup 
task is a copy of information from a source ta a destination deviee". He also 
dereferences the "made" property, he gets the definition of this term, it means: 
"something that was made by this agent" (Brickley et Miller, 2014). He continues to 
dereference the other resources on the same screen, he clicks on the 
"FirstResponder", he gets that it is a "RolePlayer", he clicks on it, he obtains that this 
resource is of type "persan", he clicks on the ''persan", he gets that "the persan class 
represent people" and so on. The judge is able anytime to expand/dereference any 
represented resources, in order to understand and get more information about them. 
Figure 7.61 not only explains and defmes each term, but also it displays all the 
instances published using these terms. For example, in Figure 7.61, it displays that 
"Jean-Pierre" was the "FirstResponder", and he did a backup for the "PDA deviee". 
l'l..<.~sou a·c.~c.~ t. JRt .... : h-rrps ://12 7 . 0 . 0 .1/Voca·th/ Acquis jtion# ba c l'.up 
l) O IH >\lU : 
li..-: Ju'' n••c t.hc ln!Othn e.- .... uf:" 4,•l n,,. 
Fil cl v:-A>pQn4.tf:".t 
J~uu-f"u:-rre (,,~quiM t iOil Phat>e) 
T" I ' C: tl lo:.n.-~ 
cf-co.o-.;'\.cq-t>nckup 
9cofo"v n o·•• fh•• h •,H•nfo'(tlol Q ( .: l u,.~ 
~,o'lpc\:lcafl.")co"• •.:.•e 
PD dcv;ee (Ac(Jui~Jtiou rta...•u:c) 
Figure 7.61 Screen of the backup task in the acquisition phase 
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The scenario will be the same for other tasks in other forensic phases. Users will be 
able to navigate between all resources defined within each forensic phase. Figure 7.62 
and Figure 7.63 , shows also the tasks of the authentication and analysis phases. 
Forensic Information Cousumption 
F orensic Pb a e : * Il Authentication 
.:J 
1 Search 1 
httQs:!/127 .0 .0.1.N ocab/ Authentication#Primal}'Device 
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httl)s://127 .0 .0.1/V ocab/ Authentication#checksumSecondarv 
httlls:l/127.0.0.1f\locab/Autheutication#checksumPrimarv 
httus:l/12 7.0 .0 .1/V ocab/ Authentication#chckal!zmithmSecondarv 
Figure 7.62 Screen for displaying the resources of the authentication phase 
Forensic Information Consomption 
1 F orensic Phase : * 1 Analysis 
IForensic Task~ For Analysis Phaser-- Described by Resource(s) 
httQs://127. 0. 0.1 IV ocab/ Analvsis# Ana1vzer 
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Figure 7.63 Screen for displaying the resources of the analysis phase 
:1 
1 
. 
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7.5.2 Crawling the e-CoC ofKruse model case study 
As explained before, the crawling is a search by a keyword. After publishing the three 
forensic phases, the judge can use the CF -CoC system to find and get infmmation 
about any forensic resource in any forensic phase. A crawling using a keyword 
retrieves all triples containing this keyword, and appearing in any slot of any the RDF 
triples. Using this pattern, judge will be able to get any information from the e-CoC. 
For instance, if the judge needs to get all tasks performed by Robert, he does his 
search using the keyword "Robert". The result will be two triples containing Robert 
as a subject as shown in Figure 7.64: 
Figure 7.64 
En er a Literai Ke .. :rord for C ·awling Triples: it 
En er % o C a )/1 all T iples 
jRobert 
1 Gra~YINow ) 
Triple 
Screen for crawling using the keyword "Robert" 
Another example IS shown in Figure 7.65, by crawling using the keyword 
"LaptopHD". 
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Enter a K Y\VOrd for rawlin Tripl : • 
(Eult.'"r ~o to · \'l lU Tripl ) 
jLaptop HO 
-~ ~ack"UpTo < qui ilion> Lat'ltop HD ( cqui itioo) 
-~ (Outology_~f:o_langua:--1 
Figure 7.65 Screen for crawling using the keyword "LaptopHD" 
7.5.3 Reasoning the e-CoC of Kruse rnodel case study 
To exp lain clearly the mechanism of the reasoning module, classes and properties for 
each forensic task are summarized in the following tables. This will facilitate how the 
system infers implicit information (i .e., triples that are not explicitly stored in the 
RDF store) using the entailment rules mentioned in Chapter 2. The inferred 
information is a set of resources that are also interlinked and dereferenced to more 
other resources (see Section 7.5 .1). The inferred information is not limited to the 
examples mentioned in the next sections; more information can be inferred using 
other examples. 
7.5.3.1 Reasoning on the acquisition phase 
The classes of the acquisition phase are provided in the next table. This table pro vides 
all terms of type class that appear in domain and range of properties. 
2~4 
Table 7.2 Classes of the acquisition phase 
Classes 
Il) Term name In Domain of 
In Range 
Subclass of 
"' 
~ 
G<: 
"' of 
..= 
G<: 
~ E--
RolePlayer - - Pers on 
1:::: 
.9 backup, preserve, 
...... FirstResponder preservedBy RolePlayer ro 
è recover 
<1.) 
C/) 
<1.) 
...... 
~ DigitalMedia S~, preservedBy Things preserve 
1:::: 
0 
·.-< o. ...... BackupDevice backupTo DigitalMedia ·.-< 
.Q -C/) 
·;:; (.) 
cr' ro 
(.) ÇQ 
-< 
SuspectedDevice 
backupTo, backup, 
DigitalMedia 
è containsRecover recover 
<1.) 
> 0 (.) 
con tains DeletedResourc <1.) 0::: DeletedFiles --
recover e 
The properties of the acquisition phase are provided in the next table. It shows the 
domain, range, and sub-property of all property terms used by each forensic task. 
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Table 7.3 Properties of the acquisition phase 
Properties 
Sub-
Q,) ~ Term name Domain Range property 
"' ~
"' 
-= 
~
~ ~ of 
SN DigitalMedia Liter al identifier 
~ First 
0 preservedB y DigitalMedia - made ..... 
~ Responder 
C; 
Q) 
rn 
Q) 
.... Digital_ ~ 
FirstResponder preserve made 
Media 
~ backup FirstResponder 
Suspected_ 
made 
.s deviee .~ 
rn o. 
·a ~ cr' 
{.) {.) Suspected_ Backup_ <t:: ro r:o backupTo made 
Deviee deviee 
First Suspected_ 
-
made recover 
è Res pond er 
deviee 
Q) 
> 0 
{.) Suspected_ Deleted Q) 
~ containsRecover - format 
Deviee Files 
Referring to the Table 2.3, next points provide sorne examples to illustrate how the 
reason1ng module of the CF-CoC works with the classes and properties of the 
acquisition phase. For each RDFS constructor, an example is provided, to illustrate 
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how its entailment rule(s) can be applied using the terms schema of T-Box (i.e. , 
classes and properties) and A-Box (i.e. , instances). 
• rdft:subClassOf 
For (A, rdft:subClassOf, B), (B, rdft:subclassOf, C) => (A, rdft:subClassOf, 
C) 
(FirstResponder, rdft:subclassOf RolePlayer), (RolePlayer, rdft:sublclassOf, 
Person) => (FirstResponder, rdft:subClassOf, Person) 
Another Entailment rule of rdft:subClassOf 
(a, rdf type, A), (A, rdft:subClassOf, B) => (a, rdf typ e, B) 
(Jean-Pierre, rdftype, FirstResponder) , (FirstResponder, rdft:subClassOf, 
RolePlayer) => (Jean-Pierre, rdf typ e, RolePlayer) 
• rdft:subPropertyOf 
For (a, p, b) (p, rdft:subPropertyOf, q) => (a, q, b) 
(Jean-Pierre, recover, PDA deviee), (recover, rdft :subPropertyOf, made) => 
(Jean-Pierre, made, made, PDA deviee) 
• rdft:domain 
(p, rdft:domain, A), (a, p, x) => (a, rdf typ e, A) 
(containsRecover, rdft:domain, SuspectedDevice), (PDA deviee, 
containsRecover, Word_files) => (PDA deviee, rdf type, SuspectedDevice) 
• rdfrange 
,---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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(p, rdfs:range, A), (x, p, a)=> (a, rdftype, A) 
(preserve, rdfs:range, DigitalMedia), (Jean-Pierre, preserve, PDAdevice) => 
(PDA deviee, rdftype, DigitalMedia). The last two inferences deduced that 
the "PDA deviee" is of type "SuspectedDevice" and at the same time of type 
"Digita!Media". By referring to Table 7.2, the "SuspectedDevice" is a subclass 
of "Digita!Media ". This asserts the same information that can be inferred from 
the following entailment rule: 
(a, rdftype, A), (A, rdfs:subClassOf, B) =>(a, rdftype, B) 
(PDA deviee, rdftype, SuspectedDevice), (SuspectedDevice, 
rdfs:subclassOfDigitalMedia) => (PDA deviee, rdftype, DigitalMedia) 
owl:Functiona!Property, owl:InverseFunctiona!Property and owl:inverseof 
The complete examples of these three constructors in the acquisition phase 
are described in Section 5.4. 
7.5.3.2 Reasoning on the authentication phase 
The classes of the authentication phase are provided in the next table. This table 
pro vides all terms of type class that appear in domain and range of properties. 
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Table 7.4 Classes of the authentication phase 
Classes 
Cl) 
..::.:: Termname In Domain of In Range of Subclass of 
"' ~
"' 
-= 
~
~ E--
Primary_ hashing_ authenticate 
- FileDataObject 
Deviee Primary pnmary 
Secondary_ hashing_ authenticate 
- FileDataObject 
Deviee Secondary secondary 
authenticate 
-
Authenticator 
Primary, 
RolePlayer -
s authenticate 
0 ;:::s -Cl) 
0 ~ Secondary ...... ...... (.) 
ro (!) 
(.) ~ 
...... u ...... 0 (!) (!) 
checksum ~ ...... ro 
...... 
.... 
-
;:::s (!) 
-< 0 Imagefile_ pnmary, hashing_ (!) 
FileHash tJ 
Primary chckalgorithm _ pnmary 
Primary 
checksum Hashing_ 
-
Imagefile_ Secondary, 
FileHash 
Secondary chckalgorithm _ 
Secondary Secondary 
The propertie of the authentication phase are provided in the next table. This table 
shows the domain, range, and sub-property of all properties term used by each 
forensic task (i.e., generate checksum) in the authentication phase. 
,.---------------- ----------- ----------------
- --------------------------
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Table 7.5 Properties of the authentication phase 
Properties 
Sub-
QJ ~ Termname Domain Range 
"' ~ "' property of 
..d ~
Po. E-; 
authentieate Primary_ 
- Authenticator made 
Primary Deviee 
authentieate Seeondary_ 
- Authentieator made 
Seeondary Deviee 
hashing_ Primary_ Imagefile_ 
hasHash 
Primary Deviee Primary 
s hashing_ Seeondary_ Imagefile_ hasHash p ;::::! U) Secondary Deviee Seeondary .~ ~ 
....... 
(.) 
c<:S il) 
(.) 
...0 
·- u ....... p 
il) eheeksum Imagefile_ il) 
...0 ....... - String hasValue c<:S ....... 
.... ;::::! il) Primary Primary ~ p il) 
0 
eheeksum 
-
Imagefile_ 
String hasValue 
Secondary seeondary 
ehekalgorithm _ Imagefile_ 
String hasAlgorithm 
Primary Primary 
chckalgori thm _ Imagefile_ 
String · hasAlgorithm 
Seeondary Seeondary 
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Referring to the Table 2.3 , next points provide sorne examples to illustrate how the 
reasoning module of the CF-CoC works with the classes and properties of the 
authentication phase. 
For each RDFS constructor, an example is provided, to illustrate how its/their 
entailment rule(s) can be applied using the terms schema ofT-Box (i.e. , classes and 
properties) and A-Box (i.e., instances). 
• rdfs:subClassOf 
For (A, rdfs:subClassOf, B),(B, rdfs:subclassOf, C) => (A, rdfs:subC!assOf, 
C) 
(ImagefileSecondary, rdfs:subC!assof, FileHash), (FileHash, rdfs:subclass, 
FileDataObject) => (ImagfileSecondary, rdfs:subC!assOf, FileDataObject) 
Another Entailment rule of rdfs:subC!assOf 
(a, rdftype, A), (A, rdfs:subC!assOf, B) => (a, rdftype, B) 
(HDL _image.img, rdf type, lmagefileSecondary), (ImagefileSecondary, 
rdfs:subC!assOf, FileHash) => (HDL_image.img, rdftype, FileHash) 
• rdfs:subPropertyOf 
For (a, p, b), (p, rdfs:subPropertyOf, q) => (a,q,b) 
(P ersonal_ Digital_ Assistant, 
(hashingPrimary, 
hashingPrimary, PDA_image.img), 
rdfs:subPropertyOf, hasValue) => 
(P ersonal_ Digi tai_ Assistant, has Value, PD A_ image. img) 
--------- -----------
261 
• rdfs:domain 
(p, rdfs:domain, A), (a, p, x)=> (a, rdftype, A) 
( checksumPrimary, rdfs:domain, ImagefilePrimary), (PDA _ image.img, 
checksumPrimary,MD5) => (PDA_image.img, rdftype, ImagefilePrimary) 
• rdfs: range 
(p, rdfs:range, A), (x, p, a)=> (a, rdftype, A) 
(hashingSecondary, rdfs:range, ImagefileSecondary), (Hard_ drive _laptop, 
hashingSecondary, HD L _ image.img) => (HD L _ image. img, rdf type, 
ImagefileS econdary) 
• owl:FunctionalProperty 
In our case study, there is one triple published to describe the hashing task of 
the laptop' hard drive: 
hashingSecondary (hard_ drive _laptop, HDL _image.img) 
Let us assume that there was another triple describing the hashing task of the 
deviee using an instance called "Laptop _Hard _image. img" 
hashingSecondary (hard_ drive _laptop, Laptop _Hard _ image.img) 
If a property p is tagged as a FunctionalProperty then all x, y, and z: p (x, y) 
and p (x, z) => y=z 
So if we have the following two triples and hashingSecondary is tagged as 
FunctionalProperty: 
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hashingSecondary (hard_ drive _laptop, HDL _ image.img) and 
hashingSecondary (hard_ drive _laptop, Laptop _Hard _image.img) => 
Hard_ image.img = Laptop _Hard _image.img 
Thus, when the judge consumes one of them, the system manipulates and 
pro vides all related resources of both "HDL _image. img" and 
"Laptop _Hard _image. img ". Both will be complementary information to 
each others. This means that both instances are the same, and considered as 
they are related together using the "sameAs" property. 
• owl:sameAs 
In the Figure 7.56, there was a mappmg usmg the "sameAs" between 
"LaptopHD" (i.e., used by Jean-Pierre) in the acquisition phase and the 
"Hard_drive_laptop" (i.e., used by Peter in the authentication phase). As 
mentioned, the relation between these two instances made that the resources 
related to both instances are complementary information to each others. 
The system provides to the judge that the "LaptopHD" is the backup of 
"PDA deviee", and the "LaptopHD" is the same instance of 
"Hard_ drive _laptop", which has been hashed to generate the 
"HDL _image. img". 
• owl:JnverseFuntiona!Property 
In our case study, there is one triple published to describe the value of the 
checksum generating from primary image "PDA_image.img": 
checksumPrimary (PDA _image.img, OX49E9DEC3) 
Let us assume that there was another triple describing the checksum, and a 
new instance is used to describe the PDA image called: "IMG-Personal 
assistant": 
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checksumPrimary (IMG-Personal assistant, OX49E9DEC3) 
If a property p is tagged as InverseFunctionalProperty then ali x, y . and z: 
p(y,x) and p(z,x) => y=z 
So, if we have the following two triples and "checksumPrimary" is tagged as 
InverseFunctionalProperty: 
checksumPrimary (PDA_image.img, OX49E9DEC3) and checksumPrimary 
(IMG-Personal assistant, OX49E9DEC3) => PDA_image.img = !MG-
Persona! assistant. 
7.5.3.3 Reasoning on the analysis phase 
As same foots tep of the two last sections, next table shows the classes of the analysis 
phase and provides the domain, range, and subclass of the forensic analyze task (see 
table 7.6). The "SecondaryDevice" is a class term defined by Peter in the generate 
checksum task of the authentication phase, and it is reused by Robert in the reasoning 
task of the analysis phase. It is mentioned in Table 7.6 because it is used as a domain 
and range of analysis phase properties. 
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Table 7.6 Classes of the analysis phase 
Classes 
Ter rn In Domain 
<)) 
..!:( In Range of Subclass of 
"' ~
"' of 
..= 
~ na me 
~ E--
Role 
Analyzer analyze --
player 
Forensic 
-
analyzedBy Software -
tool 
U) Q) 
ëii N hidden ;>.., ;>.., 
éd éd -
~ ~ con tains, 
Hidden hidden 
- -
cori tains HardDiskPartition 
partition us mg, 
hidden 
-
SlZe 
Q) 8 Q) U) analyzedBy, ~ Cil ;:::l 
...... ~ U) 
8 o. ~ Secondary dataS ize, 1=1 () 0 Q) 
~ 0 ~ analyze FileDataübject 
'"0 
-~ u Deviee totalSize, 
Q) - ~ Q) t:: ...... ...... 1=1 e<:l con tains 0 Q) ... o. Q) 
8 -ti 1=1 ;:::l Q) >-< 
..:t: d 
The properties of the analysis phase are provided in the next table. This table shows 
the domain, range, and sub-property of all property terms in the analysis phase. 
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Table 7.7 Properties ofthe analysis phase 
Properties 
Sub-
~ ~ Term name Domain Range 
"' ~ "' property of 
..= 
~
~ ~ 
analyze Analyzer Seeondary _deviee made 
analyzedBy 
Seeondary_ 
ForensieTool made 
Deviee 
dataS ize 
Seeondary_ 
In te ger eontentSize 
Deviee 
totalSize 
Seeondary_ 
In te ger eontentSize 
Deviee 
VJ Q.) 
...... N VJ 
:>.. :>.. Seeondary_ 
'"@ '"@ 
eon tains HiddenPartition hasPart ~ ~ Deviee 
hidden Hidden 
- - InforrnationElement hasPart 
Con tains Partition 
hidden Hidden 
- - Software made 
Using Partition 
Hidden 
hiddenSize - In te ger eontentSize 
Partition 
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• rdfs:subClassOf 
For (A, rdfs:subClassOf, B), (B, rdfs:subclassOf, C) => (A, rdfs:subClassOf, 
C) 
(Analyzer, rdfs:subClassOf, RolePlayer), (RolePlayer, rdfs:subClassOf, 
Person) => (Analyzer, rdfs:subClassOf, Person) 
Another Entailment rule of rdfs:subClassOf 
(a, rdftype, A), (A, rdfs:subClassOf, B) => (a, rdf typ e, B) 
(Encase, rdf typ e, ForensicTool), (ForensicTool, rdfs:subClassOf, 
Software) => (Encase, rdftype, Software) 
• rdfs:subPropertyOf 
For (a, p, b) (p, rdfs:subPropertyOf, q) => (a, q, b) 
(Hard_drive_laptop, contains, hidden part) (contains, 
rdfs :subPropertyOf, hasPart) => (Hard_drive_laptop, hasPart, hidden 
part) 
• rdfs:domain 
(p, rdfs:domain , A), (a, p, x) => (a, rdf type, A) 
(hiddenContains, rdfs:domain, HiddenPartition), (hidden part, 
hiddenContains, Excel Files) => (hiddenContains, rdftype, HiddenPartition) 
• rdfs: range 
(p, rdfs:range, A), (x, p, a) => (a, rdftype, A) 
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(analyzedBy, rdfs:range, ForensicTool), (Hard_drive_laptop, analyzedBy. 
Encase) => (Encase, rdftype, ForensicTool) 
• owl:Functiona!Property 
If a property p is tagged as a "Functiona!Property" then all x, y, and z: p (x, 
y) and p (x, z) => y=z 
The "analyze" property m the analysis phase IS tagged as 
"Funtiona!Property ", because it is assumed that the role player Robert of the 
analysis phase, wants to assert that there is only one media to investigate 
during his phase, and this media is the "Hard_drive_laptop". 
The triple that describe the analyze task IS (Robert, analyze, 
Hard_ drive _laptop ). If there exist another resource describing the laptop hard 
drive, for example, "HDL" that stands for hard drive laptop, in a triple 
(Robert, analyze, HDL) => Hard_drive_laptop = HDL, and both are referring 
to the same concept. 
• owl:InverseFunctiona!Property 
there is no property term defined by "Robert'' in the analysis phase that is 
tagged as an "JnverseFunctiona!Property ". 
7.5.4 Querying the e-CoC of Kruse model case study 
Using this pattern, a judge can query the three phases of the Kruse model. This 
module has an interface to use the SP ARQL code and query the triples from the RDF 
store. The main difference between this pattern and the crawling one is that, in this 
pattern, judge is not aware about the published information. He can exploit this 
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pattern for first time consumption in order to retrieve and discover as much as he can 
from the published information (i .e., all instances are listed in each slot within the 
triple). However, in the crawling pattern, judge knows sorne information about the 
published resources, and he can crawl using one of these resources. Figure 7.66 
shows an example of the querying pattern. 
Foreusic Information Cousumption 
1 Subject 1 Predicate 1 Object 
1 
1 Hard_drive_laptop ::1 1 J· Ali Predicate (default) . .:J 1 1 · Ali Objects (defaull) · .:J 
1 1 
Query Now 1 
Hard_ drive _laptop hashingSecoudary HDL_image. img 
Hard_ drive _laptop coutaius Hidden Part 
Hard_drive_laptop analyzedBy Encase 
Hard_drive_laptop dataS ize 100 Mega 
Hard_ drive _laptop tota!Size 105 ::vlega 
Figure 7.66 Screen for querying using "Hard_ drive _laptop" 
This interface avoids the judge to write down the SPARQL code to query the RDF 
forensic triples. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how the CF-CoC system can be applied on a complete 
forensic process. The implemented module in this chapter answered and proved the 
research hypotheses. 
It started with Section 7.2, the PKI module (i.e., sixth module in the framework). It 
depicts how the digital certificates are issued and used by the role players and neutral 
side, to consume the represented resources of LD on a clo ed scale, and this part 
proved the fourth hypothesis: 
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"PKI can be applied to the Linked Data (LD) to securely publish and consume the 
data between role players and judges, as well as transform the open data to closed 
data". 
In Section 7.3, after role players are identified through their client certificates, they 
started to use the system to represent and convert their tangible CoCs into electronic 
data, and this is achieved through the modules of defining and publishing resources, 
and RDF triples (i.e., first, second, and third module in the framework) . These 
modules were used to build interlinked e-CoCs using RDF models that can be used 
by people and machines and integrate the AFF4 results (see Section 7.3 .3.2) within 
the published e-Co Cs. This section proved the first hypothesis: 
"The semantic web can be a fertile land to create interlinked e-Co Cs, which are 
readable and consumable by people and machines, and the forensic information 
resulting from a forensic tool can be interoperable with these interlinked Co Cs ". 
After creating the trustworthiness among role players and judge using the PKI 
module, Section 7.4 explained how the role players started to annotate their forensic 
information using different provenance vocabularies imported from the semantic web 
(i.e. , the fourth module in the framework). This module depicted how the role players 
use such metadata to foster and add supplementary provenance information about the 
origin of the published resources . This proved the second hypothesis: 
"Provenance metadata of the semantic web can be useful to answer the questions 
about the origin of the CoC data, and then foster trustworthiness among role 
players and judges ". 
Finally, Section 7.5 discussed how the judge or any role player used different 
consumption patterns of the LD to consume the forensic resources, in order to 
understand different forensic resources and consume all their instances to take the 
proper decision (i.e. , fifth module in the framework) . Those consumption patterns 
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helped the judge to dereference, query, browse, crawl, and infer the forensic 
resources, and foster the subject matter. This proved the third hypothesis: 
"Representing the CoC resources using the linked data princip/es can provide a 
descriptive e-CoC and then improve the subj ect matter and the understanding of 
the digital evidence". 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Introduction 
This dissertation discussed the era of using the Linked Data Principles (LDP) to 
represent information in a linked data manner for the web of data. It depicted how 
such principles are used together with the semantic web vocabularies to represent 
different resources. This has been elaborated through on an example imported from 
the forensic domain to represent a Chain of Custody (CaC) generated from each 
forensic phase. Other situations can be imported from other domains, such as 
insurance, health care, government, law enforcement, etc. By applying the LDP to the 
forensic domain, a new framework solution related to the field of e-Justice has been 
provided. 
Generally, this dissertation depicted a novel framework that will be used by role 
players to represent tangible chains of custody resulting from their cyber 
investigation. Role players use this framework to represent and publish forensic 
resources in arder to be consumed by judges in a court of law. This work explained in 
detail alllayers of the framework that are based on the technology stack of the linked 
data. This technology stack (RDF, HTTP, and URI) is used to represent and publish 
different resources in a structured way on the web. The role players start their 
representation process by defining new proprietary/custom terms describing the 
forensic information of their tangible chain of custody. This task is performed using 
lightweight ontologies through RDFS constructors and sorne primitives from OWL. 
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Role players may also add different provenance metadata imported from semantic 
web vocabularies to describe the origin of forensic information and then strengthen 
the trustworthiness with judges. All represented resources are then published in RDF 
format upon URI resolution in order to be shared on a closed scale between role 
players and judges, through the public-key infrastructure approach. The latter is a 
research called the Linked Closed Data (LCD), the counterpart to Linked Open Data. 
Linked Closed Data share ail the advantages of LOD, but come with consumption 
restrictions. 
8.2 Organization and scopes 
This dissertation was organized according to four mam topics. These topics are 
manipulated in terms of challenges, objectives, proposed hypotheses, related 
research, and lastly, used methods and approaches. Finally, the hypotheses are proven 
by applying our novel framework to a complete forensic process. 
The first topic dealt with the benefits oftransforming the tangible CoC, describing the 
digital investigation to accornmodate digital technologies. These benefits arise 
because such documents containing the information about digital evidence need also 
to be interoperable with the information generated from forensic investigation tools. 
Therefore, the proposai was that the tangible documents need to undergo a radical 
transformation from paper documents to electronic data, readable by humans and 
consumable by computers. 
The dissertation proposed that the semantic web may provide fru itful insight for 
meeting this objective. This is proven first by illustrating the aspects used to create 
linked data on the web, how the LDP are used to create open linked data using 
lightweight ontologies (i.e., RDFS and sorne constructors from OWL), how 
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publishers can define their own proprietary terms using RDFS and how reasoning can 
be performed over the published resources. Secondly, it discussed all published 
works from the literature related to forensic representation and formats . 
After that, the research methodology chapter states different advantages of using the 
LDP to transform the tangible CoC to e-CoC. 
The second topic concerned fostering trustworthiness among role players and judges. 
This topic dealt with the fact that providing forensic resources should be 
accompanied and annotated by supplementary information describing the origin of 
this information. Therefore, the objective was to foster trust among judges and role 
players. 
The dissertation proposed that the provenance metadata of the semantic web can be 
useful to answer the questions relating to the origin of the CoC data. This is covered 
by describing the different type of provenance vocabularies on the semantic web. 
Then, in the research methodology, the Named Graph approach was used to annotate 
the forensic information with provenance metadata. 
The third topic tackled judges' awareness of digital evidence. This is a concern as 
judges do not usually have enough knowledge about the field of ICT. Therefore, the 
objective is to provide consumption patterns aiding judges to consume and 
understand the represented resources and foster the subject matter. 
The dissertation proposed that representing resources using LDP can provide a 
descriptive and deferenceable e-CoC. This is covered by describing all types of LD 
consumption patterns. Subsequently, in the research methodology, the dissertation 
discussed the fact that these patterns can be alleviated in a way to separate judges 
from technical details . 
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The last topic dealt with adapting the PKI approach to the LOD. We argue that the 
openness of cyber forensics data and metadata would not be convenient. Sorne access 
restrictions should be applied. The objective was to share forensic information on a 
closed scale and bend the LOD into LCD. 
This dissertation proposed that the PKI can be applied to publish and consume the 
data among role players and judge securely. This point is covered by first introducing 
the PKI and digital certificates, and then the purposes, protocols and types of digital 
certificates. In the research methodology, the dissertation then discussed the 
feasibility of applying the digital certificates to the LD. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, the dissertation provided a complete case study applied to the 
Kruse model to v ali date the CF -CoC system and prove the proposed hypothesis. In 
this chapter, we explained how the modules in the novel framework answered all 
research problems, as well as how the system can be used to represent, consume, and 
secure forensic resources of a complete forensic task. 
8.3 Contribution to the computer science dimension 
The proposed framework contributed to the computer science dimension with the 
following points: 
• Transforming tangible documents of a forensic process into electronic 
resources using linked data principles. 
• U ing provenance vocabularie of the emantic web to annotate the forensic 
resources. 
• Adapting consumption patterns of the linked data to be used by the actors of a 
forensic process. 
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• Adapting the PKI approach to transform open linked data into closed linked 
data. 
• Representing the forensic information in the form of an RDF model, allowing 
for the interoperability with the AFF4 format. 
8.4 Contribution to the cognitive dimension 
The proposed framework contributed to the cognitive dimension with the following 
points : 
• Using the web aspects of the semantic web for formai representation of 
forensic information: state of the art did not mention that the tangible CoC has 
been represented before using the LDP. This is the first work to represent the 
tangible CoC using web aspects. By transforming the tangible CoC into e-
CoC, we have a new formai representation of forensic information. 
• Improving the subject matter for the judge in a court of law: by using the 
consumption patterns of the LD, the judge was able to consume and 
understand the represented resources by dereferencing, querying, crawling 
and reasoning. The LDP provided said patterns. 
• This linked data structure allows role players to contribute as a collective in 
publishing their forensic information: this structure allows the role player to 
participate together in co-operation to construct a complete e-CoC for a 
forensic process. 
• Representation of conceptual models for forensic processes and tasks using 
UML. 
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8.5 Limitations and future work 
In terms of limitations, while we have tested our framework on the Kruse model, we 
aim to test it on other forensic models in the future. We are also in the process of 
collaborating with the cyber justice lab of the Université de Montréal (UDEM).38 The 
lab's main objective is to integrate the field of ICT within the judicial system. Our 
solution framework helps to achieve that goal, as it is an example ofusing technology 
to serve the judicial system. 
On the other hand, the implemented CF-CoC system used different technologies from 
different disciplines. The system is not limited to such technologies. However, it can 
be enhanced and upgraded according to the recent technologies provided in each 
discipline. The following sub-sections discuss different perspectives for said 
upgrades. 
The ability of the system to infer more implicit rules can be enriched by the injection 
of more entailment rule set provided by OWL DL and OWL Full. These rules will 
help the consumers of the system to understand, publish and take the proper decisions 
about the crime case. 
8.5.1 Framework modules 
This framework assumed that the role players (i .e. , publishers) already have enough 
capabilities to understand the web semantic technologies. However, this will not be 
always the case. We cannot expect the user to have the technical skills to understand 
such technologies (ontology, RDF, SPARQL, etc.), and therefore, be able to publi h 
38 http://www.cyberjustice.ca/ 
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the CoC data. It is necessary then to present an "intelligent" module that can guide 
the role players through the publication process. Following the model of an intelligent 
tutoring system, we can imagine having sub-modules within this module: one for the 
tutor that possesses the knowledge about teaching and tactics; one for the domain that 
possesses the knowledge about lightweight ontology; and one for students (i.e. , role 
players) that reflects how much the student knows about the domain (Salgueiro et al., 
2005). 
This "intelligent" module will not only help the producers to publish their forensic 
resources. It will also guide the consumer (i.e., judge) to consume said resources 
through different online tutoring strategies (Frasson et al., 1996; Murray, 1999; 
Wenger, 2014). The judge may also misunderstand the contents of certain 
vocabularies in the court of law. An intelligent module based on linked education 
may help the judge to confirm and improve his comprehension about any forensic 
resources. 
8.5.2 Semantic vocabularies 
The semantic web is rich with different well-defined vocabularies. The current 
system does not encompass all these vocabularies. Said vocabularies can be added to 
support the creation of new proprietary terms and can also be added to support the 
level of provenance vocabularies (i.e. , all provenance vocabularies can be found in 
(Hartig et Zhao, 2012)). 
8.5.3 Creating ontologies for cyber forensics 
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Creating a cornmon set of ontologies for cyber forensics will be very useful to publish 
different forensic resources using the lightweight ontology. This set will contain 
different terms to represent any information presented in the tangible CoC 
documents. Relating most closely to this section is the work mentioned in Section 
2.2.1.5 (Brinson et al., 2006). 
8.5.4 Machine consumption 
Computer machines can be used to consume and leam from the represented 
information. This should be consumed through serializing down the RDF model. The 
usage of the machine in this framework is limited to extracting implicit information 
from explicit RDF triples stored in the RDF store, using sorne stored entailment-
based rules. The system currently implemented is able to serialize down any RDF 
model to any serialized language (e.g., Turtle, RDF/XML, N3, etc.). In the future, this 
option allows for the exploitation of serialized code to ex tract common or uncornmon 
patterns. 
8.5.5 Linked Education 
The area of Linked Education is booming nowadays. For educational purposes, it is 
provided according to the standard of the web of data and linked data. This new area 
has evolved thanks to the RDF standard for sharing data on the web. The CF-CoC is 
already based on this standard, which will integrate different educational resources 
and promote the interoperability between CF-CoC and said resources39. 
39 https:lll inkededucation. wordpres .corn/ 
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